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 1 Introduction 
The European Union, decarbonisation, 
and foreign policy 
Introduction 
The European Union (EU) and the world community are embarking on a fundamental 
societal and economic transition away from fossil fuels and towards full decarbonisation 
(the ‘climate transition’). Under the 2015 Paris Agreement, governments agreed to phase 
out emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) over the coming decades in 
order to hold global temperature rise to well below 2°C and to pursue eforts to limit it 
to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (Klein et al. 2017). To this end, a growing number of 
countries have committed to phasing out GHG emissions by 2050 or 2060, including the 
EU, the United States, China, and others (see https://eciu.net/netzerotracker, last vis-
ited on 24 June 2021). The EU has been at the forefront of climate action by international 
comparison and has generally been considered an international leader on climate change 
(Oberthür and Dupont 2021). To make the EU sustainable and achieve climate neutrality 
by 2050, the European Commission launched the European Green Deal in 2019 (Euro-
pean Commission 2019). In this context, the EU has committed to reducing its GHG 
emissions by 55 percent by 2030 and to achieving climate neutrality (i.e., net zero GHG 
emissions) by 2050. At the time of writing, further implementing legislation to this end is 
forthcoming (see the next section). 
Transcending climate policy as such, the challenge of the climate transition implies 
far-reaching adaptations of a wide range of other policies, including foreign policy and 
external relations.1 The need for further alignment of other sectoral policies with climate 
policy arises from the crosscutting nature of the climate challenge. Although climate 
policy integration – the integration of climate policy objectives into other policies – has 
signifcantly advanced in the EU (Dupont 2016), the need for further progress has been 
acknowledged and highlighted in the European Green Deal that aims to ensure other EU 
policies support the climate transition. Part of the agenda of climate policy integration 
concerns EU external policies that need to be further developed so as to build sustainable, 
fruitful international partnerships under decarbonisation and in support of the climate 
transition (European Commission 2019: esp. 15–22). 
Research on the integration of climate policy into EU foreign policy at large is at an 
early stage. As further discussed below, several literatures possess relevance for the topic 
but have so far at best made frst attempts to explore the issues at a general level. Beyond 
the specialised literature on EU climate diplomacy and foreign climate policy (e.g., Adelle 
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et al. 2018), studies on general EU foreign policy have started to acknowledge the princi-
pal importance of the climate transition, in particular with respect to EU foreign energy 
policy and bilateral relations with selected partner countries such as Russia (Knodt et al. 
2017; Godzimirski 2019). Research has also begun to explore the geopolitical implica-
tions of the global climate transition for the international distribution of power and inter-
ests and international interdependence (e.g., Scholten 2018; IRENA 2019; Van de Graaf 
and Sovacool 2020). And literature on environmental and climate security has highlighted 
the signifcance of both climate change and climate policy for security policy (Ide et al. 
2021; Swatuk et al. 2021). However, these literatures have so far stayed at a rather general 
level, not exploring in much detail the wide-ranging implications of the European and 
global climate transition for EU external relations. 
Against this background, this book aims to enhance our understanding of the concrete 
implications of decarbonisation for EU external relations and how these can be managed 
and reshaped. To this end, we analyse bilateral relations between the EU and its member 
states, on one side, and a selection of ‘hard cases’, namely fossil fuel exporting countries, 
on the other, with a twofold focus. First, we aim to identify in more detail the signif-
cant challenges that arise from the decarbonisation process in the specifc context of the 
partner countries. Second, we endeavour to delineate the room and the opportunities for 
developing bilateral relations beyond fossil fuels under the particularly challenging condi-
tions of the selected partner countries in order to (1) help advance the climate transition, 
and (2) foster generally fruitful bilateral relations. We therefore defne the task of foreign 
relations under decarbonisation as twofold, namely as (1) facilitating the phase-out of fos-
sil fuels and GHG emissions and (2) transitioning towards renewed sustainable external 
relations that are based on other sectors, including low-carbon ones, while preventing 
potentially destabilising efects of the transition. 
This introductory chapter sets the scene for the overall volume in four steps. The next 
section frst provides some further background on EU climate policy and external rela-
tions in the context of the global decarbonisation challenge. Subsequently, we discuss 
how our efort relates to and advances four related and evolving literatures on EU climate 
policy, EU foreign policy and external relations, environment/climate and security, and 
the geopolitics of energy. This is followed by an introduction of our analytical approach 
and methodology, including the criteria for the selection of the six case studies that lie 
at the core of this study. The fnal section provides a short overview of the remainder of 
the volume. 
Background: decarbonisation, EU climate policy, and EU 
external relations 
The decarbonisation challenge 
In 2015, the international community adopted the Paris Agreement and set the course 
for global decarbonisation before the end of the century. On the basis of its aforemen-
tioned temperature goal of 2/1.5°C, the Paris Agreement establishes in its Article 4.1 
the collective target of achieving net-zero GHG emissions in the second half of this cen-
tury. Consequently, many countries have moved to cut and phase out GHG emissions. 
Crucial to these eforts is the transition away from fossil fuels to a decarbonised energy 
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supply, but decarbonisation is also a much broader process that will require, for example, 
changes in land use, greater resource efciency, and the preservation of carbon sinks, 
such as forests and oceans (IPCC 2014, 2018). Given the long-term nature of the climate 
transition, durable commitment and long-term planning for realising decarbonisation are 
required. Consequently, the Paris Agreement also foresees that its parties develop long-
term strategies to this efect (Art. 4.19). These strategies complement medium-term na-
tional climate action plans called ‘nationally determined contributions’ (NDCs) towards 
the collective temperature and decarbonisation goals (on the Paris Agreement, see Doelle 
2016; Falkner 2016; Klein et al. 2017). 
Realising the global decarbonisation goal implies a twofold fundamental change in 
the way economies and societies work. First, it entails the decline and destabilisation of 
carbon-intensive development models based on the production and burning of fossil fuels 
and overexploitation of natural resources. Second, it requires the emergence of more 
sustainable forms of energy production and resource use. As a ‘disruptive, contested, and 
non-linear’ process (Geels et al. 2017), we may expect it to have both adverse and positive 
efects on countries, with the particular challenges and opportunities they face varying 
considerably between them. The scale of these challenges is likely to be linked to existing 
economic dependence on fossil fuels and other high-carbon assets, while the potential to 
reap benefts and take advantage of new opportunities arising from decarbonisation will 
depend on the fexibility and capacity of the economy and society to shift and diversify. 
The climate transition constitutes a crosscutting challenge for countries’ economies 
and societies. It cuts across many key sectoral systems, including transport, buildings, 
power, industry, agriculture, forestry, fnance, and so on – constituted of ensembles of 
actors, technologies, infrastructures, economic structures, institutions, and ideas that 
produce resistance to change (Geels and Schot 2010). As a result, the climate transition 
requires countries to implement and manage deep, structural changes to their economies 
and societies transforming these key sectoral systems and overcoming their inherent re-
sistance to change to efectively eliminate GHG emissions. The strength of governance 
and institutions, as well as overall economic and political stability, are therefore likely to 
be important success factors in driving deep decarbonisation processes. Conversely, con-
fict and instability can signifcantly undermine eforts to decarbonise (IPCC 2014, 2018). 
EU climate policy towards decarbonisation 
EU climate policy has developed signifcantly especially since the 2000s and has moved 
towards the aim of climate neutrality by 2050. Its roots go back at least to the early 1990s 
when the frst legislative and policy action was taken in the context of the 1992 United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). EU climate policy de-
velopment accelerated in the 2000s, when the EU began to implement its GHG emission 
reduction commitment under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (see Table 1.1) and established the 
EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). Since then, the development of EU climate policy 
has advanced further and has led to a rich acquis of climate legislation addressing all rel-
evant sectors (including buildings, transport, industry, power, land use, etc.) and using 
a diversifed array of regulatory, market-based, and procedural policy instruments. In 
this process, the EU has also stepwise strengthened its decadal GHG emission reduction 
objectives, as depicted in Table 1.1 (on the development of EU climate policy, see Jordan 
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et al. 2010; Oberthür and Pallemaerts 2010; Skjærseth et al. 2016; Delbeke and Vis 2019; 
Kulovesi and Oberthür 2020). 
In the late 2010s, the EU has frmly moved towards aiming for climate neutrality and, 
hence, full decarbonisation by 2050. Since 2019, the development of EU climate policy 
has proceeded under the umbrella of the European Commission’s European Green Deal 
(European Commission 2019). This has included the strengthening of GHG emission 
reduction targets for 2030 and 2050 (see Table 1.1). Based on the Commission’s strate-
gic long-term vision and pathway to a climate-neutral economy (European Commission 
2018), the European Council approved the 2050 climate neutrality target in December 
2019, which formed the EU’s long-term strategy submitted to the UNFCCC in March 
2020 (European Union 2020). Both the 2050 climate neutrality target and the upgraded 
2030 GHG emission reduction target of 55 percent are enshrined in the European Cli-
mate Law agreed by the Council of the EU and the European Parliament in April 2021. 
The evidence available so far suggests that the Covid-19 pandemic and especially the Next 
Generation EU Fund agreed in response may enhance the implementation of the Euro-
pean Green Deal and the climate targets (Dupont et al. 2020). Eventually, the climate 
neutrality target implies that EU consumption and imports of fossil fuels are set to decline 
steeply to reach residual levels by 2050. 
The EU has also established overall headline targets for the share of renewable energy 
in fnal energy consumption and for the improvement of energy efciency for 2020 (both 
20 percent) and for 2030 (32 percent for renewable energy and 32.5 percent for energy 
efciency). These targets for 2030 are expected to be further strengthened in the ongoing 
implementation of the upgraded GHG emission reduction target of at least 55 percent 
for 2030. The European Commission is scheduled to table related legislative proposals to 
this efect in mid-2021. Both energy efciency improvements and the share of renewable 
energy will also have to be enhanced further beyond 2030 in order to achieve net zero 
emissions in 2050 (EEA 2020). 
As mentioned above, the European Green Deal also entails an upgrading of ‘climate 
policy integration’, that is, the integration of climate policy objectives into other sectoral 
policies ranging from trade over industrial to agricultural and foreign policies (see Adelle 
and Russel 2013; Dupont 2016). The Green Deal aims at a new quality of climate policy 
integration, namely that no other EU policies do signifcant harm to the climate and sus-
tainability transition pursued, but that all other EU policies support, and synergise with, 
this transition. In this context, it also acknowledges the social dimension of the climate 
transition through the launching of a Just Transition Mechanism designed to assist regions 
and sectors particularly dependent on fossil fuels and carbon-intensive industry – and it 
highlights EU external relations as an integral part of the European Green Deal, as dis-
cussed next (European Commission 2019). 
The decarbonisation challenge for EU external relations 
EU climate policy has a strong external and international dimension. The EU possesses a 
strong track record of international leadership on climate change, including a longstand-
ing climate diplomacy strategy. Ever since the negotiations of the 1992 UNFCCC, the 
EU has been the most ambitious major economy in international climate politics and has 
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aspired to act as an international leader. Over the years, it has developed and adapted its 
international strategy to become a ‘leadiator’ (leader cum mediator; see Bäckstrand and 
Elgström 2013). As such, it has been an important driving force behind the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement, including its further development post-2015. In 
general, the EU has advanced its domestic climate policy objectives in tandem with in-
ternational climate policy developments (Oberthür and Dupont 2021; see also Table 1.1).
Part of the development of the EU international leadership strategy has been an enhanced 
involvement of foreign services. For example, the EU established a Green Diplomacy 
Network in the early 2000s to coordinate national and EU foreign services in support of 
EU international climate policy. Since 2010, this has also involved the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) established under the Lisbon Treaty. In 2008, the Commission 
published a climate diplomacy strategy, to achieve a global climate agreement, support 
the implementation of climate policies in partner countries, and address the security risks 
arising from climate change in different regions around the world (European Commission 
2008). Since 2015, the foreign/general affairs Council has furthermore elaborated and 
regularly updated a climate diplomacy action plan. And in 2019, a climate ambassador was 
appointed to the EEAS (Schunz 2019; Oberthür and Dupont 2021).
The European Green Deal accordingly contains a strong external dimension. Specifi-
cally, it aims at further profiling the EU as a global leader on climate change. To this end, 
it highlights a number of pertinent priorities, including further work under the Paris 
Agreement, continued and strengthened engagement with international partners bilat-
erally and in regional contexts (with emphasis on Africa and the EU neighbourhood), a 
further greening of trade policy, and enhancing synergy with the international financial 
system. In this context, it also explicitly recognises the role of climate change and envi-
ronmental challenges as a significant threat multiplier and a source of instability (Euro-
pean Commission 2019: 20–22).
It remains to be seen whether the external dimension of the Green Deal will in reality go 
beyond a focus on how EU foreign policy can enhance ‘climate diplomacy’ to help advance 
the EU’s international climate objectives, which has been prevalent so far (e.g., Federal For-
eign Office 2019; for the United States, see Podesta and Stern 2020). The broader implica-
tions of climate change and climate policy for external relations and foreign policy at large 
have been slow to move into political focus. Hence, the 2019 mission letter to the incoming 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, 
Table 1.1  EU greenhouse gas emission reduction targets
Year adopted (related UN climate 
development)
GHG emission reduction target  
(base year 1990)
Status
1990 (1992 UNFCCC) Stabilisation by 2000 (CO2 only) Achieved
1997/1998 (1997 Kyoto Protocol) 8 percent by 2008–2012 Achieved
2007 (2009 Copenhagen COP 15) 20 percent by 2020 24 percent in 2019
2009 (2009 Copenhagen COP 15) 80–95 percent by 2050 Additional measures required
2014 (2015 Paris Agreement) 40 percent by 2030 Additional measures required
2019 (2021 Glasgow COP 26) Climate neutrality by 2050 Additional measures required
2020 (2021 Glasgow COP 26) 55 percent by 2030 Additional measures required
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only mentioned climate change in passing (von der Leyen 2019). Only more recently, an
acknowledgement of the geopolitical dimension of climate change and climate policy has
come about, including with respect to planned policy measures such as a Carbon Border
Adjustment Mechanism to level the playing feld for EU industry vis-à-vis international
competition arising from lower emission standards and the transition towards low-carbon
energy sources (including hydrogen, batteries, and more; Timmermans and Borrel 2021). 
However, the climate transition’s implications for foreign policy have yet to receive 
fuller consideration in the development of EU external relations. Many questions remain 
un- (or under-) explored. What are the repercussions of the commitment to deep decar-
bonisation by the EU (and the world community) for the general relations with various 
partner countries? How could and should these relations be further developed and re-
shaped under decarbonisation? How can synergies with the decarbonisation agenda be 
fostered and trade-ofs be minimised or managed? This book aims to make a contribution 
to bringing these questions into focus. 
EU climate policy and external relations: four literatures 
Aiming to advance our understanding of the repercussions of the European and global cli-
mate transition for EU external relations, this study in particular relates to and advances 
four literatures on the following: (1) EU climate diplomacy and foreign climate policy, (2) 
EU foreign policy and external energy relations, (3) environment/climate and security, 
and (4) the geopolitics of energy under decarbonisation. Here, we briefy discuss these 
literatures and how this study relates and contributes to them. Like the broader political 
debate addressed in the previous section, the academic debates about foreign policy and 
international relations in general and EU foreign policy and external relations in particu-
lar have only just begun to explore the implications of deep decarbonisation that are hence 
in much need of further investigation. 
First, literature on EU climate diplomacy and foreign climate policy and governance
has advanced over more than two decades. It has been embedded in the broader lit-
erature on general EU climate policy and governance that has explored a variety of
aspects such as policy innovation dynamics, particular policy instruments such as the
EU ETS, policy durability/robustness, the overall ambition and efectiveness, as well as
the climate policy integration into other policy felds (e.g., Skjærseth et al. 2016; Del-
beke and Vis 2019; Jordan and Moore 2020; Oberthür et al. 2021). The more specifc
literature on EU external climate policy has included analyses of the EU’s longstanding
and evolving international climate leadership; its multilateral, regional, and bilateral
climate diplomacy; and the external efects of its domestic climate policies (e.g., Wurzel
et al. 2017; Adelle et al. 2018; Oberthür and Dupont 2021; Petri and Biedenkopf 2021).
This literature has remained largely focused on the role and efectiveness of the EU in
afecting climate policy developments beyond its borders, be it at the multilateral level
or  transnational, regional, national, or subnational levels. This study complements and
broadens this focus. We go beyond a focus on climate policy developments and explore
the efects of the EU’s climate transition, in the context of the global drive towards
decarbonisation, on the general bilateral relations with other countries, especially fossil
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these circumstances. While staying focused on the climate transition, we also expand
our existing focus on climate diplomacy (and how it could support the transition) towards
general diplomacy and EU bilateral/external relations (and how these may be able to
cope with the efects of the transition). 
A second point of reference for our investigation is the literature on EU foreign policy 
and external relations in general and on EU external energy policy in particular. This 
literature has investigated the shapes, procedures, and conditions of EU foreign policy as 
a feld characterised by strong EU member-state competences (e.g., Keukeleire and Del-
reux 2014; Bickerton 2015; Jørgensen 2015). Discussions on EU external energy policy 
have focused on issues of the security of energy supply – with a major emphasis on Russia 
as a main supplier of not only gas but also oil and coal; dynamics of competition, coop-
eration, and coordination between the European Commission (as the main supranational 
actor) and EU member states; and the form and nature of EU external energy policy at 
the interface of market imperatives and a stronger strategic orientation (e.g., Goldthau 
and Sitter 2015; Herranz-Surrallés et al. 2020; Thaler 2020; Siddi and Kustova 2021). 
Considerable attention has been paid in this context to prominent and possibly paradig-
matic cases such as the construction of the North Stream 2 pipeline connecting Russia and 
Germany and, more generally, pipeline politics (including with respect to Ukraine and 
Azerbaijan; ibid.). The climate agenda has begun to enter relevant analyses as an issue that 
shapes actors’ interests and options, with few contributions exploring external coopera-
tion on related aspects such as energy efciency and renewable energy (e.g., Boute 2013; 
see also Casier 2015; Knodt et al. 2017; Godzimirski 2019). Overall, however, it remains 
fair to say that climate change and climate policy have not been at the core of this stream 
of literature, taken into account mainly as an intervening factor afecting to some extent 
the actual issue of interest. In contrast, this study puts climate change and climate policy 
centre stage in the investigation of EU external (energy) relations. 
Third, the scholarship on environment/climate and security is relevant for our en-
deavour. While not focused on the EU and EU policy, this literature has highlighted, 
and provided evidence, that environmental problems and climate change are important 
threat multipliers (Gemenne et al. 2014; Ide et al. 2021; Swain et al. 2021). Hence, it has 
found the impacts of climate change – such as drought, water scarcity, or climate-induced 
migration – to heighten the risk of violent confict emerging both within and across bor-
ders. In so doing, it has drawn attention to how heightened environmental stress and im-
pacts interact with other factors. For example, climate change is considered to exacerbate 
existing tensions or lead to the emergence of new security threats especially in fragile, 
confict-prone regions (ibid.; Rüttinger et al. 2015). More recently, this literature has 
expanded its scope beyond environmental impacts to also consider the efects of climate 
policy on the emergence of confict. This has prominently included a focus on ‘maladapta-
tion’ to the impacts of climate change resulting, for example, in the displacement of com-
munities from traditional lands as a result of climate policies (e.g., Gemenne et al. 2014; 
Swatuk et al. 2021). Our investigation shares with this literature the interest in (1) explor-
ing the efects of climate policy beyond its confnes, namely on broader external relations, 
and (2) paying attention to other, contextual factors (including state fragility and the 
security context), with which climate policy-induced changes will interact to shape both 
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While not focusing on security and confict, this study therefore also provides a rich set of 
case studies in which the interaction between climate policy and other key factors central 
in the investigation of climate and security is explored. 
Fourth, our analysis relates and contributes to the evolving literature on the geo-
politics of energy under conditions of the advancing climate transition. This literature
has generally begun to explore the effects of changes resulting from the global move
towards decarbonisation on the international distribution of power and interdepend-
ence against the backdrop of geographical factors and resource endowments (Stein-
metz 2012; Ivleva and Tänzler 2019). Important aspects that have received particular
and increasing attention in related sub-literatures concern the impact of growth of
renewable energy, the resulting decline of fossil fuels, and the emerging rise of hy-
drogen as an energy carrier (e.g., de Jong et al. 2017; Scholten 2018; IRENA 2019;
Van de Graaf and Sovacool 2020; Van de Graaf et al. 2020; Blondeel et al. 2021). The
focus of this strongly emerging literature has been on broad and general effects across
different groups and types of countries within their geographical contexts (including
the availability of natural resources), as raw materials and potentials for renewables
and hydrogen replace fossil fuel reserves and infrastructure as the key ‘currency’ of
energy geopolitics. The literature has so far operated at a fairly aggregate level, with
few country case studies on the more concrete implications. Our study adds such a
concrete country-level analysis of the likely implications of the climate transition
(taking into account geographical context and resource endowments) so as to identify
the challenges and opportunities arising for EU relations with the fossil fuel export-
ing countries concerned. Such a focus on bilateral relations also nuances the focus on
interdependencies prevailing in the geopolitics perspective. As such, our study may
serve as an input into efforts to concretise, nuance, and scale up geopolitical implica-
tions (in terms of power and interdependence; see also Chapter 8). 
Overall, our study builds on and contributes to the four aforementioned literatures. Its 
added value in particular arises from its rooting in concrete country case studies, its broad 
focus on general bilateral relations between the EU and the partner countries (beyond 
climate and energy proper) and on exploring the efects of decarbonisation on these rela-
tions, and the embedding of climate and energy policy and relations in their respective, 
variable context. As such, our analysis operates at the intersection of, and links, scholar-
ship on (EU) climate governance and (EU) foreign policy/external relations, while also 
drawing on and contributing to research on the environment/climate and security, and 
the geopolitics of energy. In the next section, we further specify our analytical approach 
and methodology to this end. 
Analytical approach and methodology 
Our analytical approach and methodology follow from the overall purpose of our inves-
tigation. As indicated above, we especially aim at understanding the main challenges and 
opportunities that arise from the European and global climate transition for the bilateral 
relations of the EU and its member states. This implies seeking answers to several key 
questions. How is decarbonisation going to afect the relationship between the EU and 
the partner country? What are the likely repercussions on the partner country given the
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existing adaptive capacity and the broader context? What toeholds and potentials exist in 
areas other than fossil fuels and high-carbon products for advancing the climate transition 
and fruitfully developing bilateral relations under decarbonisation? 
These questions also indicate the fundamentally exploratory nature of our study. Given 
the current state of research in the feld, the study does not aim at explanation or hypoth-
esis testing. Instead, we explore the aforementioned questions with respect to a cross-
section of fossil fuel exporting countries to generate frst insights which may subsequently 
be further detailed and investigated in additional studies. In the following, we discuss 
in more detail the rationale of our case selection as well as key features of our approach, 
which shape the structure of the case studies. 
Case selection: a cross-section of ‘hard’ cases 
To explore our overarching questions, we base our study on six carefully selected country 
case studies. As discussed above, such concrete case studies have so far been lacking to ex-
plore in further detail the impacts of decarbonisation on external relations. A case study 
approach allows to trace the varying circumstances in the countries under investigation 
as well as the difering starting points and potentials of EU bilateral relations with them. 
It also provides a basis for exploring the variation of conditions, contexts, and prospects 
across diferent countries. 
In the case study selection, we frst decided to focus on fossil fuel exporting countries. 
These countries are likely to face particular economic and political challenges arising 
from decarbonisation in the coming years and decades. Given their dependence on ex-
ports of high-carbon assets, and thus on other countries’ demand for such commodi-
ties, their economies face particular strain, government budgets are set to experience 
shortfalls, and planning processes become more uncertain (Van de Graaf and Verbruggen 
2015). Fossil fuel exporting countries also face the prospect of their substantial fossil 
fuel-related assets, including untapped hydrocarbon reserves and relevant infrastructure, 
becoming stranded by being prematurely devalued, written down or converted into lia-
bilities (Carbon Tracker Initiative 2015; Ivleva et al. 2017; Curtin et al. 2019). As a result, 
EU external relations with these countries are also likely to face particular challenges, 
especially where a signifcant share of fossil fuel exports has so far gone to the EU. We 
thus focus on ‘hard’ cases where challenges for EU external relations can be expected to 
be signifcant and opportunities, in turn, to be rather limited. 
We made the selection from a bigger sample of about 25 fossil fuel exporting countries 
derived from large country-level data sets showing economic dependence on fossil fuels 
and other high-carbon assets. Key indicators used were fossil fuel rents as a percentage 
of gross domestic product (GDP) and fossil fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise 
exports (World Bank 2021a, 2021b, 2021c and 2021d). 
Second, within the group of hard cases, we decided to focus on ‘second-tier’ countries. 
First of all, a substantial body of literature and analysis has already addressed the major 
fossil fuel exporters to the EU, and in particular Russia – even if a stronger focus on the 
implications of decarbonisation has remained lacking (e.g., Youngs 2014; Goldthau and 
Sitter 2015; Khrushcheva and Maltby 2016; Rossbach 2018). Furthermore, putting em-
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whether European and global decarbonisation constitutes a key challenge for EU external 
relations beyond the most prominent fossil fuel exporters within the EU neighbourhood 
and beyond, including – next to Russia – Norway and Algeria but also Saudi Arabia (see 
also Casier 2015). 
Given the exploratory nature of our investigation, we furthermore attempted to en-
sure that the country selection would capture a variety of country circumstances that 
may be expected to afect the challenges and opportunities for EU external relations. We 
therefore tried to ensure a wide geographical spread, to capture diferent regional dy-
namics, and took into account the countries’ trading relationship with the EU, especially 
regarding fossil fuels and other high-carbon assets. We also tried to ensure that fossil fuel 
exporters selected varied widely with respect to fragility and existing security threats, 
human development, strength of governance, climate change impacts, and development 
of sustainable energy sources. To this end, we considered a number of relevant indexes, 
including the Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace 2021), the Human Development Index 
(UNDP 2020), the Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank 2020a), the index 
of Climate Change Vulnerability (ND-GAIN 2020), and the Regulatory Indicators for 
Sustainable Energy (World Bank 2020b). 
On the basis of these factors and indicators, we made a selection of six fossil fuel export-
ing countries with varying vulnerability to deep decarbonisation: Azerbaijan, Canada, Co-
lombia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Qatar. Of these, Nigeria and Indonesia can be considered
highly vulnerable to the climate transition. Nigeria’s economy is highly dependent on gas
and particularly oil, since these two commodities account for almost all its export revenues
(with the EU as an important export market). The country also scores poorly on indexes
assessing state fragility, human development, strength of governance, and preparedness
for climate change impacts, indicating that it may be ill-equipped to respond to economic
shocks resulting from decarbonisation. Indonesia is a rapidly developing economy, experi-
encing huge growth in the demand for goods and energy. This growth is highly dependent
on the exploitation of its abundant hydrocarbons, primarily coal and oil, as well as other
high-carbon assets, such as palm oil. While trade in fossil fuels between Indonesia and the
EU has been negligible, the EU has become a major importer of Indonesian palm oil. In-
dexes on state fragility, human development, strength of governance, and preparedness for
climate change impacts, all suggest a medium to high level of concern. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Canada and Qatar can be deemed comparatively less 
vulnerable and well placed to actively adapt to and shape decarbonisation. As refected 
in the aforementioned indexes, Canada is a stable, highly developed democracy with a 
diversifed economy and a well-educated workforce. Although its oil industry remains 
economically important, Canada has an established climate policy architecture and re-
newable energy sources are at an advanced stage of development. Trade in fossil fuels only 
accounts for around 10 percent of trade with the EU, and it has well-established relations 
with the EU in many areas, including in domains that support decarbonisation. Qatar 
is a rich petrostate with stable governance structures and one of the highest per capita 
incomes in the world. Although it remains highly dependent on fossil fuels, it has used 
the wealth generated by its oil industry to develop its gas sector, which has longer-term 
prospects under decarbonisation, as well as other areas of its economy and its external 
relations. 
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The remaining two countries, Colombia and Azerbaijan, face both major risks and 
opportunities as the world decarbonises. In Colombia, revenues from coal and oil exports 
are economically signifcant, but the economy is increasingly diversifying into other areas 
and it has a strong climate policy architecture to steer growth into low-emission areas. 
However, the country is still emerging from decades of internal confict and lasting rec-
onciliation is likely to rely on political and economic stability over the coming decades. 
With the EU being a key market for Colombian coal at present, future bilateral relations 
may likely rely on developing trade in other sectors. Azerbaijan’s economy is also highly 
dependent on oil and gas, and among the sample countries chosen it is the country that is 
most dependent on trade in these commodities with the EU. Scores on human develop-
ment, governance, and climate change impacts indicate low or modest levels of concern, 
although resilience to external shocks may be limited. 
Overall, our selection represents a broad cross-section of fossil fuel exporting coun-
tries likely to be vulnerable to varying extents to falling demand for coal, oil, gas, and 
other high-carbon products resulting from the global climate transition. This selection 
should serve well the purpose of our study to explore the varying challenges and oppor-
tunities arising for EU external relations from decarbonisation. Given the study’s explor-
ative nature, the case selection did not aim at systematic variation on any ‘dependent’ or 
‘independent’ variables but aimed at variation in both sample countries’ vulnerability and 
their existing bilateral relations with the EU, with both to be further specifed in the case 
studies. Focusing on a key risk group under decarbonisation, the country selection re-
fects a broad cross-section in terms of state stability or fragility, economic development, 
geographical region, and the relative reliance on coal, oil, and gas. 
Paying attention to context and wider external relations 
To some extent already refected in the criteria of case selection discussed above, our 
analytical approach frmly rests on paying attention to relevant contextual conditions and 
broader external relations beyond fossil fuels and energy. On the one hand, the challenges 
and opportunities arising from decarbonisation for countries in general and fossil fuel 
exporters in particular depend on wider economic and political framework conditions, 
both internal and external. On the other hand, EU foreign policy can both help address 
the challenges and foster the opportunities so as to advance decarbonisation and advance 
bilateral relations under decarbonisation. Such potential of foreign policy exists beyond 
the area of climate and energy. We here detail our approach to capturing these two as-
pects further. 
As regards broader economic and political framework conditions, we suggest focusing 
on key aspects beyond sectors directly afected by reductions in demand for fossil fuels 
and other high-carbon goods. Climate action and decarbonisation processes are likely to 
have broader efects, including on trade relations, fnance and investment fows, ofcial 
development assistance, or eforts to promote confict prevention and peacebuilding. Such 
a broader perspective entails consideration of various other fragility and security risks that 
may intersect with the impacts of decarbonisation, including existing political tensions 
or security risks at national or regional levels (e.g., Kim and Conceição 2010), strength 
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fossil fuels: Esanov 2012; Collier 2012), and climate change impacts likely to act as a 
‘threat multiplier’ in the coming decades (Rüttinger et al. 2015) and potentially afecting 
important economic sectors (such as agricultural production) as well as food, water, and 
livelihood security in general. By appraising the development and stability of economy, 
society, and political governance, we aim to investigate how the carbon-dependent econ-
omy may intersect with other potentially destabilising factors. 
Furthermore, we consider the barriers to and potential for diversifying the economy. 
This encompasses an analysis of the country’s climate politics and policy, including its 
international engagement under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, the status of 
domestic climate policy, the political infuence of fossil fuel industries, and the level of 
public support for climate action. Beyond climate politics, the potential for successfully 
managing the climate transition will also depend on factors such as the current levels of 
development of low-carbon sectors (e.g., renewable energies), economic diversifcation, 
and strength of the educational system. Overall, we thereby capture key factors afecting 
partner countries’ exposure to global decarbonisation and their ability to successfully 
manage the climate transition. As such, understanding these challenges and potentials is 
also key for identifying the scope for fruitfully developing bilateral relations. 
Furthermore, gauging the prospects of EU external relations with the indicated coun-
tries under decarbonisation requires understanding the existing bilateral relations. One 
may be tempted to focus on bilateral relations in climate and energy policy, because these 
are most closely related to the climate transition. However, we consider that a broad 
approach to foreign policy seems most appropriate for our purpose of assessing the chal-
lenges and, importantly, the opportunities for developing EU external relations with the 
selected partner countries in general under decarbonisation. Consequently, we attempt 
to capture the main tenets of EU relations with and policy towards the partner countries 
concerned, with a particular focus on underexploited potentials. While not necessarily 
capturing external relations comprehensively, the following fve policy felds stand in fo-
cus in the country case studies as key areas of general foreign policy that are particularly 
implicated by deep decarbonisation: 
• Climate and energy policy lies at the centre of the climate transition and is hence di-
rectly implied. As trade in fossil fuels fades under decarbonisation, the promotion 
of climate friendly solutions (in the feld of energy production and beyond) and key 
climate policy instruments (such as the EU ETS) constitute possible alternatives for 
EU external relations. 
• Trade and investment are at the centre of the EU’s external relations and ‘market power’ 
(Damro 2014). Related agreements may be further recalibrated to strengthen sup-
port for global decarbonisation and the climate transition of partner countries in the 
context of the European Green Deal. As a key area of EU external relations, trade 
and investment can serve to develop alternatives to trade in fossil fuels and other 
high-carbon products. 
• Research and education constitute another prominent area of EU external relations 
with partner countries. They are key to much-needed eforts at developing a more 
knowledge-based economy and diversifying economies away from fossil fuels 

















EU, decarbonisation, and foreign policy 13 
cooperation programmes for higher education to the provision of fnancial and tech-
nical assistance for vocational education and training to supporting the development 
of skills required in low-carbon sectors. 
• Security policy is perhaps the highest politics core of any external relations. In an era 
of decarbonisation, it can specifcally help address destabilisation risks related to the 
climate transition, which may shape evolving regional power relations and coalitions. 
We therefore consider the potential of EU security policy to contribute to long-term 
engagement strategies and addressing partner countries’ risks. 
• Development fnance and cooperation is another key area of EU external relations with 
eligible recipient countries. Taken together, the EU and its member states are by far 
the biggest source of development assistance worldwide, providing €75.2 billion to 
developing countries in 2019 (European Commission 2020). As this is increasingly 
used to support climate action, development cooperation can help accelerate the just 
transition towards a decarbonised economy in partner countries, thereby nurturing 
alternatives to fossil fuels. 
While these policy areas delimit the overall scope of our investigation of the status and 
potential of EU external relations with its partner countries in focus, this investigation 
takes into account the particularities of each partner country. Hence, development coop-
eration is only explored for countries eligible for related support. Similarly, cooperation 
on research and education and climate and energy may have varying potential across the 
selected countries and are thus explored to varying extents. At the same time, the assess-
ment of EU external relations with partner countries concerned generally includes also a 
more general, cross-cutting dimension of political relations. 
A clarification on the scope of EU foreign policy under investigation in this study
is in order. EU member states remain key actors in external relations. The compe-
tences and roles of the EU itself and its member states f luctuate per policy field. The
supranational EU role is strongest in areas of exclusive EU competence, in particular
in trade. In contrast, member states remain predominant especially with respect to
security policy. The other areas are characterised by varying mixes of competence,
so that both the EU itself and its member states play important roles. While a full
assessment of EU member states’ foreign policy towards the countries selected is
beyond the scope of this study and we put emphasis on the EU level, we try to ref lect
the reality of both the EU and the member states being engaged in, and together
shaping, European foreign policy in an aggregate way. For ease of reference, we gen-
erally refer to ‘the EU’ throughout, even though the analysis is aimed to capture, and
relate to, ‘the EU and its member states’. We occasionally refer to ‘the EU and its
member states’ where the role of member states is particularly in focus. We return
to the scope for further deepening the analysis with respect to EU member states in
the concluding chapter. 
Structure and methods of the case studies 
Based on these considerations, we devised a common structure of the country case studies 
in order to identify the barriers and risks the countries are facing under decarbonisation 
 14 EU, decarbonisation, and foreign policy 
and, more generally, to analyse the countries’ potential for moving beyond fossil fuels and 
to scrutinise existing bilateral relations with the EU and their promise. Accordingly, each 
case study consists of the following fve steps. 
First, we investigate the partner country’s exposure to decarbonisation in the context 
of wider fragility and security risks. Specifcally, case studies examine how dependent a 
country’s economy and trade are on fossil fuels or other high-carbon goods and how ex-
posed the economy of a country could be to reductions in demand for these goods, both 
globally and within the EU. As discussed above, we also broaden the scope of our analysis 
beyond sectors directly afected by such demand reductions. We assess the development 
and stability of economy, society and political governance, including internal and regional 
security risks as well as the potential (security) risks arising from climate change itself. 
Second, and in line with the discussion above, the country case studies explore partner 
countries’ past and present eforts to decarbonise. This analysis includes partner coun-
tries’ emission profles, the status of domestic climate policy (including the strength of 
institutions in charge of implementing it), and the role in the UNFCCC and the Paris 
Agreement, most importantly including its NDC. It also addresses key components of 
domestic climate politics, in particular the political weight and infuence of the fossil fuel 
industries as well as the level of public support for climate action. This analysis lays a basis 
for assessing the scope for deepening cooperation on climate and energy. 
Third, the case studies investigate existing trends and potentials in key areas such as 
economy and education in order to gauge countries’ potential to move beyond fossil fuels 
and high-carbon products and the scope for expanding related cooperation. We in par-
ticular consider potential in key low-carbon sectors such as renewable energy and energy 
efciency, including related policy support. Moreover, education and skills development 
and eforts to diversify the economy receive specifc attention. We remain attentive to 
specifc country characteristics in the sectoral focus and emphasis of our analysis (e.g., 
analysing forestry and agriculture where appropriate). 
Fourth, our case studies examine the current status of countries’ external relations 
with the EU. Starting from the general institutional framework of cooperation and ex-
change, we focus on the fve key areas highlighted above (climate and energy policy, trade 
and investment, research and education, security policy, development fnance and coop-
eration). This analysis aims to unearth the existing seeds of a relationship beyond fossil 
fuels and high-carbon products. It puts varying emphases depending on the relevance 
of individual key areas for EU relations with the specifc country in question, for ex-
ample, regional security, development cooperation, or the broader cooperation agenda. 
This analysis can inform thinking about how relations can fruitfully be developed under 
decarbonisation. 
The case studies conclude with a synthesis of the main fndings. These also serve as 
a basis for identifying focal points for the fruitful development of EU external relations 
with the country in question in the context of the climate transition. We hence try to ad-
vance towards ascertaining the scope for and promise of fruitful EU foreign policy under 
decarbonisation. 
In line with the explorative approach of the study, the case studies chosen are gener-
ally based on in-depth desk research deploying a variety of sources. They are rooted in 
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relevant aspects of the countries’ characteristics, economics and politics, complemented 
by selective and focused document analysis and broad examination of news reports. In 
addition, our analysis is built on a range of indicators and databases measuring the level 
and trajectory of socioeconomic development, political stability and strength of govern-
ance, and vulnerability to climate change impacts, as well as assessments of national and 
regional security challenges. 
The research on the case studies was generally completed in late 2019 and updated in
2020/2021. Our case studies do not therefore include a detailed analysis of the impacts
of the Covid-19 pandemic, although we have attempted to include limited and cautious
updates where feasible, bearing in mind that the exact implications of the pandemic
continue to unfold (and will continue to unfold for some time to come). If anything,
the pandemic-induced economic crisis and consequent decline of fossil fuel prices have
further reinforced the fndings related to the vulnerability of the case study countries
to price fuctuations and the challenges, need, and urgency of moving beyond fossil
fuels. We are confdent that the analysis presented here remains generally relevant also
in the post-pandemic world – even if the fallout of the pandemic may require some
adaptations. 
Overview of the study 
The remainder of this book implements the aforementioned plan. The case studies on the 
six selected countries highly dependent on the export of fossil fuels or other high-carbon 
products form the core of the present study. The case studies are presented roughly in 
the order of the fragility and security risks that the countries face, taking into account a 
number of indicators (see above). As the country that is subject to the greatest fragility 
and security risks, the Nigeria case study is hence presented frst, followed by Indonesia, 
Azerbaijan, Colombia, Qatar, and Canada. As mentioned above, the case studies follow 
a common structure and template so as to systematically tease out the challenges and op-
portunities that decarbonisation will present for these countries and, specifcally, for EU 
relations with them. The common structure and template also facilitate the aggregation 
and comparison of the results in the fnal chapter. In the following, we present a brief 
preview of each chapter. 
Chapter 2 addresses Nigeria as the country most fragile and vulnerable to decarbonisa-
tion in our selection. The fortunes of Nigeria’s economy are closely tied to the oil price, 
making it vulnerable to oil market fuctuations and the phase-out of fossil fuels. While its 
oil and gas reserves have brought huge wealth to the country, the profts and benefts have 
not been equitably shared or sufciently invested in key public services and infrastructure. 
The chapter demonstrates that this underinvestment coupled with other major challenges 
has held back eforts to diversify the economy, despite signifcant existing potential. Al-
though eforts to increase and liberalise EU-Nigeria trade in non-oil sectors have stalled, 
there is plenty of scope for the EU to support Nigeria in sustainably developing its non-oil 
economy. There are numerous entry points for political dialogue and development co-
operation to enable the EU to advance its relations with Nigeria under decarbonisation. 
These relate to Nigeria’s many pressing security, economic, and socio-political issues and 
to the promotion of a decarbonised economy. 
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Chapter 3 turns to Indonesia and EU-Indonesia relations. Indonesia’s economic growth 
has been underpinned by a huge variety of natural resources at its disposal. After the Am-
azon, it is the world’s most heavily forested region, and it also has rich deposits of hydro-
carbons and minerals. Many of these natural assets have also been developed for export. 
The country is the second largest exporter of coal after Australia and the world’s largest 
exporter of palm oil – the latter accounting for a large proportion of its trade with the EU. 
Indonesia has diversifed its export base beyond fossil fuels over the past 15 years, but it 
has also become increasingly dependent on coal to meet rising domestic energy demand. 
Overall, Indonesia is an increasingly important partner for the EU, as it is both a major 
economy and a leading voice within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
The chapter argues that the EU has established a fruitful basis for cooperation, with on-
going negotiations on a comprehensive economic partnership agreement enhancing the 
potential for further cooperation, including in areas that are relevant for decarbonisation. 
Chapter 4 analyses Azerbaijan and the prospect of EU relations with it under decar-
bonisation. Azerbaijan is highly dependent on the production and export of oil and gas. 
Accordingly, while the development of its oil and gas resources has in general helped to 
advance welfare and has provided for political stability in the twenty-frst century, its eco-
nomic development has fuctuated with the world market price of oil and gas. Eforts to 
diversify the economy have had limited efects so far but provide an important entry point 
for developing EU-Azerbaijan relations beyond fossil fuels. Azerbaijan also faces serious 
issues regarding state legitimacy and repression as well as security challenges in the con-
text of its confict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. The case study demonstrates 
that EU-Azerbaijan cooperation can build on a frm and broad institutional framework. 
The EU is Azerbaijan’s most important trading partner, accounting for nearly half of the 
latter’s trade. While energy and especially oil and gas have been key to EU-Azerbaijan 
relations, cooperation on both renewable energy and education holds signifcant potential. 
Colombia and EU-Colombia relations are in focus in Chapter 5. Fossil fuel export rev-
enues make a signifcant contribution to Colombia’s economy, which has been vulnera-
ble to drops in commodity prices. However, the past 25 years have also seen important 
structural transformations and shifts towards economic diversifcation. The 2016 peace 
agreement that ended the internal confict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Co-
lombia (FARC) considerably improved Colombia’s political stability, although a stable 
economy and continued political commitment are needed to ensure lasting peace. Rural 
development, climate action, and economic diversifcation are important entry points for 
EU-Colombia cooperation to support both decarbonisation and post-confict develop-
ment processes. Overall, the chapter argues that the EU can build on a sound basis for 
cooperation, with increasing political dialogue in relevant areas of mutual interest. The 
EU was a valuable partner in the fnal stages of the peace process and possesses signifcant 
potential to tackle the root causes of the confict as a donor as well as via investment and 
trade. 
Qatar is the focus of Chapter 6. Qatar is highly dependent on the production and ex-
port of oil and gas, which form the backbone of its economy and the basis of its consider-
able wealth. Qatar’s reliance on oil and gas also makes it vulnerable to price fuctuations 
and the phase-out of fossil fuels. Eforts to diversify its economy have been efective only 
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position of Qatar in the Gulf region and the Middle East more generally) provide impor-
tant entry points for developing EU-Qatar relations beyond fossil fuels. EU-Qatar rela-
tions have grown closer over the years, and a Cooperation Agreement was signed in 2018. 
Furthermore, EU-Qatar relations are embedded in broader cooperation between the EU 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council. The chapter argues that the important and evolving 
areas of trade and investment as well as energy possess signifcant potential to integrate 
decarbonisation (e.g., through developing Qatar’s signifcant renewables potential). Given 
the precarious situation in the Middle East, security and geopolitics form another key area 
of the relations between Qatar and the EU. 
Chapter 7 examines Canada and EU-Canada relations under decarbonisation. As the 
production and export of oil, gas, and coal are important for Canada’s economy, the coun-
try is vulnerable to price fuctuations and the phase-out of fossil fuels. However, with a 
thriving and highly developed economy that goes far beyond fossil fuels, Canada has the 
potential to build on a highly diversifed economy to transition towards climate neutrality. 
Regional diferences provide a signifcant challenge for this process. The chapter argues 
that historical ties and shared interests and values provide a fruitful basis for developing 
EU-Canada relations under decarbonisation. These relations have been close and dense 
for several decades, as evidenced by the conclusion of the Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA) in 2016, as well as the long-established close cooperation in a 
multitude of settings and areas. Trade and investment as well as energy (both fossil fuels 
and renewables) are important and evolving areas, with signifcant potential to integrate 
decarbonisation. In addition, both the EU and Canada face similar challenges in the cli-
mate transition, including with respect to the just transition of regions and sectors highly 
dependent on the fossil fuel-based economy. 
The concluding chapter, Chapter 8, frst of all synthesises the main fndings of all the 
case studies. The chapter specifcally highlights that decarbonisation generally constitutes 
a key political and economic challenge for fossil fuel exporters that regularly intersects 
with other, specifc fragility and security risks. This challenge is further aggravated by 
regularly comparatively underdeveloped climate policy frameworks and unfavourable 
climate politics. The development of relations with the EU can build on pre-existing ar-
rangements of various strength and form, which generally provide ample potential and 
room for developing bilateral relations beyond fossil fuels. The chapter then explores the 
broader contributions of the study to advancing the relevant existing literatures discussed 
previously. It concludes with the identifcation of seven avenues for future research on EU 
external relations under decarbonisation. 
Notes 
1 There is an important diference in the EU context between ‘foreign and security policy’ and 
‘external relations’. However, for the purposes of this study, we use both ‘foreign policy’ and 
‘external relations’ interchangeably. 
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 2 Nigeria 
Addressing fragility away from oil? 
Introduction 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria (henceforth Nigeria) is a hugely diverse country with over 
250 ethnic groups and a growing, youthful populace. With the largest population and the 
biggest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is also a major force on the African continent. 
By 2020, its gross domestic product (GDP) rose to 25th in the world (World Bank 2021a), 
with this growth largely driven by revenues from oil and gas extraction. 
However, the billions of dollars generated each year in oil and gas revenues have not 
brought prosperity to most Nigerians, with GDP per capita ranking only the 176th high-
est globally (CIA 2021). Unlike in some other resource-rich countries, where the wealth 
generated has been invested in developing key public goods, such as education, healthcare, 
or transport networks, Nigeria’s fossil fuel industries have mainly enriched a small mi-
nority of Nigerians, as well as foreign investors. As such, Nigeria is often referred to as a 
case illustrating the ‘resource curse’, with oil and gas profts breeding corruption, fuelling 
confict between ethnic groups, undermining governance and institutional frameworks, 
and holding back other areas of the economy. The country features low down on indexes 
measuring overall well-being, development, and inclusiveness (Sachs et al. 2017; UNDP 
2018; WEF 2018). 
The oil and gas industries have also had a devastating impact on the environment and 
climate. Liquid pollutants and gas faring1 have contaminated the oil-producing Niger 
Delta’s rich ecosystem and posed health risks for around 20 million people (Anejionua 
et al. 2015). Aside from the major climate impacts of its oil and gas exports in other coun-
tries, gas faring alone in Nigeria is estimated over the past 50 years to have emitted more 
carbon dioxide (CO2) than 1,000 coal-fred power plants would in a year.
2 Nigeria is 
highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and has been ranked the 21st last coun-
try in the ND-GAIN Index measuring vulnerability and readiness (ND-GAIN 2020). 
As has been done for other case studies presented in this book, this chapter too will 
explore the challenges and opportunities Nigeria and Nigeria-European Union (EU) re-
lations are facing under decarbonisation in fve steps. The next section frst substanti-
ates Nigeria’s high dependence on the production and export of oil and gas and hence its 
vulnerability to price fuctuations and the phase-out of fossil fuels. It also analyses other 
fragility and security risks, including internal terrorist and security challenges. Subse-
















24 Nigeria: addressing fragility 
for further improvement. This is followed by the review of relevant trends and potentials, 
including with respect to agriculture and other low-carbon sectors. The one but last sec-
tion reviews the framework and basis of EU-Nigeria relations beyond fossil fuels. The fnal 
section concludes and identifes focal points for EU foreign policy towards Nigeria under 
decarbonisation. 
Exposure and risks 
The oil price collapse from 2014 to 2016 and the devastating efects of the Covid-19 
pandemic on international oil markets showed that Nigeria is highly exposed to shifts in 
the international oil market. With government revenues and foreign exchange earnings 
strongly linked to the oil and gas sector, these downturns had major implications for the 
entire Nigerian economy. Furthermore, as the world decarbonises, Nigerian fossil fuel as-
sets risk losing their value. Nigeria also faces substantial other fragility risks and security 
threats and as such it is ranked 12th out of 179 countries in the 2021 Fragile State Index 
(see also Figures 2.2 and 2.3). High levels of corruption and the poor distribution of oil 
wealth, both throughout society and geographically across diferent regions, have resulted 
in signifcant socioeconomic inequality, fuelled ethnic tensions, and led to instability and 
violence in some areas. The country is also highly vulnerable to climate change impacts, 
with the Lake Chad region and coastal megacity Lagos being examples of high-risk areas. 
Exposure to global decarbonisation trends 
The fortunes of the Nigerian economy are closely tied to the oil price, making it vulnerable
to oil market fuctuations and the phase-out of fossil fuels. Possessing the largest oil and gas
reserves in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria is the region’s largest and the world’s 12th largest
oil producer (BP 2020). Nigeria’s oil boom began when the oil industry was nationalised
and the country joined the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
in 1971. In 2019 production totalled about 2.1 million barrels per day (BP 2020). The
marginal production cost of onshore oil is relatively low at US$15 per barrel and US$30 per
barrel for deep-water extraction (Knoema 2018). While it is only the 17th largest producer
of natural gas (BP 2020), Nigeria ranks sixth in the world in terms of liquefed natural
gas (LNG) exports (International Gas Union 2021). Since Nigeria’s natural gas reserves
came on stream in 1998, the gas sector has been developed for domestic supply and foreign
export, with production increasing by about 35 percent since 2011 to 49.3 billion cubic
metres in 2019 (BP 2020). However, large quantities continue to be fared, or burnt of, as
many oilfelds lack the infrastructure to capture the gas they produce (Raval 2017). 
The oil industry accounted for 7.4 percent of Nigeria’s GDP in 2019 (World Bank 
2021b). Although this fgure is relatively low compared to some other oil-producing na-
tions, revenues from the oil and gas sector are a vital source of foreign exchange and the 
largest single source of government revenues. Fossil fuels constitute about 90 percent of 
Nigeria’s total goods and services exports (World Bank 2021i), and in 2019 fossil fuel 
exports generated US$50.3 billion, accounting for about 95 percent of Nigeria’s foreign 
exchange earnings (Chatham House 2021; see also Figure 2.1). Tax revenues from the oil 
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Fossil fuel exports as % GDP (2019) 
8.4% 
Fossil fuel exports as % total exports 
(2019) 
87% 
Fossil fuel exports to EU as % of total Exports to EU as % of total
exports to the EU (2020) exports (2020) 
92.3% 24.1% 
Figure 2.1 Status of fossil fuel exports of Nigeria in 2019/2020. 
Sources: Data based on: https://data.worldbank.org (fossil fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise export; 
oil, gas, and coal as a percentage of GDP – accessed 25 July 2021) and European Commission (2021b) (exports 
to EU – accessed 25 July 2021). 
public spending at federal and state level is dependent on production levels and interna-
tional commodity markets. Non-oil government revenue comprised only 3.4 percent of 
GDP in 2018, one of the lowest in the world (EIA 2020). Nevertheless, the underassess-
ment and underpayment of taxes have been a signifcant issue in Nigeria, and in 2017 
the government realised only 53 percent of budgeted oil revenues (World Bank 2018). 
Furthermore, the Nigerian government supports the industry with signifcant subsidies. 
As the government began to rein in its subsidies, Nigeria has reduced government energy 
subsidies to less than US$1 billion in 2020 (IEA 2021). 
Between 2005 and 2015, the Nigerian economy experienced impressive GDP growth 
of 8 percent per year on average. This was largely driven by the high oil price, with the 
country’s exports generating the foreign currency to import most of the country’s needs 
(Adeosun 2017). In 2019, these included US$8.8 billion worth of refned petroleum im-
ports, 71.6 percent of which came from Europe (Chatham House 2021). However, the 
economy’s exposure to changes in the international oil market became strikingly apparent 
when oil prices collapsed from more than US$100 per barrel in 2014 to under US$30 in 
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major knock-on efects on non-oil sectors dependent on imports of inputs and raw materi-
als such as industry and services (World Bank 2017). As a result, in 2016, Nigeria experi-
enced its frst full year of recession in 25 years, with real GDP contracting by 1.6 percent 
(World Bank 2021c). Although still at relatively low levels, public debt as a result also rose 
from 17.6 percent of GDP in 2012 to 29.1 percent in 2019 (Trading Economics 2021a). 
The Covid-19 crisis has further reconfrmed the risks inherent in Nigeria’s continued 
dependence on fossil fuels. With the oil sector accounting for half of government revenue, 
oil revenues were 65 percent lower than expected during the frst half of 2020. The Ni-
gerian economy contracted by about 1.8 percent in 2020, even exceeding the recession of 
2016 (Natural Resource Governance Institute 2020; World Bank 2021c). 
Nigerian oil production has also fuctuated signifcantly over time. Since the mid-
2000s, this has predominantly been due to militant groups sabotaging pipelines and other 
key infrastructure in the Niger Delta and staging kidnappings and militant takeovers of 
oil facilities to forward their political objectives of greater redistribution of oil wealth and 
local control of the oil sector (EIA 2021). 
Fossil fuel reserves make up 40 percent of Nigeria’s total assets (Manley et al. 2017). 
With proven reserves of 37 billion barrels of oil in 2019, Nigeria could maintain current 
oil production levels for another 48 years (BP 2020). Exploration has slowed in recent 
years due to the low oil price, increased security threats, and regulatory uncertainty (EIA 
2021). Nonetheless, under the 450 ppm scenario,4 estimates have suggested that by 2025 
Nigeria may unnecessarily invest US$42.5 billion in capital expenditure – 22 percent of 
the oil sector capital expenditure for that period (Ivleva et al. 2017). 
The National Petroleum Policy adopted in 2017 evaluates the potential end of the oil 
era and explores options for reducing oil dependency (George and Onuah 2017). One 
key pillar of plans to diversify the economy is to signifcantly expand gas production for 
domestic use and international export (Raval 2017; Wallace et al. 2018), given the longer-
term prospects of this fuel in the global low-carbon energy transition. The country cur-
rently has discovered reserves of 5.4 trillion cubic metres of natural gas (BP 2020), which 
would allow it to maintain current production levels for more than 100 years. In any 
event, heavily investing in infrastructure to exploit these natural gas assets is likely to 
create stranded asset risks further down the line. 
Although diversifying the economy has become a government priority, the rise in fed-
eral revenues from petroleum extraction from the 1970s was accompanied by decades of
neglect of other key economic sectors, particularly agricultural production (Eigege and
Cooke 2016). Prior to the oil boom, Nigeria was a world leader in the production of cocoa,
palm oil and kernel, and other cash crops, with agriculture contributing over 60 percent to
GDP. In 2020, this fgure stood at 24 percent (World Bank 2021d), and Nigeria is losing an
estimated US$10 billion in annual export opportunity from palm oil, cocoa, and other cash
crops due to a decline in the production of these goods (FAO 2018). Although the declin-
ing fortunes of the agricultural sector may in part be attributable to – and corresponding
to – the reduced global importance of this sector relative to others, the competitiveness
of Nigerian agricultural products may also have sufered the efects of the ‘Dutch disease’
– an appreciating exchange rate due to the overwhelming amount of oil-based foreign cur-
rency earnings. Nigeria went from being a major exporter of agricultural products to an
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Other fragility and security risks 
While its oil and gas reserves have brought huge wealth to the country, the profts and 
benefts have not been equitably shared or sufciently invested in key public services and 
infrastructure. Even the Nigerian economy’s impressive growth in the years prior to the 
recent recessions did not result in signifcant poverty reduction or job creation. Before 
the pandemic, about 53 percent of the Nigerian population lived on less than US$1.90 per 
day5 and more than 30 percent lived in severe multidimensional poverty (UNDP 2018). 
However, there are wide disparities between diferent regions, with those living in the 
north of the country much more likely to be deprived and vulnerable (AfDB 2018: 8). 
Decades of underinvestment in public services and infrastructure have left 59 million 
Nigerians without clean water (WaterAid 2018), and most without access to public trans-
port or more than rudimentary health facilities (Holman 2017). In spite of its abundant 
oil and gas resources, and huge renewable energy potential, Nigeria is also locked in a 
‘full-blown energy crisis’ (Raval 2017; see also below). The country has gradually become 
more unequal in terms of wealth, income, opportunities, basic services, and intergenera-
tional equity (WEF 2018). If anything, the Covid-19 pandemic has further worsened the 
situation (World Bank 2021e; see also Figures 2.2 and 2.3). 
Nigeria also faces signifcant demographic pressures. The country is estimated to have 
had a population of around 196 million in 2018, and, despite the birth rate falling, its 
population is estimated to reach 264 million in 2030 and 411 million in 2050 (IARAN 
2016; UN DESA 2018). As such, around 1.8 million young Nigerians enter the workforce 
every year and GDP growth may have to reach into double fgures for job creation to 
keep pace (Alemu 2015). Unemployment has been constantly rising, especially during the 
2014–2016 economic downturn when unemployment increased in both rural and urban 
areas, almost tripling between late 2014 and the third quarter of 2017 to 18.8 percent, 
particularly among young people. As a result of the recession following the Covid-19 
pandemic, unemployment jumped to 33.3 percent in January 2021 (Trading Economics 
2021b).6 Signifcant job creation is unlikely to come from the oil and gas sector, which 
accounts for less than 1 percent of jobs in Nigeria (PWC 2016: 23). By contrast, the 
agricultural sector employs over 60 percent of the labour force but is characterised by 
low productivity and production, with the latter increasingly impacted by climate change 
(Eigege and Cooke 2016). 
Fragility (2021) 
Human development (2019) 
Strength of governance (2019) 
Climate change vulnerability (2019) 
Sustainable energy development (2019) 
Sustainable Stable Warning ALERT 
Very high High Medium LOW 
Very high High Medium LOW 
Low Medium HIGH Very high 
Very high HIGH Medium Low 
Figure 2.2 Governance indicators (Nigeria). 








































Figure 2.3 Nigeria’s performance in the Fragile States Index 2006–2021 
Although military rule ended in Nigeria in 1999, the frst democratic transfer of
power only occurred in 2015 when opposition candidate General Muhammandu Buhari
was elected president. The country performs poorly on indexes measuring voice and
accountability, government efectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control
of corruption. Nigeria performed poorly in the 2019 World Bank Worldwide Govern-
ance Indicators for Voice and Accountability (percentile rank 35), Political Stability
and Absence of Violence (5.2), Government Efectiveness (13.5), Regulatory Quality
(17.8), Rule of Law (18.75), and Control of Corruption (13) (World Bank 2021f; see
also Figure 2.2) and ranked 149 out of 180 countries in the Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions Index 2020, scoring 25 out of a potential 100. Despite Bu-
hari campaigning for the presidency on the promise to crack down on corruption, the
country’s score has slightly worsened since 2014 (27/100, rank 136/175) (Transparency
International 2021). 
In particular, the country has faced signifcant challenges in managing the unaccount-
able use of revenues and corruption in the oil and gas sector, with Nigeria’s central bank 
governor warning that US$20 billion in sales revenues from the Nigerian National Petro-
leum Corporation (NNPC) had disappeared (NRGI 2015). Despite eforts by the govern-
ment, a 2017 study by Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics and the UN Ofce on Drugs 
and Crime showed that corruption is still rife, with an estimated 82.3 million bribes, 
amounting to US$1.1 billion paid out each year (Johnson 2017). This has consequences 
for the provision of public services and the wider economy. 
Weak governance represents a signifcant barrier to diversifying government revenue 
streams beyond the oil and gas industries. Reform of Nigeria’s ‘cumbersome and ambig-
uous’ tax system has long been needed (PWC 2016), with IMF research suggesting the 
informal economy may account for as much as 65 percent of the country’s GDP, by far the 
highest proportion of the 37 Sub-Saharan Africa countries compared in its study (Hof-
mann et al. 2015: 2; IMF 2017: 51). Increasing non-fossil-fuel trade would reduce vola-
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procedures in Nigeria and the near impossibility of controlling its 4,000-kilometre land 
border have created strong disincentives to trading through formal channels and resulted 
in a sophisticated network of unrecorded trade in non-oil sectors. It has been estimated 
that ofcial government statistics may not refect between 70 and 80 percent of Nigeria’s 
total trade (Hofmann et al. 2015: 2). 
Nigeria also faces numerous security challenges, with development eforts regularly
undermined by terrorist attacks and regional conficts in the northeast, the Niger
Delta, and the Middle Belt, each of which have diferent drivers and economic impli-
cations (Johnson 2017). Control of Nigeria’s oil wealth has been at least a contributing
factor in many of the country’s most violent conficts, notably the bloody secession-
ist Biafran War (1967–1970) and the security challenges in the oil-producing Niger
Delta since the early 2000s, the latter fuelled by militant groups seeking greater local
control and revenues from the oil industry. Secessionist sentiments have increased in
the southeast (Munshi 2018). The wide disparities in income and opportunity across
society and the country are another key root cause of confict, with the security chal-
lenges in the northeast and the brutal insurgency of the Islamist sect Boko Haram
driven by ‘a dangerous mix of unemployment, depleting resources, economic hardship
and violent confict’ (Nett and Rüttinger 2016: 10). As a result, more than 2.8 million
people are currently internally displaced, and, aggravated by the Covid-19 pandemic,
about 9.2 million people countrywide are food-insecure, of whom about 3.2 million
live in the north-eastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe (FAO 2021; UNHCR
2021). Intensifying competition for fertile land is also contributing to the country’s
security challenges, particularly in the northeast and Middle Belt, where clashes be-
tween farmers and herdsmen over access to farming or grazing land and water have
been frequent (Eigege and Cooke 2016). Although the administration of President
Muhammadu Buhari has made eforts to calm these conficts, both regions remain
fragile, posing a risk to political and economic stability in Nigeria (Johnson 2017;
Crisis Watch 2018). 
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Furthermore, Nigeria is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and already strug-
gling with increasing temperatures, erratic rainfall, desertifcation, rising sea levels, and 
hydrological drought (ND-GAIN 2020; Germanwatch 2021; see Figure 2.2). In the agri-
cultural sector, these impacts have diminished crop yields and ‘disrupted long-held crop 
rotation practices and traditions’. Food insecurity is on the rise, particularly in northern 
Nigeria, where agriculture is the economy’s ‘lifeblood’ and which had thus already been 
disproportionally disadvantaged by the sector’s decades of decline. The variability in the 
water levels of Lake Chad and the unfolding crisis in the region have put additional pres-
sure. Climate change also poses signifcant challenges for Nigeria’s rapidly growing urban 
centres. Nigeria’s and Africa’s largest city Lagos, which has a population of 21 million and 
70 percent of whom live in slums, is also exposed to sea-level rise and fooding given its 
low-lying position on the Atlantic coast (Slaughter and Odume 2017). Furthermore, Ni-
geria has a long road ahead when it comes to preparing for the impacts of climate change, 
ranking 183 out of 192 countries in terms of its economic, governance, and social readi-
ness (ND-GAIN 2020). 
Past and present eforts to decarbonise 
Nigeria is party to most major climate treaties, having ratifed the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1994, the Kyoto Protocol in 2004, 
the Doha Amendment in 2020, and the Paris Agreement in 2016. It is a non-Annex I Party 
to the UNFCCC and is hence considered a developing country in climate treaties. In its 
original Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement, Nigeria 
committed to a 20 percent emission reduction relative to a business-as-usual scenario 
by 2030, and, if international support is provided, to increase this to 45 percent. The 
latter would ensure that Nigeria’s emissions remained almost stable up until 2030. The 
NDC identifes climate-smart agriculture and land use, renewable electricity generation, 
energy efciency, the oil and gas sector, and transport as priority areas for reducing emis-
sions (FRN 2015). In May 2021, Nigeria submitted an interim update of its frst NDC 
(to be followed by a fnal update later on in 2021) that updated data and projections and 
otherwise reconfrmed the ambition of the original NDC (FRN 2021). 
Nigeria accounts for less than 1 percent of total global GHG emissions (FRN 2015).
Nigeria’s GHG emissions amounted to 357.5 Mt CO2e in 2018, and energy and land use,
land use change, and forestry (LULUCF) are by far the highest GHG-emitting sectors
(WRI 2021; see also FRN 2021; Figure 2.4). Having lost around 20 percent of its forest
cover between 1990 and 2018, reducing deforestation and implementing aforestation
programmes will be crucial for both adaptation and mitigation in Nigeria (World Bank
2021g). 
Nigerian climate policy is still in the early stages of development, and its legislature 
has yet to enact a climate change law with binding emission reduction targets. However, 
there have been new initiatives to strengthen and mainstream climate policy and govern-
ance, which falls under the remit of the Ministry of Environment. With regard to climate 
change mitigation and adaptation policy, the National Climate Change Policy Response 
and Strategy, adopted in 2012, provides the framework and central vision for the imple-
mentation of Nigeria’s NDC, while the National Policy on Climate Change, approved a 
year later, will form the basis for any new climate change laws. However, a climate change 
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bill passed by the parliament in 2018 was blocked by the president in 2019, and by early 
2021 a revised bill had still not been enacted (GRICCE 2021; see also FRN 2020b). 
The oil price collapse and ensuing recession strengthened the political will for struc-
tural reform and diversifying the Nigerian economy beyond fossil fuels. In early 2017, the 
Buhari administration launched an overarching economic development plan – the Eco-
nomic Recovery and Growth Plan 2017–2020. In June 2020, an Economic Sustainability 
Plan was adopted that aims to create 250,000 jobs and power 5 million households by 
2023 through the expansion of solar power. However, policies to promote renewable en-
ergy production and use, energy efciency, climate change adaptation, and other elements 
of climate policy remain to be further specifed (GRICCE 2021), and the government 
envisions oil and gas continuing to play a major role in the Nigerian economy (FRN 2017; 
FRN 2020b). In this context, the response to the Covid-19 crisis has been found to lack 
on green spending (Global Recovery Observatory 2021). 
Enacting the structural reforms to implement Nigeria’s NDC and other policies aimed 
at diversifying and decarbonising the economy will require sustained political will and 
strong governance at national, state, and local levels. Among the governance concerns 
already addressed above, the extent to which Nigerian politicians and public servants may 
have vested interests in the country’s fossil fuel industries is of particular concern for cli-
mate policy. While these sectors lack transparency and accountability, repeated corrup-
tion scandals and the slow pace of reform suggest signifcant links between public ofcials 
and the fossil fuel lobby. Furthermore, aside from revenues from these sectors forming 
a signifcant proportion of public budgets, the Nigerian government is heavily invested 
in the country’s oil sector via the state-owned NNPC. In 2019, the NNPC was directly 
responsible for more than a third of Nigerian oil production, and in 2015 it sold almost 
half of the country’s oil production (NRGI 2015). It also plays a central role in all stages 
of decision-making relating to the oil sector (NRGI 2018). 
Although Nigeria has made ‘meaningful progress’ to improve the transparency of the 
oil and gas sector (EITI 2017), there is still an acute lack of information on revenue fows 
and the benefciaries. Despite top ofcials’ repeated commitments to tackling the poor 
governance of the NNPC and the sector in general, Africa’s largest state-owned enter-
prise has yet to produce comprehensive annual reports detailing its fnances or to disclose 
information on the earnings by its subsidiaries, the costs of its operations, and its signif-
cant spending on non-commercial activities. A particular area for concern is the licensing 
and contracts for oil and gas projects, as the Nigerian government ‘does not regularly 
disclose government ofcials’ fnancial interest in the extractive sector or identities of 
benefcial owners of extractive companies’ (NRGI 2018). 
Trends and potential 
Nigeria is a country with huge resources for developing beyond fossil fuels, including a 
growing, youthful population and enormous renewable energy potential. However, to 
take advantage of these opportunities, it requires major investment in its low-carbon sec-
tors and its overstretched public infrastructure and services, which are essential for pro-
moting economic diversifcation and more climate-friendly and inclusive development. 
For example, Nigeria’s erratic and unreliable power grid and the gaps in its public educa-













32 Nigeria: addressing fragility 
Financing low-carbon development 
Nigeria faces a huge investment gap in areas that are essential for promoting economic 
diversifcation and more climate-friendly and inclusive development. Alongside fscal re-
forms and other measures to boost public revenues and spending in areas such as education 
and power infrastructure, private sector investment is needed to push the development of 
low-carbon sectors. Foreign, diaspora, and domestic investors have generally been wary 
of investing in the country, due to the largely poor state of public infrastructure and 
services, combined with the country’s endemic corruption, weak institutions, poor en-
forcement of regulation and laws, low skill levels, and macroeconomic uncertainty (PWC 
2016: 4; Barungi et al. 2017: 8). 
To encourage investor confdence, the current administration has allocated signifcant
public spending to power and transport infrastructure, including a National Integrated Infra-
structure Master Plan adopted in 2021 (Ivleva et al. 2017; PWC 2018; GRICCE 2021), and
enacted reforms to improve the business environment. These resulted in Nigeria moving up
39 ranks in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index from ranking 170 (out of 189) in
2015 (World Bank 2015) to ranking 131 (out of 190) in 2020 (World Bank 2020). Nigeria’s
growing population, including its expanding middle class7 and cities, is likely to generate
a signifcant increase in demand for energy and consumer goods over the coming decades
(PWC 2016), and this, combined with relatively underdeveloped consumer and e-commerce
markets, means Nigeria could potentially ofer signifcant opportunities for smart investors.
The vibrant digital start-up scenes in cities like Lagos have increasingly attracted foreign in-
vestment (Green 2017). Nigerians in diaspora also contributed US$21 billion to the economy
in 2015, and ‘local Nigerians also have billions of dollars locked in low-performing assets
because people are unsure of the investor environment’ (Heinrich Böll Foundation 2017: 20). 
The Buhari administration also took a signifcant step forward in its low-carbon tran-
sition in December 2017 when it launched Africa’s frst Sovereign Green Bond to fll the 
funding gap generated by the recession and raise capital for NDC implementation, which 
the World Bank has estimated will require US$142 billion by 2030 (Gyamf 2017). The 
bonds are being used to fnance projects to protect the environment and to mitigate and 
adapt to the impacts of climate change, and the frst issuance of 10 billion naira (around 
US$27.6 million) successfully fnanced three projects related to reforestation and promot-
ing energy security via of-grid solar and hydropower systems. The government issued a 
second bond (Series II Green Bond) in 2019, funding 23 projects in fve sectors (afores-
tation, renewable energy, transport, agriculture, and water) and has also made moves 
towards a third bond issuance (FRN 2020a). 
Potential in key low-carbon sectors 
Responsible for a large proportion of Nigeria’s GHG emissions, the energy sector is an 
important focal area for Nigeria’s low-carbon development. Only around 60 percent of 
Nigeria’s population are connected to the electricity grid, and 80 percent of those with 
grid access rely on generators running on expensive imported diesel fuel to cope with 
frequent outages (IEA 2017). In rural areas, 75 percent of people do not have access to 
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cooking. In northern Nigeria, this is likely the case for 99 percent of families, and the need 
for frewood is a major driver of deforestation (BNEF 2017). Expanding electricity access 
rapidly enough to meet existing, let alone rising future demand, is a major concern (BNEF 
2017). Required electricity sector investment over the next 25 years has been estimated 
to be as high as US$100 billion (Heinrich Böll Foundation 2017: 20). 
However, the scope for improvements on both demand side and supply side is huge.
With energy efciency regulation currently underdeveloped (World Bank 2017), there are
a range of options available for decreasing energy consumption. Many of these – from in-
troducing more efcient stoves in rural areas to reducing gas faring – ofer co-benefts like
reduced air pollution alongside cost-savings. Nigeria is considered to have huge renewable
energy potential, particularly with regard to solar PV. While Nigeria’s installed solar ca-
pacity was only around 28 MW in 2019 (IRENA 2021), it has been estimated that covering
just 1 percent of Nigeria’s land area with state-of-the-art polycrystalline PV modules could
generate 207,000 GWh per year – ten times the total electricity production in Nigeria
in 2011 (Ley et al. 2015: 85). The government has been slow to promote renewables, al-
though the issuance of green bonds in December 2017 was a step forward (FRN 2020a).
However, entrepreneurs and aid agencies are leading the way with innovative mini-grid
and decentralised solar energy schemes in urban and rural areas (Green 2017). 
As mentioned above, the Economic Sustainability Plan adopted in 2020 does foresee some
limited investments in the expansion of renewable energy in general and solar power in par-
ticular. However, the response to the Covid-19 crisis has overall had only little emphasis on
clean energy and green spending (Global Recovery Observatory 2021; GRICCE 2021). 
The Nigerian agricultural sector also has major potential; however, for the last 50 years 
it has been cheaper to import rice from China, India, or Thailand than to source food in 
Nigeria. Increasing production and moving towards self-sufciency, particularly for cere-
als, would reduce Nigeria’s agricultural products import bill, which amounted to US$4.4 
billion in 2019 (Chatham House 2021). The agricultural sector employs 70 percent of the 
population, with 95 percent of the country’s US$90 billion farm output estimated to be 
produced by subsistence farmers, often with less than a hectare of land each (Wheatley 
2017). As such, there is ample scope for increasing productivity and creating higher-
paying jobs in processing, marketing, or distribution. Improvements to infrastructure 
would also signifcantly boost sector output. The delays caused by the country’s unreliable 
power supply and congested transport networks and ports, combined with bureaucracy, 
corruption, and poor governance, mean that at present fruit and vegetables often perish 
before making it to market. Furthermore, most subsistence farmers do not have access to 
credit to buy the storage and processing equipment they need to efciently market their 
produce. Investment is also needed to increase the sector’s resilience to climate change 
impacts. Nigeria’s original NDC stated that 
under a business-as-usual scenario agricultural productivity could decline between 
10 to 25 percent by 2080. In some parts of the north, the decline in yield in rain fed 
agriculture could be as much as 50 percent. This in turn would impact GDP, reduc-
ing it by as much as 4.5 percent by 2050, even though the share of agriculture in GDP 
will decline from 40 to just 15 percent. 
(FRN 2015) 
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Despite major challenges, revitalising the sector could be central to Nigeria’s future de-
velopment, and the weakening of the Nigerian currency naira and various policy initi-
atives have begun to turn the situation around (Wheatley 2017). Government, private 
sector, and foreign donors have begun to promote innovative and scalable schemes to 
expand market access, provide credit to farmers, and reduce post-harvest losses (Downie 
2017). Increasing production to become a net exporter of agricultural products would 
diversify and stabilise the economy by providing a major source of non-oil revenue and 
foreign currency. Improving nutrition and food security would also raise living standards 
and tackle some of the root causes at the heart of Nigeria’s security challenges. For exam-
ple, the food emergency in the northeast has served to signifcantly strengthen support for 
the insurgency of Boko Haram (Nett and Rüttinger 2016; Downie 2017: 7). 
Education and skills development 
Nigeria’s growing and youthful population presents both challenges and opportunities 
for the future. With around 67 percent of the population under the age of 30, and 43 
percent under the age of 15, Nigeria has the potential to follow the path of other emerging 
economies that have reaped a ‘demographic dividend’ as a result of a growing working 
population. However, this is contingent on the rapid expansion of the public school sys-
tem, educational and vocational curriculums being suited to the future demands of the 
labour market, and on ample jobs being available for school leavers when they enter the 
workforce (PWC 2016; OBG 2017a). There are signifcant gaps in the Nigerian public 
education system at present. Net enrolment in primary education has remained below 70 
percent (WEF 2019; World Bank 2021h). Overall, the Nigerian education system lacks 
investment and basic infrastructure and is characterised by poor teaching, a rigid curricu-
lum, and large class sizes, which can reach 80 to 100 students in some regions. According 
to 2015 UNESCO data, one in three children drop out of school at primary level, only one 
in two children in the Nigerian public education system can read or write, and in rural 
areas two in three children cannot read at all (OBG 2017a). As regards higher education, 
the number of university spaces is currently inadequate to absorb the rising number of 
applicants, with the 1.8 million candidates who sat the university admissions exams in 
2017 jostling for only 850,000 places (Adesulu 2017). Among those who do secure places, 
there is a clear preference for arts and social science subjects, as well as professional de-
grees in law, medicine, and engineering. The comparative lack of school leavers opting 
for vocational courses and university students studying science, technology, engineering, 
and mathematics (OBG 2017a, 2017b) may leave Nigeria with a workforce ill-prepared for 
low-carbon professions, such as those related to the design, maintenance, and installation 
of energy-efcient or renewable-energy technologies. 
The Nigerian government has put in place policies to improve access to education and 
the public school and university systems. Although falling during the 2015 recession, 
spending on education rose from 2016, with 7 percent of the 2018 budget allocated to 
this policy area. However, the programme the government launched in 2016 to create 
more jobs for teachers, provide school food, and other measures has sufered from slow 
implementation (Barungi et al. 2017: 10–11). The number of private sector schools and 
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in urban areas (Härma 2016). The government has launched initiatives to better prepare 
more school and university leavers for jobs in sectors such as construction (OBG 2017b). 
Major investment is also required in university education, vocational centres, and techni-
cal colleges to educate and train the kinds of high-skilled workers needed by the country’s 
growing services sector (PWC 2017). However, the government cut back expenditure on 
education in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis (Olufemi 2020). 
Cooperation with the EU 
EU foreign policy towards Nigeria is already providing support for many of the major 
challenges the country faces in making a stable transition to a non-oil economy and meet-
ing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The EU has been active in supporting ef-
forts to address key areas such as good governance and security as well as those promoting 
low-carbon development through various measures such as renewable energy and energy 
access, sustainable agriculture, entrepreneurship, and innovation. However, eforts to 
deepen trade in non-oil sectors via an Economic Partnership Agreement have stalled. 
Political dialogue 
EU cooperation with Nigeria has for more than 20 years found its legal basis in the Coto-
nou Agreement, a partnership agreement that since 2000 has provided the framework for 
cooperation with 79 developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and Pacifc (ACP) in 
the felds of development cooperation, trade, and political dialogue. The Cotonou Agree-
ment was due to expire in 2020, but the parties agreed to extend its application until No-
vember 2021. Political negotiations for a post-Cotonou agreement bore fruit in late 2020, 
but the new agreement still has to be signed and ratifed by the parties. The new partner-
ship agreement with African nations will aim to support the implementation of the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development, including on peace and stability, democracy and 
good governance, and economic and human development (European Commission 2020). 
The EU and Nigeria began to intensify political dialogue beyond the Cotonou Agree-
ment in 2004, and in 2009 established the ‘Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward’ as a new 
political framework for dialogue. Agreed priority issues of mutual interest and concern 
include peace and security; good governance and human rights; economic development, 
including trade and regional integration; energy; and environmental sustainability and 
climate change. The core of the new framework is annual ministerial dialogues. In 2018, 
the EU made commitments to support Nigeria in the fght against terrorism, most no-
tably Boko Haram, and ofered support in strengthening democratic governance and 
institution-building in the run up to the 2019 general elections (EEAS 2018a, 2018b). 
Trade relations 
Nigeria and the EU maintain strong economic ties. Nigeria is the destination for around
half of EU exports to the West African region and close to 70 percent of imports (EEAS
2016). Fossil fuels, and particularly oil, are the main pillar of this trading relationship
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(€20.6 billion) of total Nigerian goods exports to the EU and 54 percent (€6.3 billion)
of total EU goods exports to Nigeria (European Commission 2021a; see also Chatham
House 2021). While EU crude oil imports are highly diversifed, with Nigeria providing
only 7.3 percent (worth US$17.7 billion) in 2019, refned oil and oil products from the
EU, worth US$6.3 billion, accounted for about 72 percent of Nigerian oil imports.
Agricultural products, mainly cacao and leather, are the second most important com-
modities exported by Nigeria to the EU, gradually increasing to reach US$2.1 billion
between 2000 and 2013. However, exports of these products fell back to US$687 mil-
lion in 2019 (Chatham House 2021). According to the EU statistics, the EU imported
Nigerian agricultural products worth €574 million in 2019, which constitutes only
about 2.7 percent of total goods imports (European Commission 2021a). Important EU
exports to Nigeria include agricultural products, such as wheat, milk, and frozen fsh,
and chemicals and machinery and transport equipment (Chatham House 2021; Euro-
pean Commission 2021b). 
Eforts to expand trade in non-oil sectors have stalled in recent years. As of July 2021,
Nigeria was the only country among the 15 member states of the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS), home to 300 million people, not to have signed the
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU (European Commission 2021c).
Negotiated between 2004 and 2014, the EPA ofers ECOWAS countries immediate
tarif-free access to the EU in return for the phased liberalisation over a 20-year period
of 75 percent of the bloc’s markets to EU trade. Powerful voices in Nigerian politics,
including the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria, have opposed the EPA, arguing that
it would interfere with the government’s strategy to promote and protect burgeoning
non-oil segments of the economy. The government’s position has been that Nigeria’s
industries – even in 20 years’ time – will be too underdeveloped to beneft from more
liberalised trade and that the US$8.94 billion in fnancial and technical assistance ofered
to ECOWAS member states via the EPA Development Programme to prepare for com-
petition from European products is insufcient (Boyo 2017). Alone, Nigeria’s annual
infrastructure investment gap is estimated to be US$8 billion, and Nigerian ofcials have
noted that the same fnancial assistance is available via the European Development Fund
and EU state budgets. As all ECOWAS members have to sign up to the EPA for it to en-
ter into force, the EPA is therefore unlikely to enter into force anytime soon, especially
given that other ECOWAS member states are unwilling or unable to pressure Nigeria
into signing (Vasey 2017). 
Development cooperation 
Due to its oil and gas exports, Nigeria has never been a country dependent on aid. None-
theless, development assistance has an important role in Nigeria’s relations with the EU 
(European Commission n.d.). The EU institutions allocated €562 million in ofcial devel-
opment assistance to Nigeria for the period 2014–2020, with the National Indicative Pro-
gramme for Nigeria outlining the main areas of cooperation, namely sustainable energy 
and access to electricity, health, nutrition and resilience, and rule of law, governance, and 
democracy (European Commission n.d.). Since 2014, the EU allocated more than €340 
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context of the Covid-19 pandemic (European Commission 2021d) and €224.5 million in 
support to the north-eastern Borno state in 2017 in view of the growing crisis in the Lake 
Chad region (European Commission 2017). 
In the past, by far the largest EU member state donor to Nigeria had been the United 
Kingdom, which provided US$431 million in assistance in 2016 (OECD 2021), with 
about a third of the budget being allocated to health-related projects (UK Aid 2021). Post-
Brexit, EU member state contributions are therefore likely to fall signifcantly, with the 
next largest member state donors France and Germany having provided US$43 million 
and US$155 million, respectively (OECD 2021). 
Low-carbon development 
EU eforts to promote sustainable energy included the Nigeria Energy Support Pro-
gramme funded by the EU Delegation to Nigeria and the German government (GIZ
2019). The programme took a range of approaches to improve on- and of-grid access
to sustainable energy in Nigeria. These included support for planning and monitoring
of sector strategies, assistance to existing initiatives by public actors such as the Ru-
ral Electrifcation Agency, and providing its expertise on creating an enabling envi-
ronment for private investment in renewable energy and energy efciency. Initiatives
at member-state level have also supported renewable energy rollout in Nigeria. For
example, the German government has sought to more strongly focus the Nigerian-
German Energy Partnership enacted in 2008 on sustainable energy sources in recent
years (Adekoya 2019). 
With regard to promoting sustainable agriculture, the EU is funding numerous pro-
jects to reduce malnutrition and support sustainable agricultural livelihoods and rural 
adaptation to climate change impacts. Two examples are the Produce and Sell initiative 
being jointly implemented by Oxfam in Nigeria and the Development Exchange Center. 
Targeting 300,000 people in 30,000 farming households, it aims at improving the ‘resil-
ience of small-scale farmers, fshermen and livestock owners in the face of shocks from 
climate change, such as changing rainfall patterns, drought and desertifcation’ (Oxfam 
2018). The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irreg-
ular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa is also funding a project to promote sus-
tainable agriculture in Nigeria’s northern Borno state. Benefciaries will receive resources 
and training to help them implement best practices in fsh farming, animal husbandry, and 
agricultural production and manage their businesses (EEAS 2019). 
The EU has also provided support for improving conditions for business and agricul-
tural investment in Nigeria. The European Investment Bank (EIB) has contributed US$20 
million alongside the US$50 million from the African Development Bank to support the 
new Nigerian Development Bank set up in 2018. The latter is also being supported by 
13 EU member-state shareholders. Given that only 5 percent of the country’s 37 mil-
lion entrepreneurs and small businesses can access credit from fnancial institutions, it 
aims to support Nigeria’s micro, small-, and medium-scale enterprises with funding and 
risk-sharing facilities (EIB 2018). The EU has also provided support to Nigeria and the 
ECOWAS region through the West Africa Competitiveness Programme to boost eco-
nomic integration, growth, and jobs with €120 million funding (ECOWAS 2018). 
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Conclusions 
Nigeria is a country where economic development has been dependent on gas and par-
ticularly oil export revenues. Although it has grown to become the largest economy in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the country is grappling with a high poverty rate, corruption and 
poor governance, climate change impacts, rapid urbanisation, growing youth unemploy-
ment and low productivity, due to patchy energy and transport infrastructure and low 
access to quality education and healthcare. The country is also facing multiple security 
threats. Boko Haram has remained virulent in the north, and other threats, including 
conficts between herdsmen in the Middle Belt and secessionist sentiment in the south-
east, have become more acute. The fallout of the Covid-19 pandemic, including a severe 
economic recession, has aggravated these challenges. 
The importance of oil revenues for government budgets and foreign exchange earnings 
means that Nigeria is highly exposed to shifts in the international oil market, which is 
increasingly being shaped by decarbonisation trends in Europe and the world. As such, 
decarbonisation increases the likelihood of oil price drops that sent the Nigerian economy 
into recession in 2015 and in 2020. This could place further strain on oil and non-oil sec-
tors, socioeconomic welfare, social cohesion, and political stability in a country already 
facing a range of complex, interrelated challenges. Nigeria’s challenge is to reduce secu-
rity threats, strengthen governance and channel its resource wealth – revenues from its 
oil and gas sector as well as from other climate-friendly sectors, such as renewable energy 
and sustainable agriculture – into low-carbon sectors to push development in a direction 
that prepares it for a decarbonised future, rather than increasing its vulnerability to it. 
The EU is an important trading partner for Nigeria, but to date this trading relation-
ship has been based mainly on oil. Eforts to increase and liberalise trade in non-oil sec-
tors have stalled. The EU and its member states are already providing support to Nigeria 
in many of the areas where the country faces signifcant challenges – including security 
issues and the critical need to strengthen democratic governance. These can arguably 
be considered as areas most fundamental to helping Nigeria to cope with the potential 
negative impacts of global decarbonisation on its oil sector. However, there is plenty of 
scope for intensifying this cooperation. It is worth noting that the United Kingdom was 
the member state that provided by far the most development assistance to Nigeria and that 
Brexit may therefore have implications for future EU-Nigeria relations. 
There are numerous entry points for the EU to support Nigeria in sustainably devel-
oping its non-oil economy and preparing for decarbonisation. While trade agreements 
remain of the table at present, the EU can still support Nigeria via political dialogue, 
development cooperation, and climate fnance and assistance. Key priorities include: 
• Security situation: Support measures to prevent further escalation of humanitar-
ian and security crises, particularly in the northeast, Middle Belt, and Niger Delta. 
The roots of these crises are deep and complex. A coordinated, long-term strategy 
is required for the EU and its member states, to engage their military, security, de-
velopment, humanitarian, and environmental agencies and institutions in dialogue 
and cooperation with the Nigerian authorities. With the United Kingdom having 
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EU could continue to cooperate with the United Kingdom in its relationship with 
Nigeria in the wake of Brexit. 
• Good governance: Strong governance and policies will be needed to drive the 
transition to a low-carbon economy and harness the country’s potential. The EU 
and member states should continue their eforts to support democracy and free and 
fair elections. Capacity-building instruments such as the NDC partnership can help 
Nigeria achieve its climate targets. 
• Sustainable energy and agriculture: The EU can strengthen rural regions by 
investing in sustainable energy access and climate-smart agriculture. It can continue 
to use development cooperation to support climate-smart agriculture, low-tech in-
novations like efcient cook stoves, and rural electrifcation with renewable energy 
in order to improve the health, living standards, and livelihoods of Nigeria’s rural 
communities. 
• Trade: The EU can use trade relations to support Nigeria’s readiness to a decarbon-
ised world. While encouraging adoption of the Economic Partnership Agreement, 
Nigeria needs reduced barriers to export non-oil goods, particularly agricultural 
ones, to the EU. Environmental standards and climate considerations could be in-
serted into trade relations to develop the long-term trade relationship beyond oil. 
• Support for investment, innovation, and education: The EU can continue to 
fund initiatives that support and expand access to credit for entrepreneurs and small 
businesses in Nigeria, particularly in sectors supporting the country’s non-oil econ-
omy like agriculture, energy efciency, and renewable energy. Targeted schemes to 
help young entrepreneurs and vocational programmes for jobs with long-term pros-
pects could also play a role in tackling youth unemployment. 
Overall, Nigeria and the EU have already established a good basis for cooperation. Al-
though eforts to deepen the trading relationship between the EU and Nigeria beyond 
oil and gas have stalled for now, a variety of dialogues, frameworks, and diferent types 
of assistance have been set up to provide EU expertise and funding to support Nigeria in 
addressing many of its most pressing security, economic, and socio-political issues and 
to promote and strengthen Nigeria’s non-oil economy. However, given the scale of chal-
lenges and intensifying risks due to decarbonisation, climate change, and demographic 
change, there is signifcant scope for scaling up support in all areas. 
Notes 
1 ‘Gas faring is the burning of natural gas that is associated with crude oil when it is pumped 
up from the ground. In petroleum-producing areas where insufcient investment was made 
in infrastructure to utilize natural gas, faring is employed to dispose of this associated gas’ 
(JINN 2010: 1). 
2 Calculated using the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s Greenhouse Gas 
Equivalencies Calculator using data from Giwa et al. (2014). 
3 Nigeria is a low-taxed economy with tax to GDP estimated to be 8 percent – the second lowest 
in Africa and fourth lowest in the world (PWC 2016). 
4 Introduced in the International Energy Agency (IEA) 2014 World Energy Outlook, the 450 
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5 In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. 
6 Nigerian statistics count anyone working under 20 hours a week as unemployed. For more informa-
tion, see https://africacheck.org/reports/nigerias-unemployment-rate-18-8-widely-tweeted/. 
7 Nigeria’s middle class grew from 13 percent of the population in 2003/2004 to 19 percent in 
2012/2013, although this increase was lower than expected given the high increases in GDP 
during that period. The middle class in the country’s southern states grew quicker than in 
northern regions (Corral Rodas et al. 2019). 
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 3 Indonesia 
Building a partnership beyond fossil 
fuels and palm oil 
Introduction 
The Republic of Indonesia (henceforth Indonesia) is the world’s largest archipelagic na-
tion, with 13,466 islands, 922 of which are permanently inhabited (CIA 2021). It is also 
the world’s fourth largest in terms of inhabitants, with the population due to hit 300 
million in the early 2030s (UN DESA 2019). The capital Jakarta is located on the densely 
populated island of Java, which although only around the size of England is home to 145 
million people. Indonesia is urbanising faster than other countries in the region, with 57.3 
percent living in cities in 2021 (CIA 2021) and 73 percent projected to do so by 2050 (UN 
DESA 2018). 
Indonesia is the world’s third largest democracy and largest Muslim-majority nation, 
with 87 percent of the population practicing Islam (CIA 2021). Re-elected in April 2019, 
its seventh president Joko Widodo, also known as Jokowi, has pledged to protect Indo-
nesia’s tradition of pluralism and moderate Islam in the ofcially secular country (Rizki 
and Cahya 2018). His relatively high approval ratings are underpinned by the sustained 
strength of the Indonesian economy over the past two decades since the Asian fnancial 
crisis. The Indonesian economy is by far the largest in Southeast Asia and the 16th largest 
in the world (World Bank 2021a). Accordingly, Indonesia is the seat of and a leading voice 
in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and a member of the G20. 
Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, Indonesia’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
averaged around 5 percent per year, and had been accompanied by signifcant increases in 
consumption and living standards, with GDP per capita increasing 108 percent from 2000 
to 20191 and the poverty rate falling from 35 to 2.7 percent over the same period.2 Before
the pandemic, unemployment was relatively low at 3.6 percent in 2019 (World Bank 
2021d), although in the same year youth unemployment stood at 20.5 percent (World 
Bank 2021e). However, despite these gains, there was still signifcant wealth inequality, 
and around 40 percent of the population lived on an income only just above the poverty 
line. Furthermore, rapid economic development and urbanisation have led to intensifying 
environmental problems, including large-scale deforestation, overexploitation of marine 
resources, air pollution, trafc congestion, unsustainable waste management, and water 
pollution (CIA 2021). As a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, Indonesia’ economy entered 
a recession for the frst time in two decades in 2020 (with negative consequences for the 
other aforementioned indicators). 
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Following the approach of the case studies, this chapter explores the challenges and 
opportunities Indonesia and Indonesia-European Union (EU) relations are facing under 
decarbonisation in fve steps. The next section frst discusses Indonesia’s dependence on 
the production and export of fossil fuels and palm oil as well as its vulnerability to related 
price fuctuations and global decarbonisation. It also analyses other fragility and security 
risks, including terrorism and climate change impacts. Subsequently, the status of Indo-
nesia’s climate policy is assessed, which leaves signifcant room for further improvement. 
This is followed by the review of relevant trends and potentials, including regarding ef-
forts to further reduce fossil fuel subsidies and develop low-carbon sectors (energy ef-
ciency and renewable energy). The one but last section reviews the framework and basis 
of EU-Indonesia relations beyond fossil fuels and palm oil. The fnal section concludes 
and identifes focal points for EU foreign policy towards Indonesia under decarbonisation. 
Exposure and risks 
Exposure to global decarbonisation trends 
Indonesia’s economic growth has been underpinned by the huge variety of natural re-
sources at its disposal. After the Amazon, it is the world’s most heavily forested region, 
and it also has rich deposits of hydrocarbons and minerals. Many of these natural assets 
have also been developed for export, and the country is the second largest exporter of coal 
after Australia and the world’s largest exporter of palm oil – the latter accounting for a 
large proportion of its trade with the EU. Indonesia has diversifed its export base beyond 
fossil fuels over the past 15 years but has become increasingly dependent on coal to meet 
rising domestic energy demands. 
Indonesia’s economic growth has been underpinned by the exploitation of its abundant 
hydrocarbons and rich forests. Indonesia is a major producer of fossil fuels and in 2019 was 
the world’s 2nd, 12th, and 24th largest producer of coal, natural gas, and oil, respectively 
(BP 2020). Coal production more than doubled from 2009 to 2019 to about 360 million 
tonnes of oil equivalent. Oil production has been on an overall downward trend since the 
1990s and reached 781,000 barrels per day in 2019 (BP 2020). Indonesia withdrew from 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 2016 so as not to have 
to comply with the group’s production cuts (Singgih 2017). Natural gas production has 
also fallen, decreasing from 78 billion cubic metres in 2009 to 67.5 billion cubic metres 
in 2019 (BP 2020). 
In 2019, Indonesia had proven coal reserves of almost 40 billion tonnes, the sixth larg-
est in the world. Reserves could support current production rates for another 65 years 
(BP 2020). In 2019, Indonesia had proven oil reserves of around 2.5 billion barrels, which 
would be exhausted within the next decade if production continued at current levels (BP 
2020). By contrast, estimated natural gas reserves of about 1.4 trillion cubic metres would 
support current production levels for more than 20 years (BP 2020). 
Despite enormous potential and ambitious policies to harness renewable forms of en-
ergy, coal remains the mainstay of the Indonesian electricity mix, providing 59 percent 
of energy generation in 2019 (IEA 2021c). With reserves that are plentiful and easy to 
extract and transport, coal is less expensive to produce than lower-emission fuels such 
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as natural gas and benefts from a more favourable policy environment than increasingly 
cost-competitive renewables (PWC 2018). Over the past decade, the consumption of oil 
and natural gas has risen only gradually, while coal consumption has surged, increasing by 
145 percent between 2009 and 2019 (BP 2020). The proportion of oil in the power gen-
eration mix has decreased by 80 percent since 2010, from about 20 percent of electricity 
generation in 2010 to about 4 percent in 2019, in line with government policies to reduce 
petroleum imports (PWC 2017; IEA 2021c). 
Although overall per capita electricity and fuel consumption remains low in Indonesia 
compared to other Southeast Asian countries, demand for energy is increasing rapidly. As 
the country’s GDP almost tripled between 2000 and 2019 in constant 2010 US$, electric-
ity demand increased by 233 percent (IEA 2021b; World Bank 2021j). The rising incomes 
and energy needs of its growing and increasingly urban population, as well as government 
plans to ensure almost universal energy access by 2025, mean that the country’s electric-
ity demand is projected to triple by 2030 (IRENA 2017). The upsurge in energy use is 
expected to be highest in industry and transport, with demand growing by more than half 
in these sectors over the same period. The country’s industrialisation continues apace, 
and around 75 million new scooters and motorcycles and a million new cars hit Indonesia’s 
roads every year, adding to domestic oil demand and the heavy air pollution in its densely 
populated cities (IRENA 2017). A growing number of household consumers are also in-
vesting in appliances like air-conditioners, fans, and cookers (PWC 2017). 
Steep falls in the oil price in the 1980s prompted government action to diversify the 
Indonesian economy and export base (Elias and Noone 2011; World Bank 2021g). As a 
result, the economy has become more balanced. Exports and taxation of fossil fuel extrac-
tion have remained a signifcant source of government revenues (Ivleva et al. 2017). While 
coal has become increasingly important, the contribution of the oil and gas sector to state 
revenues fell from around 20 percent in 2004 to 14 percent in 2014 and then further to 3 
percent in 2016 due to the oil price slump. Initiatives to attract major new investment to 
revive these industries have largely been unsuccessful (Arifn 2018). 
Goods and services export revenues contributed 18.5 percent of Indonesia’s GDP in 
2019 (World Bank 2021f). In 2017, commodity exports made up 58 percent of total 
Indonesian merchandise exports, of which agricultural commodities (including palm oil) 
and fuels made 29 and 22 percent, respectively (UNCTAD 2019, see also World Bank 
2021g). Coal is Indonesia’s most valuable export commodity, and coal exports generated 
US$26.3 billion in 2019, making the country the world’s second largest exporter of coal 
after Australia (Chatham House 2021). In 2019, over half of its coal export revenues came 
from China and India, the world’s frst and second largest importers of coal, respectively 
(Chatham House 2021). Nonetheless, the government has sought to lower the country’s 
dependence on coal demand in other countries by creating incentives for domestic indus-
try and power generation to use coal to maximise coal extraction profts (CAT 2020). The 
country also has signifcant gas and oil exports totalling US$12.8 billion in 2019 (Chatham 
House 2021; see also Figure 3.1). However, due to growing domestic demand and falling 
production, Indonesia has been a net importer of crude oil since 2004 and could become 
a net importer of gas in the 2020s (Karlis and Rusmana 2017). 
Palm oil is the country’s second most valuable export commodity, with revenues to-
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Fossil fuel exports as % GDP (2019) 
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Figure 3.1 Status of fossil fuel and palm oil exports of Indonesia in 2019/2020. 
Sources: Data gathered from https://data.worldbank.org (fossil fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise 
export; oil, gas, and coal as a percentage of GDP – accessed on 25 July 2021) and European Commission 2021b 
(exports to EU – accessed on 25 July 2021). 
from commodity trade in 2019 (Chatham House 2021). The 30 million tons of palm oil 
Indonesia produces annually generate 4.5 percent of its GDP and provide jobs to 3 million 
people (UNDP 2018). China, India, and Pakistan are the largest importers of palm oil, 
but collectively EU member states imported as much as India, the second most important 
importer, did in 2019, with the import valued at US$2.4 billion (Chatham House 2021; 
see also Figure 3.1). In Europe, palm oil is mainly used in food, animal feed, and industry, 
as well as for transportation, with 46 percent of imports being used for biodiesel in 2015 
(Copenhagen Economics 2018). As oil palms are higher yielding than other similar crops, 
they are likely to continue to play an important role in meeting growing global demand 
for vegetable oils (Meijaard et al. 2018). Timber and other forestry products are also sig-
nifcant exports to Europe, generating US$229 million in 2019 (Chatham House 2021). 
Increases in domestic oil demand in the transport sector mean that Indonesia may be-
come more vulnerable to the downsides of fuel subsidies in future. Engaged in oil, gas, 
and renewable energy production and refning (Natural Resource Governance Institute 
2018), state-owned energy company Pertamina bears the costs of subsidising fuel for 
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Indonesian consumers. Since mismanagement and underinvestment in the oil sector led 
Indonesia to become a net importer of crude and refned oil in 2004, state revenues have 
been linked to global oil prices via subsidies on imported fuels, with increases in the global 
oil price necessitating greater spending on fuel subsidies to keep domestic prices stable 
(Chelminski 2018). Energy subsidies to reduce and stabilise energy and fuel costs have 
typically accounted for 10 to 20 percent of government spending and are an important 
reason why spending on key development areas such as health, education, and public in-
frastructure has lagged behind other Southeast Asian and lower-middle-income countries 
(Beaton et al. 2018: 138–139). 
On taking ofce in 2014, the new administration of Joko Widodo was widely praised 
for reducing fossil fuel subsidies by 90 percent, lowering government spending on fuel 
subsidies from more than 3 percent of GDP in 2014 to less than 1 percent in 2016 (IEA 
2016). However, in 2020 Indonesia still ranked eighth in the world in terms of its spend-
ing on energy subsidies, in particular for the oil sector (IEA 2020). New subsidies have 
also since been introduced. In March 2018, the government capped domestic coal prices 
at US$70 per tonne, 30 percent below the market rate, until late 2019 – a subsidy that is 
estimated to cost US$630 million and negatively impact government revenues from coal 
(Indonesia Investments 2018; Suzuki 2018) – and in April 2018 it introduced controls on 
fuel and electricity prices. Although artifcially keeping fuel prices low has been justifed 
on the basis that it preserves consumer purchasing power, subsidies stimulate overcon-
sumption of imported petrol, which both weakens the rupiah and purchasing power by 
increasing infation (Varagur 2018). Even worse, these artifcially cheap fossil fuel prices 
provide an incentive for a less sustainable, more carbon-intensive development path. 
Indonesia’s rising energy demands from industry and households mean that state-
owned power utility Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN) and private sector investors are 
set to make huge investments to expand electricity generation capacity over the coming 
decade. Renewable energies are supposed to play a stronger role in the overall energy mix. 
The Medium-Term National Development Plan (RPJMN) 2020–2024 projects reaching 
37.3 GW of renewable power capacity in 2024 (CAT 2020), which would mean a more 
than threefold increase from the roughly 10 GW installed in 2019 (IRENA 2021). This 
means an increase in ambition compared to early 2019 as PLN’s 2019 electricity supply 
plan had only projected an increase of 8 GW until 2024 (CAT 2020). Given that installed 
power plant capacity stood at 67.7 GW in 2019 and annual capacity growth from 2018 to 
2019 was 4.4 percent (IRENA 2021), these plans are highly ambitious. They could also 
potentially result in signifcant idle capacity, given that Indonesia has consistently over-
built capacity (CAT 2020). However, coal is still accounting for 48 percent of new gener-
ation capacity. Both plans envisioned renewables accounting for only around a quarter of 
new power generation capacity up to 2027 (PWC 2018: 12), despite the falling costs of 
key renewable energy technologies. In May 2021, the energy ministry announced, how-
ever, that it would not approve any new coal-fred power plants in the future, but plants 
already under construction would be completed (Bloomberg 2021). 
The response measures by the Indonesian government to address the Covid-19 pan-
demic and decreasing energy demand also present a mixed picture in terms of the overall 
sustainability of its energy sector. The government adopted diferent measures to sub-
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incentives to reduce the impact of Covid-19. On the other, the government provided tax 
incentives to the solar industry among others (IISD 2020). Nevertheless, the demand for 
solar PV panels dropped by 70 percent during the pandemic, which is partly explained by 
overall reduction of government spending in this area (CAT 2020). 
In view of the long-term nature of these investments, taking a more carbon-intensive 
path is likely to present high stranded assets risks and major opportunity costs. The In-
ternational Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) already estimated in 2017 that upstream 
energy production could account for over 80 percent of potentially stranded assets in 
Indonesia, and in 2015 the Carbon Tracker Initiative calculated that unneeded capital 
expenditure investments could total almost US$92 billion under a 450-ppm scenario3 
of the International Energy Agency (IEA), with 62 percent of coal investments and 54 
percent of investments in natural gas at risk of stranding (Carbon Tracker Initiative 2015; 
Ivleva et al. 2017: 26). Indonesia’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) foresees 
coal contributing at least 30 percent of the electricity mix in 2025 and 25 percent in 2050 
(Government of Indonesia 2016). Furthermore, policies to promote coal are locking in 
large amounts of investment and high-carbon capacity – with all the associated costs for 
health and climate change impacts – when these funds could be used to further expand 
cleaner forms of energy production. Under the contracts drawn up between PLN and 
independent coal power producers, PLN commits to paying for the contracted amount 
of electricity whether it is required or not (Chung 2017; Sanchez 2017). The Indonesian 
state could therefore be locked into funding coal power for decades to come, regardless of 
future advances and price drops in low-carbon-energy technologies: to be in line with the 
objectives of the Paris Agreement, Indonesia’s coal-fred installed capacity would need to 
decrease to about 10 percent of its current installed level before 2030 (CAT 2020). 
The rapid expansion of coal also has signifcant health implications, particularly for 
those living on the islands of Java and Sumatra where most coal-fred power plants are 
located. The situation may be particularly grave in Jakarta, with 22 coal power plant 
units operating within 100 kilometres of the city in 2017, and seven more units planned 
(Greenpeace 2017). Non-communicable diseases caused by air pollution have been found 
to be a leading cause of premature death in Indonesia (IISD 2018), and it is estimated that 
every year 100,000 Indonesians die early as a result of poor air quality, caused at least in 
part by the current energy system (Wright 2016, cited by Ivlelva et al. 2017: 27). When 
the cost of health and climate change impacts are taken into account, coal power gener-
ation may cost up to US$61.5 per MWh – over twice the current market price of coal 
generation in Indonesia (IISD 2017). 
Other fragility and security risks 
Indonesia has become increasingly secure and stable over the 2010s. However, grow-
ing wealth inequality, ongoing security challenges, and climate change impacts could put 
pressure on politics and society in future (see Figure 3.2). 
Since the Asian fnancial crisis and the overthrow of H. Muhammed Suharto’s 30-year
dictatorship in 1998, Indonesia has made steady progress in developing the political institu-
tions of a stable, fully functioning democracy. There is an established pluralism in politics,
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Figure 3.2 Governance indicators (Indonesia). 
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Figure 3.3 Indonesia’s performance in the Fragile States Index 2006–2021. 
Note: Higher index numbers indicate a higher level of state fragility. 
Source: Fund for Peace (2021). 
organisations supporting democracy, human rights, and the environment are actively driv-
ing this trend (McWilliams 2018). The Freedom House Index of 2021 categorises Indo-
nesia as ‘partly free’, and Indonesia’s position in the Fragile States Index also shows strong
improvement in state legitimacy and public services until 2020 (i.e., before the Covid-19
pandemic) (Freedom House 2021; Fund for Peace 2021; see also Figures 3.2 and 3.3). 
However, the country also continues to face many of the same challenges it did 20 
years ago. An elite class who benefted from association with the Suharto regime remains 
largely intact, including those who are linked to Indonesia’s still-powerful military, which 
has seen a strengthening of its political role in the 2010s (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020). 
Accordingly, the country’s growing economic wealth has been concentrated in relatively 
few hands. Indonesia has one of the highest rates of wealth inequality4 in the world, and 
the gap between rich and poor has widened, putting social cohesion under stress. Almost 
half the population is living in poverty or just above the poverty line, and there are major 
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Despite continued high approval ratings (Rizki and Cahya 2018), the performance of 
President Widodo’s administration in fulflling his promises on improving social justice 
and delivering democratic progress, combating corruption, and addressing human rights 
issues has remained ambivalent. While many headline development indicators show im-
provement since he was frst elected in 2014, Indonesia’s score on the Transparency Inter-
national Corruption Perceptions Index has improved very little, and the country ranked 
102 out of 180 countries in 2020 (Transparency International 2020). According to the 
Bertelsmann Foundation, ‘protection of civil rights remained volatile between 2017 and 
2019,’ and journalists, government opposition, other social groups, non-mainstream re-
ligious groups, and critics of conservative interpretations of Islam have been intimidated 
and legally prosecuted (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020). The Fragile States Index also indi-
cates continued human rights issues (Fund for Peace 2021; see also Figure 3.3). 
Multiple security threats at the national level pose a risk to democracy and stability 
in the Indonesian archipelago. At the national level, Indonesia’s long history of separatist 
movements, clashes between divergent ethnic and religious groups, and growing discon-
tent over unequal treatment of indigenous groups have led to tensions in the past. Dis-
sident movements are particularly active in the Aceh and Papua region. Observers also 
warn about the ‘threat of a military coup in the event of a political crisis’ as a consequence 
of persistent scepticism among military leaders with regards to the ‘merits of civilian 
democracy’ (Russel 2016). 
Despite increased eforts by the Indonesian government to fght terrorism after the 
2002 Bali bombing, terrorism remains a palpable threat to security, as the attacks of 
2016, 2017, and 2018 have highlighted. In addition, the potential border crossing of ex-
tremists and terrorist groups from the Philippines and the rehabilitation of returning 
Indonesian foreign fghters from Syria represent an important challenge for the Indonesian 
security landscape (Gupta and Ayesh 2018). 
Piracy, illegal fshing, natural disasters, and people and drug-trafcking bear further con-
fict potential (Sukma 2012). Although the number of piracy incidents has been decreasing
since 2015, 26 piracy attacks and attempts were recorded in 2020 (Statista 2021b). Intru-
sions of the country’s maritime borders and hijacking and kidnapping incidents in the sur-
rounding waters have afected Indonesia’s maritime security in the past (Gindarsah 2017). 
With the second longest coastline in the world, Indonesia is also vulnerable to the ef-
fects of climate change and is likely to be severely impacted by changing rainfall patterns, 
temperature and sea-level rise, and extreme weather events and natural disasters. It has 
been estimated that climate change impacts in the areas of agriculture, health, and sea-
level rise could cost 132 trillion Indonesian rupiahs (equivalent to approximately US$8.9 
billion) by 2050, with the capital Jakarta potentially experiencing a quarter of these total 
projected costs (Hecht 2016). 
Concerning agriculture and food security, temperature increase and sea level rise may 
result in reduced rice productivity and increased damage to crops (US AID 2017), food 
defcits, and food production loss. As a consequence, the number of undernourished peo-
ple is likely to increase (Case et al. 2007). Climatic changes will also decrease water 
quality, increase salinisation of coastal aquifers (US AID 2017), and diminish groundwa-
ter resources, drinking water supplies, and irrigation water for agriculture (The Dutch 
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The increased food risk due to changing rainfall patterns is likely to increase the pollu-
tion of local sources of clean water (Dreierstad 2018). Warming waters, damage to reefs 
and mangroves, and the erosion of coastlines will likely also contribute to a decreasing 
marine fsh population (US AID 2017), endangering the livelihoods and increasing the 
vulnerability of coastal communities. It is expected that climate change will also increase 
risk of forest fres and a loss of habitats. It will thus afect both land and ocean ecosystems 
(US AID 2017). 
Furthermore, the rise in sea level will increase the frequency of foods in Jakarta’s and 
Bekasi’s densely populated areas. Runaway development and a near total lack of planning 
mean that Jakarta is already the world’s fastest sinking city, with around 40 percent of 
the city now below the sea level. Some estimates predict 95 percent of Jakarta’s northern 
port district, home to 1.2 million people, being submerged by 2050 (Kimmelman 2017). 
As stated in Indonesia’s NDC, climate change-induced natural disasters particularly af-
fect people below the poverty line, preventing asset accumulation; provoking rising food, 
water, and energy prices; and ultimately further reinforcing the already existing poverty. 
As a consequence, the resulting strong socioeconomic disparity might lead to political 
instability (Government of Indonesia 2016). Health impacts are also a concern due to the 
potential for increased incidence of vector- and waterborne diseases, such as dengue fever 
and malaria (US AID 2017). 
Past and present eforts to decarbonise 
Indonesia is party to all major climate treaties, having ratifed the UN Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1994, the Kyoto Protocol in 2004, and the 
Paris Agreement in 2016. It is a non-Annex I Party to the UNFCCC and is considered a 
developing country in climate treaties. Indonesia has submitted three National Commu-
nications under the UNFCCC, the most recent one in 2018 (as of mid-2021). By 2021, it 
has also issued two Biennial Update Reports. 
In its NDC to the Paris Agreement, the country has committed to a 29-percent emis-
sion reduction relative to a business-as-usual scenario by 2030 and, if international sup-
port is provided, to increase these eforts to ensure a reduction of 41 percent. Priority 
areas for reducing emissions outlined in Indonesia’s NDC cover both sustainable forest 
management – a forest moratorium and REDD+ and the transition towards a mixed-
energy-use policy with at least 23 percent renewable energy in 2025 – and waste manage-
ment (Government of Indonesia 2016). Indonesia has not updated or upgraded its original 
NDC (as of mid-2021). 
Indonesia accounts for around 2 percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (WRI
2021). To date, energy and land use, land use change, and forestry (LULUCF) have been by
far the highest emitting sectors (WRI 2021; see Figure 3.4). Having lost a total of 15 per-
cent of its forest cover due to land use change and peat fres between 2001 and 2017 (Global
Forest Watch 2018), reducing deforestation and implementing aforestation programmes
will be crucial for both adaptation and mitigation. Palm oil is the largest single cause of
deforestation, and palm oil plantations are also reducing biodiversity, having been found to
have harmed over 190 threatened species (Carrington 2018). However, the country’s rapid
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Figure 3.4 Indonesia’s greenhouse gas emissions and emission targets (1990–2018). 
Source: WRI (2021). 
come from industry, transportation, and electricity supply (Rissmann 2017). Analysis by
the World Resources Institute forecasts that energy emissions will outstrip LULUCF emis-
sions and account for over half of total emissions by 2026 (Wijaya et al. 2017). 
Indonesia’s long-term development priorities, as expressed in its national development 
plan for 2005 to 2025, are squarely focused on stimulating economic growth to lift more 
people out of poverty and on strengthening its democracy and international standing. 
Climate and environmental protection, and their contribution to long-term prosperity, 
are not explicitly mentioned among these core objectives. 
Climate policy falls under the remit of the Ministry of Forestry and Environment. 
Several policies detailing Indonesia’s climate action eforts exist, including the National 
Medium Term Development Plans for 2015–2019 and for 2020–2024 (RPJMN), with 
eforts to foster a green economy and promote sustainable infrastructures. As part of the 
new 2020–2024 Plan, the government has launched a Low-Carbon Development Initia-
tive to ensure the environmental credentials of the next fve-year plan (GCEC 2018), and 
a low-carbon development plan, including three emission pathways to 2045 (CAT 2020). 
The National Action Plan for Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction and the National Ad-
aptation Action Plan on Climate Change are the country’s core mitigation and adaptation 
policies. They present Indonesia’s strategic vision and specify areas for action on green cit-
ies, rural development, natural resources, community resilience, forestry and peat lands, 
agriculture, energy and transportation, industry, and waste (GRICCE 2017). 
Current policy projections for sectors beyond LULUCF show that the country will 
easily overachieve its current NDC targets, and this likely overachievement has led the 
ambition of its NDC target (excluding forestry) to be rated as ‘highly insufcient’ (CAT 
2020). Indeed, a large proportion of emission reductions up to 2030 set to come from the 
forestry sector and Indonesia’s forest moratorium is the policy with the greatest potential 
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2030, it could lower emissions by around 199 Mt CO2. Furthermore, if the moratorium 
were extended to cover more forest and forest areas under concession licenses, emissions 
might be reduced by as much as 437 Mt CO2 by 2030 – the equivalent to shutting of 108 
coal power plants for a year (WRI 2020; calculated using EPA 2017). This would require 
better enforcement of existing policies and regulations, with more resources for combat-
ting illegal deforestation and mining (UNDP 2018). 
To date, there has been strong government, private sector, and public support for Indo-
nesia’s current development path, which exploits its abundant domestic coal reserves and
promises low-cost energy in the short term. A 2018 survey of stakeholders in the Indonesian
power sector found that they prioritised the afordability of energy and security of supply
over sustainability (PWC 2018: 30). This focus on keeping the price of energy low refects
mainstream public opinion. The huge increases in coal-fred power generation, including in
and around major cities, has not prompted any signifcant backlash in Indonesia – unlike in
other nearby countries like Thailand where local population has protested and staged hun-
ger strikes against new coal power plants (Palma 2018) – and a 2015 survey found that 79
percent of Indonesians were opposed to energy subsidy reform, despite its benefts (Pfeferle
2018). Although sustainable development was an important manifesto issue for Jokowi in
the presidential elections in April 2019 (Heriyanto 2019), the afordability of energy was
a much more prominent issue in both candidates’ campaigns. The government’s cap on
domestic coal prices and price controls on fuel and electricity were widely considered to be
aimed at boosting Widodo’s popularity, and other candidates were reluctant to announce
measures that would raise the cost of electricity or fuel (Crooks 2018). However, in the
medium term, as the price of renewable energy technologies continues to fall, there is likely
to be less of a trade-of between afordability and sustainability (PWC 2018). 
However, there are powerful players supporting the continued development of fossil 
fuels in Indonesia. Its history of oil production and fossil fuel subsidies has given rise 
to an ‘“oil and gas mafa”, known for its corruption, including embezzlement of funds 
from the Ministry of Energy, extortion, tax fraud and smuggling’ (Cassin 2014; Sukoyo 
2014), and the coal industry has a strong lobby in Indonesian politics and business (Crooks 
2018). ‘State-owned oil company Pertamina, the Indonesian oil-trading lobby, vehicle 
manufacturers and distributors and freight and public transport’ and other vested inter-
ests in industries that beneft most from subsidised fuels have lobbied intensively against 
them. Pertamina, for example, would be unable to compete in the market for refned 
oil products without subsidies due to decades of insufcient investment in the company 
(Chelminski 2018). 
Trends and potential 
While the country’s growth model has brought prosperity to a rising number of Indo-
nesians, Indonesia’s challenge is to leapfrog the carbon-intensive development pattern
taken by the West and China and to move towards sectors with a more sustainable,
long-term future. How well and how quickly Indonesia achieves this could also have
implications more globally as other emerging economies and developing countries in
Southeast Asia and Africa look to Indonesia as a model for successful economic develop-
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Financing low-carbon development 
Putting Indonesia on a sound footing in a decarbonised world will require sustained polit-
ical will and increased investments in renewable energy technologies and efcient equip-
ment. As shown above, Indonesia is already set to invest enormous sums into its energy 
system over the coming decades. Greater ambition in investing in clean energy technol-
ogies could signifcantly reduce stranded asset risks, and, even before the costs of health 
impacts and climate change are factored in, these investments would more than pay for 
themselves over time (Rissmann 2017). 
As well as reducing vulnerability to shocks on international markets and increasing spend-
ing on public goods such as healthcare and education, further reducing subsidies on fuel and
on electricity generated by fossil fuels could support Indonesia’s low-carbon transition in at
least two important ways. First, reducing government spending on these subsidies could
enhance scope for increasing investment in energy efciency, renewable energy technolo-
gies, and other low-carbon sectors of the economy. Second, reducing subsidies can improve
efciency, preventing unnecessary investments in expensive new power stations. The most
recent National Medium Term Development Plan for 2020–2024 (RPJMN) has taken one
step in this direction, but it remains to be seen to what extent the support for traditional
energy sector players as a response to the pandemic crisis will counteract this approach. 
Interim results from decreasing subsidies have indicated some positive trends. The in-
creases in electricity prices resulting from lower power-sector subsidies have put elec-
tricity consumption on a lower-growth trajectory (Varagur 2018). Between its 2017 and 
2018 business plan, state utility PLN reduced its target for new power generation capacity 
down from 78 GW to 56 GW by 2027, not least due to lower expected average energy 
demand growth5 (PWC 2018). Fuel subsidies have increased demand for fuel and con-
tributed to the rapid spread of privately owned motor vehicles (Asian Development Bank 
2015; IEA 2016). The transport sector is responsible for almost 40 percent of Indonesian 
energy demand, and this is also where the greatest future increase is to be expected. Con-
sequently, reducing subsidies has been shown to signifcantly reduce trafc in Indonesia’s 
congested cities (Burke et al. 2017). 
Subsidy reform has had a chequered history in Indonesia – the steep reductions in sub-
sidies and fuel price hikes following the Asian fnancial crisis in 1998 resulted in riots 
that contributed to the toppling of the Suharto regime. However, successful reforms, 
such as those enacted by Jokowi in 2014, have shown that to ensure social acceptance, 
reforms must be accompanied by social assistance to ensure that poorer households are 
not disadvantaged by rising energy prices. Strong political leadership and strategically 
communicating reform to the public have also been important (Chelminski 2018). Fur-
ther reductions of subsidies initiated before the Covid-19 pandemic hold the potential to 
realise some of the potential indicated above (IISD 2021). 
Potential in key low-carbon sectors 
Indonesia accounts for over 36 percent of energy demand in Southeast Asia, making it 
the largest energy consumer in the region (IEA 2021a). With energy demand rising and 
electricity demand potentially doubling until 2040 (IEA 2021a), efciency measures are 
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essential to keep energy use and expenditure down and reduce emissions. If current pol-
icies are implemented and enforced, they could result in energy savings of 2 percent per 
year up to 2025 (IEA 2017). However, there is ample scope for increasing ambition, 
with Indonesia scoring only 35 out of 100 for energy efciency in the World Bank’s Reg-
ulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy Index (World Bank 2020b). Important areas 
for action include cooling and transport. Average yearly installations of air-conditioning 
units are increasing at a rate of 13 percent in Indonesia, making the country the second 
fastest growing market behind India (Cool Coalition 2020). The total number of air-
conditioning units in Southeast Asia is expected to rise from 40 million units in 2017 to 
about 300 million units in 2040 and 50 percent of the new units are expected to be in-
stalled in Indonesia (IEA 2019). If implementation of regional targets for energy efciency 
in the cooling sector were to be accelerated, Indonesia could avoid an additional 32 peta-
joules (PJ) of electricity consumption by 2030, equivalent to 5.2 million barrels of oil. 
With regard to the transport sector, if Indonesia matched China in terms of fuel efciency 
standards for heavy duty vehicles, and if electric motorcycles were to achieve the same 
market penetration as in China, Indonesia could reduce its fuel imports by 13 percent by 
2030 and reduce its spending on oil imports by over US$1.4 billion per year (IEA 2017; 
see also IEA 2021a). Regulatory frameworks and a lack of infrastructure are also holding 
back progress in electric mobility (IRENA 2017). 
Regarding renewable energy, Indonesia is a country with ‘phenomenal resources for 
renewable power generation’ (IRENA 2017). Aside from emission reductions, renewable 
energy poses major advantages for improving air quality in cities, reducing health hazards, 
and supplying electricity to Indonesia’s more remote provinces and islands. There are 
also important fnancial co-benefts – taking into account the impacts of climate change 
and health costs of air pollution – scaling up renewables can save the country between 
US$15.6 billion and US$51.7 billion per year (IRENA 2017). Some technologies are also 
increasingly able to compete with domestic coal on costs. In 2019, installed capacity 
from renewable sources totalled 9,861 MW, accounting for 14.6 percent of the country’s 
electricity capacity and generation (IRENA 2021, PWC 2018). In its business plan for 
developing Indonesia’s electricity supply for the period 2018–2027, state-owned elec-
tricity utility PLN envisages adding almost 15 GW of new renewable generation capacity 
by 2027, which would represent 27 percent of new capacity overall (PWC 2018). As 
mentioned above, the National Development Plan 2020–2024 foresees an upgrade of this 
expansion target (adding more than 25 GW new renewable generation capacity by 2024). 
Indonesia’s NDC states that renewable energy will provide at least 23 percent of the coun-
try’s primary energy supply by 2025 and at least 31 percent by 2050. 
In 2019 hydropower and geothermal power accounted for almost 80 percent of elec-
tricity from renewable sources. Hydropower provides the greatest proportion, with 5,616 
MW of installed capacity covering over 6 percent of national electricity production in 
2019 (IRENA 2021). The business plan foresees around 8 GW of new power generation 
capacity being added by 2027, although the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources 
estimates that potential hydropower generation could be as high as 75 GW6 (PWC 2018). 
Indonesia also has the world’s second largest reserves of geothermal energy, with potential 
power generation of 29 GW (PWC 2017). In 2019, just above 2 GW of power – around 
3 percent of the Indonesian energy mix – was generated by geothermal plants (IRENA 
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2021), with 4.5 GW of new power generation capacity set to be added by 2027 (PWC 
2017, 2018). The development of this form of energy is being driven by state-owned en-
terprises (PWC 2017). Both these technologies provide base-load renewable power that 
can balance a high share of intermittent renewable energy sources, such as wind and solar 
PV. However, in 2017 Indonesia still trailed other G20 countries in installed capacity 
of wind and solar PV (Allianz 2017). Whereas solar and wind respectively contributed 
a mere 198 MW and 76 MW of generation capacity in 2019 (IRENA 2021), ministry 
assessments found installed peak capacity could total 207.8 GWp from solar PV and 60.6 
GW from wind power (Government of Indonesia 2019). In the latest business plan, PLN 
proposed raising its target for renewables other than hydropower and geothermal energy 
to 2,046 MW, which would represent only 4 percent of the projected new generation 
capacity by 2027 (PWC 2018). 
To accelerate growth in renewables, both government and private sector investment 
will be needed. However, the power sector is still heavily regulated by the government, 
and there have been numerous changes to regulations for independent power producers, 
creating uncertainty and holding back investment (IRENA 2017; Allianz 2017). As such, 
Indonesia ranks 19 on the Allianz Climate and Energy Investment Index for G20 coun-
tries, which evaluates policy adequacy, policy reliability, market absorption capacity, and 
general involvement conditions7 (Allianz 2018). Private sector investors are demanding 
high rates of return before entering or increasing their stake in the Indonesian renewables 
market (Allianz 2017; PWC 2018). Further barriers include the fragmented nature of 
the grid across the Indonesian archipelago, which makes efective policy and planning 
difcult, and the bottlenecks in PLN’s transmission and distribution systems, which is 
unlikely to be able to accommodate high amounts of distributed solar power without 
signifcant investment (IRENA 2017). Ensuring the continued and successful rollout will 
therefore require more detailed long-term policy and investment planning. Indonesia has 
been one of four countries in the G20 without a long-term plan to decarbonise the grid 
and power system (Allianz 2018). 
Education and skills development 
Indonesia has made huge progress raising the level of education among its young and 
growing population, particularly in the past 15 years. However, according to the World 
Bank’s Human Capital Index, the current level of education and healthcare would allow 
the average child born in Indonesia today to achieve around 54 percent of its potential, 
below the average for the East Asia and Pacifc region and below the average for upper-
middle-income countries (World Bank 2020a). Indonesia still lags behind neighbouring 
countries like Vietnam and Singapore in the average years of schooling and the quality 
of its education system (World Bank 2018). While it ranked 36 out of 137 participating 
countries in the 2017–2018 Global Competitiveness Index overall, it only came in the 
94th place for primary education and health and 64th place for higher education and 
training (WEF 2017). The literacy rate in Indonesia is 95.7 percent, and the average In-
donesian attends school for 14 years (CIA 2021). Enrolment in both secondary education 
and tertiary education has steadily increased to 89 percent and 36 percent, respectively, 
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Services was the fastest growing sector in Indonesia in the period from 2007 to 2017, 
achieving an average annual growth of 7 percent (ILO 2017; Statista 2021a), and em-
ployed around 50 percent of the population in 2019. Agriculture remains a signifcant 
employer, but its share of the workforce has gradually fallen from 39 percent in 2010 to 
28 percent in 2020 (Statista 2021a), despite the sector growing on average 4 percent per 
year (ILO 2017). Just over a ffth of Indonesians are employed in industry, which includes 
mining, manufacturing, and construction (ILO 2017; Statista 2021a). Although the gen-
eral pre-pandemic unemployment rate was relatively low (3.6 percent in 2019) (World 
Bank 2021d), youth unemployment stood at 20 percent (World Bank 2021e). Due to the 
pandemic, unemployment rose to 6.3 percent as of February 2021 (The Jakarta Post 2021).
The economy is also facing further challenges regarding the quality of work, gender, and 
disparities across the provinces (ILO 2017). 
Technological advancements are shaping the economy in Indonesia, and digitisation will
likely lead to both the loss and creation of jobs. The e-commerce, on-demand services, and
transportation sectors are growing and ofering new employment opportunities. However,
the ‘technology versus jobs debate’ continues, and further education and training schemes
will become increasingly important as increasing numbers of jobs are automated, espe-
cially since many Indonesians only have low-level educational qualifcations (ILO 2017). 
Cooperation with the EU 
As the largest economy in Southeast Asia and the seat of ASEAN, Indonesia is an increas-
ingly important partner for the EU, and a sound basis has already been developed for co-
operation between Indonesia and the EU. Trade in fossil fuels between Indonesia and the 
EU is relatively insignifcant. By contrast, the EU is a major importer of Indonesian palm 
oil, which is used in many sectors, including for biofuels. This has given rise to tensions 
given EU intentions to phase out the use of palm oil in the production of biofuels. Sustain-
able forest management has been a focal area for development cooperation. 
Institutional framework for cooperation with Indonesia and ASEAN 
EU-Indonesia relations have developed rapidly in recent years. The Partnership and Co-
operation Agreement that entered into force in 2014 established a frm framework for 
cooperation in the felds of trade, tourism, energy, transport, environment, and natural 
resources, as well as in security and combating terrorism (European Commission 2009; 
EU 2014). In addition, the EU and Indonesia hold regular political dialogues, human 
rights dialogues, and security dialogues (EU-Indonesia 2018). For example, the EU and 
Indonesia are working towards advancing the EU-Indonesia Security and Defence Part-
nership (EEAS 2018a). 
Negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) began in 
2016 with the aim of achieving an ‘ambitious and mutually benefcial trade agreement’ 
(EEAS 2018b; see also EEAS 2018c). The agreement is set to cover a broad range of issues, 
including tarifs and non-tarif barriers to trade, as well as trade in services and invest-
ment (European Commission 2021a). It is also set to include a sustainability chapter. As of 
mid-2021, negotiations are still ongoing. 
 62 Indonesia: beyond fossil fuels 
The EU has also deepened its ties with ASEAN. Already, in 2015, the High Represent-
ative of the Union for Foreign Afairs and Security Policy issued a Joint Communication 
entitled ‘The EU and ASEAN: a partnership with a strategic purpose’ (European Com-
mission 2015) which specifes climate change action as a key focal area for strengthening 
interregional cooperation. Initiatives are underway to support sustainable forest and peat-
land management in ASEAN countries. These include measures to the Sustainable Use 
of Peatlands and Haze Mitigation in ASEAN (SUPA) programme, and the EU FLEGT 
(Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade) Facility to promote the trade of le-
gally produced timber. In 2013, the latter resulted in a Voluntary Partnership Agreement 
between the EU and Indonesia to assure access of legal timber exports to the EU market 
(European Commission 2016). In December 2020, the EU and ASEAN elevated their 
partnership with a commitment to regular summits at leaders’ level (ASEAN/EU 2020). 
Ultimately, the EU hopes to use its bilateral trade negotiations and agreements with 
ASEAN countries as steppingstones towards an EU-ASEAN trade agreement. Free trade 
agreements have already been concluded with Singapore (2014) and Vietnam (2015), and, 
alongside Indonesia, negotiations are ongoing with Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philip-
pines (European Commission 2021a). In 2018, the High Representative also issued a Joint 
Communication proposing several policy initiatives and proposals to serve as building 
blocks for an EU strategy for improving connectivity between the EU and Asia, including 
improving transport, energy, and digital links (European Commission 2018a). An exam-
ple of an EU-ASEAN initiative that will feed into this strategy is the €85 million the EU 
has provided to support for consolidating the ASEAN community via a single market and 
reduced non-tarif barriers to trade (European Commission 2018b). 
Trade 
In 2020, the bilateral trade in goods between the EU and Indonesia amounted to €20.6 
billion, down from €23.8 billion in 2019. In services, bilateral trade amounted to €7.5 
billion in 2019 (European Commission 2021a). The EU mainly exports high-tech machin-
ery, transport equipment, manufacturing goods, and chemicals to Indonesia (EEAS 2017; 
see also European Commission 2021b). For example, half of Indonesia’s defence imports 
throughout the period 2004–2017 were from the EU and Switzerland (ISS 2018). All 
in all, the EU-27 accounts for 5.5 percent of Indonesian commodities exports, with the 
Netherlands (1 percent) as the biggest export partner (Chatham House 2021). Trade in 
fossil fuels between Indonesia and the EU is relatively insignifcant, with EU coal and oil 
exports accounting for less than 0.5 percent of Indonesian imports and Indonesian coal 
exports to the EU having decreased from 3.2 percent in 2011 to less than 1 percent of EU 
coal imports in 2019 (Chatham House 2021). 
Far more signifcant are Indonesia’s crude palm oil exports to the EU, which is its sec-
ond largest export market (see Figure 3.1). The EU has been ‘the most open market for 
Indonesian palm oil’ (Copenhagen Economics 2018), with Indonesia providing 36 percent 
of all EU palm oil imports in 2019 (Chatham House 2021). Almost half of EU palm oil 
imports are used for the production of biofuels (Copenhagen Economics 2018). The issue 
of palm oil in European biofuels has become a focal issue as the EU 2018 Renewable En-
ergy Directive foresees the gradual phase-out of food crops such as palm oil that it alleges 
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result in high indirect land use change (EEAS 2018d; Voegele 2018). This promises to 
severely restrict Indonesian palm oil exports to the EU and has been an issue in bilateral 
relations, including in the CEPA negotiations. As a sign of the growing tensions, Indo-
nesia launched a WTO lawsuit on the matter in late 2019 (European Commission 2019; 
Nangoy and Munthe 2019). In order to settle the dispute, a panel was established on the 
request of Indonesia in 2020 (see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cas-
es_e/ds593_e.htm). 
Development cooperation 
The EU and its member states have worked in partnership with Indonesia on a range of in-
itiatives to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and tackle climate change 
(EEAS 2018e). Due to Indonesia achieving G20 member status, the EU is no longer pro-
viding Indonesia with bilateral aid. However, the EU has supported Indonesia’s national 
climate change response via a programme, which has particularly supported the Aceh and 
Papua provinces in their eforts towards low-emission development planning and enhanc-
ing education (EEAS 2016). The EU also provided emergency humanitarian assistance 
after the Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami in September 2018. The total collective EU aid 
amounted to €18 million. In addition, the EU deployed civil protection and humanitarian 
experts to help coordinate relief eforts on site (EEAS 2018f). This is complemented by 
bilateral aid by EU member states as well as in the broader ASEAN context. 
Conclusions 
With its abundant natural resources and as one of the world’s most populous countries, 
Indonesia has advanced to become a regional leader and a major economy. Since the 1980s, 
it has diversifed its economy beyond fossil fuels, although carbon intensive exports, such 
as coal and palm oil, remain important pillars of its economic development. Furthermore, 
as a fast-developing nation with a growing population and rising expectations in terms 
of income and living standards, electricity and fuel consumption is increasing rapidly, 
and their afordability is an important political issue. The Indonesian government and 
state utility have invested heavily in exploiting the country’s abundant hydrocarbons, par-
ticularly coal, to meet these energy needs. While this may be considered cost-efective 
at present, there are major health and opportunity costs to following the high-carbon 
development path taken by the West and China, rather than leapfrogging more quickly to 
low-carbon development models. As Indonesia is a role model for other developing coun-
tries in Southeast Asia and Africa, the way it develops and how quickly it is able to harness 
its high energy efciency and renewable energy potential to move to a low-emission econ-
omy may also have wider implications for global emission reductions. 
Eforts to green the European transport sector and reduce the impact of biofuels on 
deforestation and emissions in other parts of the world may present a risk for Indonesian 
palm oil exports. Continued exports to Europe are likely to rely on Indonesia achieving 
a balance between developing its economically important palm oil industry and measures 
to protect its tropical forests and reduce its high emissions from land use and land use 
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power sector, coal consumption and power sector decarbonisation trends in India and 
China will have an important infuence on Indonesian coal export revenues. Oil imports 
and the pressure of continued – albeit reduced – fuel subsidies on government budgets 
leave Indonesia exposed to fuctuations in the international oil price, which is increasingly 
being infuenced by decarbonisation trends. In the past, oil price increases led to domestic 
price shocks and political unrest in Indonesia. 
The EU and Indonesia are cooperating to improve the sustainability of Indonesia’s palm 
oil and timber exports, for example, via strengthened diplomacy, certifcation schemes, 
and a strong focus on sustainable forest management in development cooperation. Fur-
thermore, in the negotiations for a CEPA, the EU and Indonesia aim to establish a broader 
basis for future EU-Indonesia relations and a deeper economic partnership. This will sup-
port the development of other areas of mutual interest for future EU-Indonesia relations, 
including diversifed trade and sustainable development. The EU and its member states 
can assist in important ways to help Indonesia accelerate its transition to a low-carbon 
economy. 
On the basis of these fndings, we can identify a number of prominent focal points 
for the EU to support Indonesia’s low-carbon development under European and global 
decarbonisation: 
• EU-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement: The 
conclusion of the CEPA with Indonesia can provide a basis for increased and more di-
versifed trade with Indonesia. Maintaining an open and constructive dialogue with 
the Indonesian government and stakeholders throughout the negotiations, and par-
ticularly on sensitive issues such as defnitions of sustainability and the role of palm 
oil and forestry products, will be key to the success of the fnal agreement. 
• Sustainable forest management: The EU can continue to provide assistance and 
work with Indonesian stakeholders to strengthen the Voluntary Partnership Agree-
ment on timber exports by improving the system assuring the legality of timber, its 
implementation, and monitoring of the agreement’s social, economic, and environ-
mental efects. 
• Renewable energy: The EU and its member states have substantial expertise in 
felds such as renewable energy and energy efciency in industrial processes and 
households. They can therefore provide positive support for Indonesia’s low-carbon 
energy transition in the form of capacity-building and technology transfer. Ofer-
ing economically viable alternative pathways is essential, as domestic availability of 
coal – and in the forest sector the economic importance of palm oil production – are 
seemingly frst-best solutions for Indonesia to develop its economy. Finance and tech-
nology transfer can improve the attractiveness of a lower-carbon pathway. 
• Promote just transition narratives in EU (climate) diplomacy: The EU 
and its member states have developed policies and good practices to support coal-
producing regions diversify and create low-carbon jobs, as well as gathering lessons 
learned. The EU can encourage exchange with Indonesian counterparts on this issue. 
The EU and its member states can also seek closer cooperation with Indonesia within 
international and multilateral forums promoting the low-carbon energy transition, 
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• Promote sustainable urban development: European cities have also tested a 
range of policies to reduce trafc congestion and air pollution in urban areas. Euro-
pean diplomacy can encourage exchange on this issue as European best practices (and 
failures) may be a valuable source of knowledge for Indonesian cities as they grow and 
the country becomes increasingly urbanised. 
Overall, Indonesia is an increasingly important partner for the EU, as it is both a major 
economy and a leading voice within ASEAN. The EU has established a fruitful basis for 
cooperation, and the ongoing CEPA negotiations are creating the potential for further 
cooperation and trade in existing and new areas, including many that are relevant for 
decarbonisation. Building a consensus on the sensitive issue of palm oil sustainability in 
biofuels will be important to the success of the agreement and to future relations, given its 
signifcance for Indonesian trade with the EU – and for shaping decarbonisation pathways 
on both sides. Indonesia and the EU also share common challenges with regard to decar-
bonisation, such as sustainable urban development and the low-carbon energy transition. 
This includes ensuring the just transition of regions dependent on the production of coal 
and other high-carbon products, and the rollout of high proportions of renewable energy 
technologies. These areas can form the basis of deepened cooperation as the EU and Indo-
nesia pursue more ambitious decarbonisation policies. 
Notes 
1 GDP per capita increased from US$2,144 in 2000 to US$4,451 in 2019 (in constant 2010 US$; 
World Bank 2021b). 
2 Measured in terms of the poverty headcount ratio at US$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (World Bank 
2021c). 
3 Introduced in the International Energy Agency (IEA) 2014 World Energy Outlook (IEA 2014), 
the 450 ppm scenario – compatible with limiting warming to 2°C – assumes that oil demand 
will peak around 2020. 
4 ‘Indonesia’s wealth Gini coefcient – 84 on a 0-to-100 scale – is among the highest in the 
world and has gone up since 2012. Income disparity is comparatively almost as severe (62nd) 
and has deepened since 2012’ (WEF 2018). 
5 From 8.3 percent in the 2017 business plan to 6.9 percent in the 2018 version (PWC 2018: 12). 
6 Although the Ministry’s technical assessments of potential power generation do not take into 
account fnancial/economic viability (PWC 2018). 
7 In the Allianz Climate and Energy Investment Index for the G20, Indonesia ranks fourth high-
est in terms of investment needs and 14th in terms of investment attractiveness, for which it 
scores 31 out of 100 (Allianz 2017: 40). 
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 4 Azerbaijan 
Partnership potential beyond gas? 
Introduction 
The Republic of Azerbaijan (henceforth Azerbaijan) is a country of around 10 million
inhabitants (CIA 2021) located in the South Caucasus region between Eastern Europe
and Western Asia. Azerbaijan shares borders with Iran, Armenia, Georgia, and Russia,
and it is a coastal state to the west of the Caspian Sea. A quarter of the size of Germany,
Azerbaijan is composed of 66 administrative divisions with Baku its biggest city and
capital. The country is semi-urbanised with 56.8 percent of the population living in
towns and cities (CIA 2021). Azerbaijan is a presidential republic headed since 2003 by
Ilham Aliyev, in his fourth term, having succeeded his father Haider Aliyev. The country
gained independence from the Soviet Union on 30 August 1991 and became part of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIA 2021). Azerbaijan-Russia ties remain close
and friendly. 
Azerbaijan’s economy has seen dynamic development since the mid-1990s and in par-
ticular after 2004, driven by the development of its oil and gas industry. From 1995 to 
2019, Azerbaijan’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased more than 15-fold to about 
US$48 billion (in current US$) (World Bank 2021c). GDP per capita similarly grew more 
than tenfold to about US$4.800 in 2019 (World Bank 2021d). As a result, the percentage 
of people living under the poverty line decreased from 24 percent in 2005 to around 
5 percent from 2015 onwards (Indexmundi 2020; CIA 2021). Unemployment is relatively 
low at around 5 percent (2019) (Trading Economics 2021a). 
Accordingly, Azerbaijan has become an upper-middle-income country, and available 
indices indicate a medium ranking of Azerbaijan regarding economic welfare and hu-
man development. Hence, on the Human Development Index of 2019 Azerbaijan ranks 
88 out of 189 countries (UNDP 2020). On the World Economic Forum’s Inclusive De-
velopment Index of 2018 Azerbaijan ranks third among the emerging and developing 
economies (World Economic Forum 2018). On the 2021 Sustainable Development Goals 
Index Azerbaijan is ranked 55 out of 165 countries, progressing at an average pace for its 
region (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2021). Also, Azerbaijan ranks 71 out of 179 countries on 
the Fragile States Index in 2021 (Fund for Peace 2021), with a signifcant improvement 
especially in the economic dimension since 2009 (see Figure 4.3). Similarly, Azerbaijan 
overall ranked 98 out of 137 countries on the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation In-
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Following the general approach of the case studies, this chapter will explore the chal-
lenges and opportunities Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan-EU relations face under decarboni-
sation in fve steps. The next section frst demonstrates Azerbaijan’s high dependence on 
the production and export of oil and gas and hence its vulnerability to price fuctuations 
and the phase-out of fossil fuels. It also explores other fragility and security risks, includ-
ing the longstanding confict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Subsequently, we assess the status of Azerbaijan’s climate policy, which leaves much room 
for further improvement. This is followed by the review of relevant trends and potentials, 
especially regarding eforts to diversify the economy that have only borne limited fruit so 
far. The one but last section reviews the framework and basis of EU-Azerbaijan relations 
beyond fossil fuels. The fnal section concludes and identifes focal points for EU foreign 
policy towards Azerbaijan under decarbonisation. 
Exposure and risks 
Exposure to global decarbonisation trends 
Azerbaijan’s economy is highly dependent on the production and export of oil and gas. 
The country depends on oil and gas for at least half of its economy and government reve-
nue. Accordingly, while the development of its oil and gas resources has in general helped 
to advance welfare and provide for political stability in the twenty-frst century, Azerbai-
jan has remained exposed to oil price fuctuations. 
Azerbaijan is a signifcant producer of oil and gas. In 2019, it produced about 780,000 
barrels of oil per day, equivalent to somewhat less than 1 percent of the world total. Oil 
production has decreased by more than 20 percent since the beginning of the 2010s. Azer-
baijan’s gas production reached 24.3 billion cubic metres in 2019 (an increase of about 
50 percent over the course of the decade), which put Azerbaijan among the top 30 gas-
producing countries (BP 2020; CIA 2021; SOCAR 2021a). 
Azeri gas reserves are more signifcant than its oil reserves. Azerbaijan’s proven oil 
reserves are estimated to amount to about 7 billion barrels, which might – given current 
production levels – be exhausted within the next two to three decades (BP 2020; see also 
Shepard 2016). Accordingly, Azeri oil production is expected to decline further in the 
medium term (Gurbanov et al. 2017). In contrast, estimated gas reserves of up to 2.8 
trillion cubic metres could support current production levels for more than 100 years (BP 
2020; see for other estimates: CIA 2021; EIA 2021). 
In accordance with its resource base, Azerbaijan mainly uses gas and oil as a source of
energy supply. Overall, domestic oil consumption has been increasing slightly in the 2010s
to around 108,000 barrels per day in 2019 (around 14 percent of production) (BP 2020).
Similarly, gas consumption has been increasing over the past decade, accounting for about
50 percent of overall production in 2019 (11.8 billion cubic metres: BP 2020), which has
also been increasing (see above). Gas (13 power stations) generally provides for more than
90 percent of power production (with some fuctuation depending on the availability of hy-
dropower depending on rainfall). Overall, about two-thirds of overall energy consumption
is accounted for by gas, about 30 percent by oil, with the remaining 2–3 percent made up of
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Oil and gas exports are of crucial importance for Azerbaijan’s economy. In the 2010s, 
the country exported about 85 percent of its oil production and an increasing share of up 
to 50 percent of its gas production (BP 2020; CIA 2021). Oil and gas account for over 90 
percent of Azeri exports (World Bank 2021g), which makes the country ‘vulnerable to 
external shocks’ (European Parliament 2017: 22; see also Figure 4.1).1 
As a result, oil and gas continue to play a dominant role in the Azeri economy and for the 
government budget. As the engine of the economy, the sector accounts for about half of 
GDP (fuctuating somewhat with the oil price) and the state budget. Both shares have 
tended to decline in the 2010s because of the declining oil production and oil price (see 
below) and the Azeri government’s eforts to diversify the economy, including through 
the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), as well as its attempts to 
broaden the budget income base. The SOFAZ was created in 1999 to accumulate oil 
revenues for the beneft of current and future generations. One of its major objectives is 
to provide support for the development of non-oil sectors (Breban and Mukhtarov 2017; 
Gurbanov et al. 2017: 6). Overall, the diversifcation of the economy remains a major 
challenge nevertheless (see below). 
Fossil fuel exports as % GDP (2019)
25.5% 
Fossil fuel exports as % total exports 
(2019) 
92.8% 
Fossil fuel exports to EU as % of 
total exports to the EU (2020) 
98.1% 
Exports to the EU as % of total export
(2020) 
48.3% 
Figure 4.1 Status of fossil fuel exports of Azerbaijan in 2019/2020. 
Sources: Data based on: https://data.worldbank.org (fossil fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise export; 
oil, gas, and coal as a percentage of GDP – accessed on 25 July 2021) and European Commission 2021 (exports 
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While relying on the oil and gas sector for its income, the Azeri government also 
provides subsidies for energy. According to the International Energy Agency, in 2020 
US$487 million of subsidies were given to the oil sector, US$236 million for electricity, 
and US$302 million for natural gas, primarily for consumption (overall amounting to 
about 2.4 percent of GDP) (IEA 2020). 
Despite some tools to manage oil price fuctuations, Azerbaijan has remained exposed
to variations in oil (and related gas) prices. Declining oil prices after 2014 have left a
clear mark on economic development. GDP in current US$ declined sharply from 75.2
billion in 2014 to 37.9 billion in 2016. It recovered to about US$48 billion in 2019 before
receding to US$42.6 billion in 2020 in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. GDP per
capita similarly dropped from US$7,900 in 2014 to less than US$3,900 in 2016, before
increasing to US$4,700 in 2019 (2020: 4200). Due to exchange rate fuctuations, the
fgures look far less dramatic in constant 2010 US$ according to which overall GDP
dropped from US$57.9 billion in 2014 to US$56.7 billion in 2016, reaching US$59.1 bil-
lion in 2019 and US$56.5 billion in 2020 (indicating a decline of GDP of nearly 5 percent
in 2020). GDP per capita in constant US$ declined from US$6,073 in 2014 to US$5,765
in 2017, reaching US$5,895 in 2019 and US$5,593 in 2020 (World Bank 2021c, 2021d,
2021e, 2021f). 
Accordingly, the contribution of revenue from the oil and gas sector to the government 
budget has also declined. While the SOFAZ has been used as a bufer for balancing the 
state budget in times of low or falling oil prices (under the banner of ‘supporting macro-
economic stability’) (Breban and Mukhtarov 2017; Gurbanov et al. 2017: 6), Azerbaijan’s 
public debt has nevertheless risen in the wake of sharp falls in the oil price from 2014 to 
2016. The debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 7.3 percent in 2008 to more than 22 percent in 
2016, after which it only slightly declined to about 18 percent in 2019 (with the partial 
recovery of oil prices), before increasing to more than 20 percent in 2020 (as a result of 
the Covid-19 pandemic) (Trading Economics 2021b). Overall, the debt-to-GDP ratio has 
hence remained modest (with some exposure to fuctuations). 
Azerbaijan’s energy infrastructure has remained closely tied to its oil and gas resource
base, carrying the danger of them turning into ‘stranded assets’. Three oil pipelines
serve exports to the Russian and Georgian Black Sea coasts as well as the Turkish Med-
iterranean harbour of Ceyhan. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline is by far the most im-
portant of these pipelines and started operating in the 2000s. It has sufcient capacity
(1,200,000 barrels per day) to support current/declining Azeri oil exports. By far the
most important gas pipeline is the South Caucasus Pipeline, which runs along the BTC
oil pipeline via Georgia to Turkey and started operating in 2007. It has been further
developed as the ‘Southern Gas Corridor’ to connect to Greece and Italy (via Turkey). It
thereby directly connects to the EU gas grid and supplies increased Azeri gas production
to Europe. Also, gas power stations have been modernised over the past decade (includ-
ing a further switch from oil to gas) (EIA 2019). The Southern Gas Corridor became
operational in 2020. 
Enormous investments continue to be made in the oil and gas sector, partially by Azer-
baijan itself and partially by foreign private investors (Foreign Direct Investment, FDI). 
The investments required for the Southern Gas Corridor have been estimated to amount 
to about €40 billion. FDI in Azerbaijan amounted to nearly US$15 billion in 2017, the 
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Other fragility and security risks 
Contrasting its economic advances, Azerbaijan continues to face relatively serious chal-
lenges with respect to corruption, democracy, and the protection of political rights. Ac-
cordingly, the country ranks 129 out of 180 countries on the Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2021). The Freedom House 
Index of 2021 categorises Azerbaijan as ‘not free’, pointing to serious limitations regard-
ing political rights, civil liberties, and press freedom (Freedom House 2021). Similarly, 
sub-indicators of the Fragile States Index relating to state legitimacy and human rights 
remain relatively low (Fund for Peace 2021), which is consistent with the fndings of the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index of 2020 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020; see 
also Figures 4.2 and 4.3). 
Accordingly, the European Union criticised the presidential elections of April 2018
in which President Aliyev won a fourth term of ofce (and which the opposition boy-
cotted). The EU Spokesperson for Foreign Afairs and Security Policy, including Eu-
ropean Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, stated that the elections
Fragility (2021) 
Human development (2019) 
Strength of governance (2019) 
Climate change vulnerability (2019) 
Sustainable energy development (2019) 
Sustainable Stable WARNING Alert
Very high HIGH Medium Low 
Very high High MEDIUM Low 
Low MEDIUM High Very high 
Very high High MEDIUM Low 
Figure 4.2 Governance indicators (Azerbaijan). 





























Figure 4.3 Azerbaijan’s performance in the Fragile States Index 2006–2021. 
Source: Fund for Peace (2021). 
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took place ‘within a restrictive political environment and under laws that curtail fun-
damental rights and freedoms’ and that ‘observers reported widespread disregard for
mandatory procedures, a lack of transparency and numerous serious irregularities’ (Eu-
ropean Union 2018). 
The continuing, decades-old confict with Armenia over the enclave/exclave of Nagorno-
Karabakh constitutes a signifcant distinct security risk for Azerbaijan. While the exclave
of Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in Armenia belongs to Azerbaijan, the exclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh lies wholly within Azerbaijan and possesses an Armenian ethnic ma-
jority. Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan, but most of
the region was actually governed by the Republic of Artsakh (formerly named Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic) for several decades. Armenia and Azerbaijan had gone to war in 1988
over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which resulted in a ceasefre in 1994 (CIA 2021).
While this ceasefre remained precarious, it held – despite some intermittent clashes –
until September 2020, when the confict escalated into a full-fedged war again. Six weeks
of fghting resulted in several thousand casualties (military and civilian) and eventually led
to a new ceasefre mediated by Russia. In what from an Armenian view constituted a capit-
ulation, Azerbaijan regained full control over large parts of Nagorno-Karabakh and several
adjacent districts that had been controlled by Armenian forces. However, it had to accept
the presence of Russian peacekeeping forces. Tensions in the region remain high and re-
main a risk for the development of the country (International Crisis Group 2020, 2021). 
Azerbaijan faces relatively modest challenges with respect to climate change impacts,
which are nonetheless not negligible. In particular, the agricultural sector of Azerbaijan is
under threat because of increased evaporation, water shortages, and droughts due to rising
temperatures (while the sea level of the Caspian Sea may in fact fall as a result of increased
evaporation) (Azerbaijan 2015b: 68–76). Accordingly, Azerbaijan ranked 130 out of 180
countries on the Global Climate Risk Index for 2019 and 146 for the period 2000–2019.
The Index assesses the extent to which countries have been subject to weather-related
loss events (storms, foods, heat waves, etc.) (Germanwatch 2021). Considering eight life-
supporting sectors (food, water, health, ecosystems, human habitat, and coastal, energy,
and transportation infrastructure), the index of the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Ini-
tiative (ND-GAIN) for 2018 gives a medium score and rank to Azerbaijan for its overall
vulnerability and readiness (ranked 73 out of 181 countries) (ND-GAIN 2020). Overall,
climate change impacts are likely to be signifcant but less dramatic than in other countries. 
Past and present eforts to decarbonise 
Azerbaijan is a party to all major climate treaties. It ratifed the UN Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1995, the Kyoto Protocol in 2000, and the Doha 
Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol in 2015. It also ratifed the Paris Agreement in January 
2017. It is a non-Annex I Party to the UNFCCC and considered a developing country for 
the purposes of the climate treaties. 
Azerbaijan has submitted a relatively ambitious Nationally Determined Contribution 
(NDC) under the Paris Agreement. Accordingly, it aims at a GHG emission reduction of 
35 percent by 2030 in comparison to 1990. This implies a reversal of the trend of rising 
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Figure 4.4). The NDC lists general measures or areas of measures to achieve the set objec-
tives for the energy sector, oil and gas extraction, residential and commercial sectors, the 
transport sector, the agricultural sector, the waste sector, and LULUCF. No further de-
tails (e.g., on timing or status of these measures) are provided (Azerbaijan 2015a). Future 
emissions and hence the ambitiousness of Azerbaijan’s NDC depend heavily on economic 
development (which itself is highly dependent on oil and gas prices) and are consequently 
difcult to assess. According to one source, Azerbaijan’s NDC does represent a certain 
level of ambition (Climatescope 2017; see also World Energy Council 2017). Nothing is 
known about Azerbaijan’s intentions to strengthen its NDC. 
According to the UNFCCC, Azerbaijan’s GHG emissions excluding LULUCF (land 
use, land use change, and forestry) in 2013 (the latest available data) stood at 57,994.77 
Gg CO2 equivalent, a decline of about 20 percent compared to 1990 levels (73,385.78 
Gt CO2 equivalent) but an increase of about 43 percent since 2000. Azerbaijan’s GHG 
emissions including LULUCF in 2013 stood at 51,796.66 Gg CO2 equivalent compared
to 69,695.78 Gg CO2 equivalent in 1990 (minus 26 percent compared to 1990). The 
LULUCF sector and forestry in particular have thus consistently constituted a net car-
bon sink in Azerbaijan. As much as 85 percent of GHG emissions (excluding LULUCF) 
in 2013 were energy related, while agriculture accounted for about 11.5 percent (with 
industrial process fguring at 2.2 and waste at 1.3 percent). Energy industries, fugitive 
emissions (from oil and gas production), and transport accounted for the lion’s share of 
energy-related emissions (UNFCCC 2013). 
As Figure 4.4 indicates, GHG emissions data from other sources vary from those of-
cially submitted to the UNFCCC and suggest that emissions have been on the rise since 
the end of the 1990s, potentially making the NDC even more ambitious. According to 
data of the World Resources Institute (WRI), emissions reached 80.26 Mt CO2 equiva-
lent in 2018, after a low of 56.94 Mt CO2 equivalent in 1996, thereby almost attaining 
1990 levels again. Azerbaijan’s GHG emissions including LULUCF in 2018 stood at 78.35 
Mt CO2 equivalent and developed in a similar overall pattern (WRI 2021). 
Figure 4.4 Azerbaijan’s greenhouse gas emissions and emission targets (1990–2018). 
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Contrasting the ambition of Azerbaijan’s Paris NDC, its domestic climate policy frame-
work is still emerging and in need of further development. The country has reported the 
adoption of a number of ‘laws, state programs and regulatory acts concerning the Con-
vention’ and to address climate change in general, and certain institutional structures 
have been created (e.g., a ministry for the environment) (Azerbaijan 2015b: 10). How-
ever, these measures do not amount yet to a true climate policy framework that would 
need to address the country’s main emission sectors, including oil and gas production, 
power production, transport, and agriculture. According to one assessment, Azerbaijan 
‘has no climate change policy, incentives or regulations’ (Climatescope 2017). 
Political framework conditions for the development and implementation of efective
climate policy have been problematic. The oil and gas sector is closely intertwined with
the government as the two core institutions in the oil and gas sector are state-run. First,
the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) engages in exploration,
preparation, exploitation of oil and gas felds in Azerbaijan as well as transportation and
processing and refning of oil and gas and related products. SOCAR accounts for about
20 percent of oil production in Azerbaijan, with the remaining 80 percent produced
by international oil companies. SOCAR manages the country’s two refneries, runs the
country’s pipeline system, and manages the country’s oil and gas exports and imports.
SOCAR is regulated directly by means of presidential regulations. It is overseen by the
Energy Ministry that is also responsible for attracting foreign investment in the oil and
gas sector as well as negotiations on pipelines and production-sharing agreements (EIA
2019; SOCAR 2021b). 
Second, the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), created in 1999, 
accumulates savings from oil and gas revenues for the purpose of macroeconomic stabi-
lisation of the country, to save resources for future generations, and to invest in national 
development projects, including through stimulating development of the non-oil and gas 
sector. SOFAZ remains much more closely related to and intertwined with the govern-
ment than similar funds in other countries (such as the sovereign wealth fund in Norway). 
Hence, there are no limits on how much money can be transferred from the fund to the 
government so that it has in fact also served to balance budget defcits (see above). The 
president appoints the leadership of the fund directly, and SOFAZ’ management only re-
ports directly to the president (Osservatorio balcani 2012; Ibadoghlu 2019). 
Trends and potential 
Azerbaijan has longstanding intentions and eforts to diversify its economy beyond fossil 
fuels but has achieved only limited success so far. Education and training are crucial areas 
for developing its economy. Azerbaijan has also made signifcant investments to become 
a transport hub connecting Europe and Asia (including as part of the Chinese One Belt, 
One Road initiative). Renewable energy has considerable potential, but plans for its ex-
pansion have not come to fruition yet. While the response to the Covid-19 pandemic and 
resulting crisis has provided an opening for making progress on these fronts, with an 
emphasis on a green recovery, the available information does not indicate that Azerbaijan 
has so far made targeted eforts to exploit this opportunity (see https://platform2020re-
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Diversifcation of the economy 
Longstanding eforts of Azerbaijan to diversify its economy, including through SOFAZ 
(see above), have only produced very limited results so far. Several programmes have been 
launched to support the diversifcation of the economy. They aim, among other things, 
to enhance the export potential of non-oil industry and more generally the development 
of new manufacturing, but also at developing the agricultural and service sectors of the 
economy. State investments have in particular served to support signifcant construction 
activity and the development of considerable transport infrastructure (including ports). 
Overall, the non-oil sector has seen signifcant growth in recent years, but the oil and gas 
sector remains crucial and its decline is in signifcant part a consequence of the falling oil 
price. Accordingly, international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank have found that further eforts are needed (IMF 2016; Antidze 
2018; see in general, Asgarova 2014; Guliyev 2015; Gurbanov et al. 2017; Lianlei and 
Baghirov 2016; UNECE 2021). 
Transport-hub aspirations 
One particular area of development is, based on the signifcant infrastructure invest-
ments of the past years, the role of Azerbaijan as a transport hub. Azerbaijan sees itself
as a crucial connecting country between Europe and Asia. Beyond its position in the
transport of oil and gas through pipelines, this concerns general air, train, and sea trans-
port (see new Baku International Sea Trade Port and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway). Conse-
quently, Azerbaijan has accepted China’s ofer to join its One Belt, One Road initiative
that plays into Azerbaijan’s aspiration to become a transport hub. Also beyond the One
Belt, One Road initiative (and possibly driven by it), relations between Azerbaijan and
China have grown closer over the past years, including trade, tourism, and even secu-
rity and military cooperation. China has grown to become Azerbaijan’s fourth biggest
trading partner (Gotev 2017; Osmanli 2017; Azernews 2018a, 2018b, 2018c; Xinhuanet
2018; Jafarli 2020). 
Renewable energy and clean energy 
The signifcant potential for the expansion of renewable energy and clean energy invest-
ments in Azerbaijan still remains to be realised. Eight hydropower stations already supply 
about 5–6 percent of all electricity on average. However, solar and wind power are all but 
non-existent, supplying only a fraction of 1 percent of the total electricity consumption. 
As a result, renewable energy has a share of little more than 2 percent of total energy 
consumption (BP 2020; World Bank 2021a). Investments in renewable energy have been 
minimal, and the attractiveness of clean energy investments has remained low, despite 
considerable potential. Consequently, ambitious targets for the expansion of renewable 
energy by 2020 (20 percent of electricity consumption and 9.7 percent of overall energy 
consumption) have not been met (World Bank 2021a, 2021b; Climatescope 2017; UN-











Azerbaijan: partnership beyond gas 83 
Education and skills development 
Azerbaijan’s educational system is solid but has further potential for advancing excellence. It
provides for a broad basic education and training of the population. Literacy is close to 100
percent and school life expectancy 14 years (CIA 2021). However, Azerbaijan ranked 68 out of
the 78 countries participating in the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)
in 2018 (ranked according to the average score in reading) (OECD 2019). The enrolment rate
at universities (27.2 percent) has also remained low compared to other upper-middle-income
countries (European Training Foundation 2020). Overall, Azerbaijan’s workforce is consid-
ered medium-qualifed, with 70 percent of the population holding at least an upper-secondary
qualifcation and less than 10 percent described as low-skilled (graduating at most from com-
pulsory education) (European Training Foundation 2016). Accordingly, Azerbaijan ranked 90
out of 146 countries in the 2019 Economic Complexity Index that measures ‘the knowledge
intensity of an economy’ (Observatory of Economic Complexity 2021). 
Azerbaijan has started several initiatives to improve its vocational education and train-
ing. In 2016, a Strategic Roadmap for vocational education and training was adopted, in-
cluding several strategic goals such as the improvement of normative, legal, and economic 
conditions and the information base. For the years 2015–2020, a State Programme for the 
sector has been in place. Nevertheless, the supply of skilled graduates has not been suf-
cient to meet the demand (European Training Foundation 2016). In general, the improve-
ment of conditions to facilitate the emergence of a knowledge-based economy has been 
one of the major focal points of Azerbaijan’s eforts to diversify its economy and develop 
the non-oil sector (e.g., European Training Foundation 2016; Aliyev 2014: 13; European 
Training Foundation 2020; Suleymanov 2020). 
Investments into education and training seem crucial for advancing the development 
and transition of the country and the diversifcation of its economic base. In 2020, 35.5 
percent of the workforce was still employed in the agricultural sector (a slight decline 
from 38.2 percent in 2010), nearly 15 percent in industry, and nearly 50 percent in the 
service sector (Statista 2021). Especially the relatively large share of employment in the 
agricultural sector, which provides for more than a third of employment but only con-
tributes 7 percent of GDP, constitutes a challenge. Against the backdrop of a growing 
population of young people entering the labour market, new employment opportunities 
will need to be created in the private sector (World Bank 2015; European Training Foun-
dation 2016, 2020). Whereas Azerbaijan ranked 58 out of 141 countries on the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index in 2019, the Forum has identifed ed-
ucation and training among the most important areas with potential and need for signif-
cant improvement (World Economic Forum 2019). 
EU-Azerbaijan cooperation 
EU-Azerbaijan cooperation can build on a frm and broad institutional framework. The 
EU is Azerbaijan’s most important trading partner, accounting for nearly half of the lat-
ter’s exports. Energy has been key to EU-Azerbaijan relations, with a strong focus on oil 
and gas. Renewable energy has received less attention, and existing cooperation on educa-
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Institutional framework: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 
European Neighbourhood Policy, and Eastern Partnership 
Cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan can rely on a frm institutional basis. First of all,
a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement has been in force since 1999 and addresses politi-
cal dialogue, trade, investment, economic matters, legislation, and culture. In 2017, negoti-
ations on a new comprehensive agreement that is to replace the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement of 1999 were launched. The new agreement should ‘ofer a renewed basis for po-
litical dialogue and mutually benefcial cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan’ (EEAS
2017a). In this context, it is noteworthy that a survey conducted in 2017 found that pro-EU
feelings have risen in Azerbaijan, with 47 percent of the respondents having a positive image
of the EU and 68 percent assessing Azerbaijan’s relations with the EU as good (EEAS 2017b). 
Azerbaijan is also part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP, since 2004) and the
Eastern Partnership (since its inception in 2009). These frameworks provide a basis for co-
operation on democracy, the rule of law, prosperity, and social cohesion, including coopera-
tion in the domain of environmental policy. In this context, Azerbaijan has received support
from and has had access to a number of fnancial support mechanisms, including the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Instrument (with an allocation of up to €169 million for 2014–2020).
The Neighbourhood Instrument’s support has focused on regional and rural development,
justice sector reform, education and skills development, and general capacity-building and
institution-building (EEAS 2018). The EU Clima East and EU4Climate projects have assisted
Azerbaijan in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, including the preparation and de-
velopment of its (Intended) Nationally Determined Contribution and the formulation of a
national climate change strategy (as seen above, to limited efect so far) (EU4Climate 2021). 
Trade 
The EU trade relationship with Azerbaijan has evolved signifcantly in the 2000s. The 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement did not include tarif preferences but abolished a 
number of trade quotas between the EU and Azerbaijan and aimed at Azerbaijan adapting 
to several European standards. Until 2014, Azerbaijan beneftted from the EU Gener-
alised Scheme of Preferences that reduces EU import duties by about 66 percent. Azer-
baijan lost this beneft in 2014 when it was classifed as an upper-middle-income country 
by the World Bank for three years in a row. Azerbaijan applied to become a member of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1997, with negotiations still ongoing. The EU 
supports Azerbaijan in its ambition to join the WTO. 
The EU is Azerbaijan’s most important trading partner, accounting for more than a 
third of Azerbaijan’s total trade in 2020: about half of exports went to the EU and more 
than 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s imports came from the EU in 2020 (a particular year due 
to the Covid-19 pandemic since trade volumes contracted by more than a third from 2019 
to 2020). EU imports from Azerbaijan (overwhelmingly oil and gas – see below) were 
worth €10.6 billion in 2019 and €6.4 billion in 2020, and total trade amounted to €12.4 
billion in 2019 and €7.9 billion in 2020 (European Commission 2021; see also Chatham 
House 2021). EU exports to Azerbaijan are mainly machinery, transport equipment, 
manufactured goods, and chemicals (European Commission 2021). 
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Energy: focus on fossil fuels 
The EU is the top destination of Azeri fossil fuel exports, accounting for about half in 
2019 (European Commission 2021; Chatham House 2021). EU imports from Azerbaijan 
currently mainly consist of oil, with increased gas exports planned for the future (from 
2020). Oil and gas account for about 98 percent of EU imports from Azerbaijan. The 
main destinations for Azeri gas exports are Turkey (by far the biggest client), Georgia, 
and Greece (Razayeva 2015; BP 2020) – with the EU set to increase its share in the wake 
of the Southern Gas Corridor becoming operational in late 2020 (see also Figure 4.1). 
As obvious from the trade fgures, energy has been, and has emerged as, a major area 
of the relationship between Azerbaijan and the EU. In 2006, the Memorandum of Under-
standing on a Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the European 
Union in the Field of Energy was signed (covering harmonisation of legislation, enhancing 
security of supply and transit systems, development of renewable energy systems, and 
technical cooperation). In 2016, furthermore, the EU4Energy initiative was launched that 
supports Eastern Partnership countries in achieving their energy policy objectives. In 
2019, Azerbaijan also joined the Eastern Europe Energy Efciency and Environment Part-
nership (EEAS 2017c; European Council 2020; EU4Climate 2021). Within this broader 
framework, a strategic emphasis has been put on developing the Southern Gas Corridor 
in order to bring Azeri gas to Europe. In 2011, then Commission President Barroso and 
Azerbaijan’s president Aliyev signed a Joint Declaration on the Southern Gas Corridor. 
The Gas Corridor was defned as an EU Project of Common Interest. On this basis, it 
has received active support from the European Commission and, in February 2018, a 
loan of €1.5 billion from the European Investment Bank (EIB). The apparent focus of the 
relationship on developing fossil fuel trade, and especially gas deliveries from Azerbaijan 
to Europe (now via the Southern Gas Corridor), has drawn signifcant criticism because 
of its potential confict with medium- and long-term climate objectives (Tefer 2018). 
Education: room for further development 
In addition to trade and energy, EU-Azerbaijan relations also cover education and train-
ing, and mobility. Azerbaijan is part of the Erasmus+ programme that supports higher 
education institutions, staf, and students. From 2015 to 2019, the EU funded nearly 
1,600 students and staf member mobility from Azerbaijan to Europe and 900 European 
students and staf mobility to Azerbaijan. About 3,300 young people and youth workers 
from Azerbaijan participated in diferent types of short-term stays in Europe. The EU, 
several of its member states, and Azerbaijan also operate under a Mobility Partnership 
that was signed in 2013. Perhaps most notable, a Visa Facilitation Agreement that entered 
into force in 2014 makes it easier for Azerbaijani citizens to acquire travel visas for EU 
member states (European Council 2020). 
Security and geopolitics 
Finally, EU-Azerbaijan relations have a signifcant security and geopolitical component. 
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has acted as an important protector of Armenia, while at the same time fostering close 
relations to Azerbaijan (as a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States). This 
has not least enabled Russia to efectively mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 
war over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020. At the same time, Azerbaijan remains interested in 
developing its relations beyond Russia. As a result, Azerbaijan’s relations with China have 
grown over the past years, including with respect to the economy and security (Azernews 
2018a, 2018b; Shabhazov 2018; Xinhuanet 2018; Jafarli 2020). 
The EU has an opportunity to redefne and fll its place in the regional security ar-
chitecture. The EU has for a long time supported eforts by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE 
Minsk group to resolve the confict and has generally promoted relevant confdence- and 
peace-building activities, including through the European Partnership for the peaceful set-
tlement of the confict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EEAS 2017a; The European Partnership for 
the Peaceful Settlement of the Confict over Nagorno-Karabakh 2018). Also, Azerbaijan 
sought closer cooperation in the feld of security policy, including a more proactive role of 
the EU in the Nagorno-Karabakh confict (Merabishvili 2015). The EU can build on these 
previous eforts and adapt them to the changed context after the 2020 war, which has not 
reduced the need for a lasting and stable settlement of the confict. 
Conclusions 
Azerbaijan is highly dependent on oil and gas exports for its economic welfare and po-
litical stability. It is located in the Caucasian region that is characterised by a number of 
conficts and a fragile, and evolving, geopolitical balance, involving Russia, China, the 
United States, and the EU. The EU is one of the main export markets for oil and gas from 
Azerbaijan (while Azerbaijan’s relations with China are becoming more important), and 
Azerbaijan has particular relevance for the EU as a neighbourhood country. 
Without proper accompanying political eforts, decarbonisation of Europe and the 
world has the potential to undermine political and economic stability of Azerbaijan. Phas-
ing out fossil fuel production and exports will mean replacing Azerbaijan’s main engine of 
economic development and source of government income, which could reinforce existing 
risks to political stability, including limited political freedom and military conficts that 
remain virulent and await a lasting settlement, in particular with respect to Nagorno-
Karabakh. Decarbonisation hence poses the challenge to fnd alternatives to oil and gas 
as a basis for Azerbaijan’s economic well-being and political settlement in a delicate and 
challenging broader political context. 
There are a number of areas of mutual interest between Azerbaijan and the EU be-
yond oil and gas that can provide a basis for fruitfully developing the relationship under 
decarbonisation. At a geopolitical level, the EU has an interest in developing this relation-
ship because Azerbaijan belongs to its neighbourhood, while Azerbaijan has an interest 
in diversifying its external relations and opportunities. While Russia’s role in the region 
remains prominent, it is also precarious in its relations within the region given specifc 
own interests. More specifcally with respect to the decarbonisation challenge, Azerbai-
jan has an interest in developing its economy beyond oil and gas, which the EU can assist 
in developing in important ways. This will, however, require a reorientation away from 
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Initiating an evolution of the EU-Azerbaijan relationship under decarbonisation will 
likely require a step-by-step approach, carefully considering and balancing economic and 
broader geopolitical aspects under the climate imperative. 
On the basis of the preceding analysis, several prominent and promising focal areas 
emerge for developing the relationship between the EU and Azerbaijan beyond oil and gas: 
• Education and training are a central part of the efort at economic diversifcation 
and developing a knowledge-based economy. Building on existing cooperation (e.g., 
in the context of the EU Erasmus+ programme, etc.), bilateral cooperation can be 
intensifed so as to bring the signifcant resources of the EU and its member states 
to bear to assist in enhancing and shaping education and training in Azerbaijan. One 
signifcant focus in this respect could be cooperation supporting the expansion of 
renewable energy (e.g., a degree in renewable energy in engineering). 
• The further development of the energy system, especially the expansion 
of renewable energy promises obvious advantages by making the economy less 
dependent on oil and gas and developing energy infrastructure. While it is urgently 
required for moving toward decarbonisation, it also makes sense with continued ex-
ploitation of domestic oil and gas resources in the medium term as it will increase the 
share of (declining) resources available for export. Concrete frst steps may include 
studying the risk of stranded assets with respect to relevant fossil fuel investments 
and the creation of a policy dialogue on the potential of clean/renewable energy. 
• Strengthening the rule of law and advancing the fght against corruption
is one of the crucial bases of attracting foreign investors at a large scale, including 
SMEs. The EU and its member states have signifcant experience and expertise to 
ofer to this end. Part of such a focus could also be a dialogue on strengthening fnan-
cial governance, including SOFAZ and the changing landscape of climate-proofng 
investments. 
• Multiple other areas can be further developed over time, including water manage-
ment and advancing mutual market access and investments. Also, an enhanced role 
of the EU in managing the confict between Armenia and Azerbaijan concerning 
Nagorno-Karabakh deserves particular attention. 
Overall, there is hence a range of options for developing the EU-Azerbaijan relationship 
beyond oil and gas. Such a renewed direction for the bilateral relationship would promise 
signifcant returns for Azerbaijan as it would help address stability risks arising from the 
dependence of the country on oil and gas and put Azerbaijan’s economic development on 
a broader basis, preparing for a medium-term decline of returns from decreasing oil and 
gas reserves. It would at the same time help put EU-Azerbaijan relations on a broader 
basis making them ft for a decarbonising world and strengthening them in a precarious 
geopolitical constellation. 
Note 
1 Production, consumption, and export data vary between diferent sources (including IEA, 
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 5 Colombia 
The double challenge of internal 
pacifcation and decarbonisation 
Introduction 
The Republic of Colombia (henceforth Colombia) is a country with varied geography and 
climate, ranging from the cooler climate of the central Andean highlands to a tropical 
climate along the coast, in the Llanos, its vast eastern plains, and in the Amazon rainforest 
to the south. Most people therefore live in the north and west of the country where most 
of the country’s agricultural activities and natural resources are found (CIA 2021). Co-
lombia is largely urbanised with around 82 percent of the population living in cities (CIA 
2021) and Bogotá, the world’s fourth highest capital city, has a population of 7.6 million. 
With 51.3 million inhabitants, Colombia has the fourth largest population in Latin Amer-
ica (World Population Review 2021; see also DANE 2018; CIA 2021). 
Colombia is at an important turning point in its political, economic, and social develop-
ment. In late 2016, the former coalition government led by President Juan Manuel Santos 
completed six years of negotiations to sign a peace agreement (Government of Colombia 
2015) with the country’s largest leftist armed militant group, the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym, FARC). This ended a long and com-
plex confict that had spanned over 50 years, leaving over 220,000 people dead, 25,000 
disappeared, and 5.7 million displaced (Felter and Renwick 2017). The success of the 
peace agreement rests on continued commitment from both sides and major investment 
and reform in rural areas by the Colombian government. As well as opening up new op-
portunities for development, the peace process created new dynamics and challenges for 
the government, headed since August 2018 by President Iván Duque Márquez, known 
as Duque, who has been unsupportive of the peace process. Reinforced by the Covid-19 
pandemic, the peace agreement has been increasingly fragile and has been found to be at 
the verge of collapse (Fund for Peace 2020; Reith 2021). 
In the decade up to 2015, the Colombian economy grew strongly by almost 5 percent 
per year. High commodity prices largely protected it from the impacts of the 2008 fnan-
cial crisis, and it has proved more resilient to falls in the price of crude oil between 2014 
and 2016 than other oil-producing countries (OECD 2017). The proportion of people 
living with less than US$1.90 per day fell from 21.1 percent in 2001 to 4.9 percent in 2019 
(World Bank 2021a). According to national poverty lines, however, about 36 percent of 
the population was living in poverty in 2019 (World Bank 2021b). In May 2018, Colom-
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(OECD), after major reforms to bring its labour policies, justice system, corporate gov-
ernance of state-owned enterprises, and trade rules among others into line with OECD 
standards (OECD 2018a). However, Colombia’s unemployment rates are still higher than 
the OECD average (OECD 2018b), and inequality remains high due to the large dispar-
ities in income between rural and urban areas. The Covid-19 pandemic has aggravated 
the remaining challenges, although prospects for a strong recovery exist (OECD 2021). 
Colombia has many natural resources, including petroleum, coal, and natural gas, as 
well as precious metals and minerals, such as gold, copper, iron ore, and nickel (CIA 
2021). Although the economy is well diversifed, its extractive sectors remain important. 
The country also has rich, fertile land, and the agricultural sector could grow rapidly with 
an efective implementation of the peace process (Oxford Business Group 2019). This 
could diversify exports away from fossil fuels. However, the sector is highly vulnerable to 
climate change impacts and may also increase emissions by driving deforestation. Colom-
bia is among the world’s mega-diverse nations. Although only covering 1 percent of the 
Earth’s surface, it is home to 10 percent of all known species and has forests covering 55 
percent of its land area (OECD 2014; UNEP 2016). 
In parallel with the other case studies, this chapter will explore the challenges and op-
portunities Colombia and Colombia-EU relations are facing under decarbonisation in fve 
steps. The next section frst substantiates the dependence of Colombia on the production 
and export of coal and oil and hence the country’s vulnerability to price fuctuations and 
the phase-out of fossil fuels. It also analyses other fragility and security risks, most im-
portantly the decades-long internal conficts with the FARC (and other militant groups). 
Subsequently, the status of Colombia’s climate policy is assessed, which is comparatively 
advanced. This is followed by the review of relevant trends and potentials, especially 
regarding eforts to diversify the economy in diferent directions that have already borne 
some fruit. The one but last section reviews the framework and basis of EU-Colombia
relations beyond fossil fuels. The fnal section concludes and identifes focal points for EU 
foreign policy towards Colombia under decarbonisation. 
Exposure and risks 
Exposure to global decarbonisation trends 
Colombia is a signifcant producer of crude oil and coal. A large proportion of production 
is destined for export, generating revenues that are important to the economy. With oil 
reserves diminishing, the future of the Colombian oil sector is uncertain. Oil rents have 
also been vulnerable to international price fuctuations, although the Colombian economy 
fared better than those of other oil producers during the 2014–2016 oil price slump. 
Decarbonisation is contributing to shifts in Colombia’s coal export markets, leading it to 
become increasingly reliant on just a few markets. 
Although not one of the world’s leading energy producers, Colombia is a signifcant 
producer of oil, coal, and gas in South America. It is the third largest oil producer in 
the region, and between 2009 and 2019 overall production rose 32 percent to around 
886,000 barrels per day (BP 2020). However, production decreased 12 percent from 
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outages due to attacks by a Marxist insurgent group, the National Liberation Army (ELN) 
(Acosta and Cobb 2017). Colombia is now by far the largest coal producer in Latin Amer-
ica and the eighth largest in the world, with 1.4 percent of total world production in 2019. 
That year Colombian coal production stood at 56.6 million tonnes of oil equivalent, a 
13.4 percent increase on production levels in 2009. Colombia produced 13.2 billion cubic 
metres of natural gas in 2019, 0.3 percent of global supply (BP 2020). 
With its oil reserves diminishing, it has been estimated Colombia can only support 
current levels of production for another six years (BP 2020; see also Smith 2018). This 
has led to concerns about the future of the industry and sparked heated political debates 
on the issue of fracking, still only in the exploratory stages in Colombia, with arguments 
relating to export revenues, energy independence, and the environment shaping the dis-
cussion. The Colombian Petroleum Association has estimated that about US$7 billion of 
investment would be needed each year to maintain current production levels (Murphy 
and Acosta 2018). With regard to coal, in 2018 Colombia had proven reserves of 4.4 bil-
lion tonnes, meaning current production levels could be sustained for 55 years (BP 2020). 
Capital investment in the Colombian gas sector has also decreased in recent years due to 
declining global prices, and its gas reserves of 100 billion cubic metres will only last for 
another eight years (BP 2020). 
Despite its major hydrocarbon reserves, fossil fuels play a relatively minor role in elec-
tricity generation in Colombia, with natural gas and coal each accounting for about 10 
percent of electricity generation in 2019. Oil plays only a minor role in electricity gen-
eration, though energy capacity additions since 2010 were mostly composed of hydro-
power, oil, and diesel (Climatescope 2020; IEA 2020). The Colombian power sector has 
a low-carbon footprint due to the high proportion of hydropower in its energy basket. In 
2019, mainly large-scale dams provided 62 percent of the country’s installed capacity and 
71 percent of electricity generation (Climatescope 2020; see also IHA 2018). It is also 
continuing to build out its hydropower capacity, although the focus has recently been 
more on smaller-capacity projects (IHA 2018). Other renewable energy technologies, 
such as wind and solar PV, have so far only accounted for small shares of capacity and 
electricity generation, albeit increasing in recent years (IEA 2020; IRENA 2021a). 
The electrifcation rate in Colombia is high at close to 100 percent (IEA 2020), and 
energy demand has risen steadily over the past decade. Further increases have been pro-
jected, despite signifcant progress in increasing energy efciency among household and 
industrial users and in the power and transport sectors (GRICCE 2021). The latter is 
projected to remain the sector with the largest energy needs up to 2050 (Paez et al. 2017). 
The high proportion of hydropower in Colombia’s electricity mix has meant that it
has largely been able to exploit its hydrocarbon reserves for export. In 2019, fossil fuel
exports generated US$24.2 billion in revenue, and fuel exports accounted for about 55
percent of Colombian merchandise exports, although down from US$43.4 billion at
the height of the oil price boom in 2013 (Chatham House 2021; World Bank 2021c; see
Figure 5.1). Crude oil and coal exports accounted for the vast majority of these earnings,
with Colombian natural gas mainly destined for domestic consumption.1 
With Colombian oil reserves dwindling, investment in exploration low, and the future 
of Colombia’s nascent fracking industry still uncertain, earnings from Colombia’s to date 
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Fossil fuel exports as % GDP (2019) Fossil fuel exports as % total exports 
(2019) 
4.3% 45.7% 
Fossil fuel exports to EU as % of Exports to the EU as % of total export
total exports to the EU (2020) (2020) 
15.4% 10.3% 
Figure 5.1 Status of fossil fuel exports of Colombia in 2019/2020. 
Sources: Data retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org (fossil fuel exports as percentage of merchandise ex-
port; oil, gas, and coal as a percentage of GDP – accessed on 25 July 2021) and European Commission (2021a) 
(exports to EU – accessed on 25 July 2021). 
to investment is that Colombian oil is relatively expensive to produce, with Colombia’s 
largely state-owned oil company Ecopetrol and foreign feld operators requiring the in-
ternational oil price to stay above US$50 to remain proftable (Slav 2017). Oil industry 
investment and export revenues took a tumble when the oil price slumped from almost 
US$100 in 2014 to US$30 in 2016, and it remains to be seen if the Duque government’s 
eforts to revive the sector will bear fruit (Acosta and Cobb 2019). Colombian crude oil 
exports generated US$14.6 billion in 2019, down from US$30.1 billion in 2013. If oil 
reserves were to decline, reduced exposure to such external price shocks could be a silver 
lining to falling oil rents. In 2019, about 45 percent of Colombia’s oil exports went to the 
United States, with China and Panama being other signifcant export markets for Colom-
bian crude oil (Chatham House 2021). 
Coal has grown to become a key export commodity since 2000, and Colombia is the 
world’s fourth largest exporter of thermal coal (IEA 2017a). In 2017, all but a tenth of 
the coal produced in Colombia was exported, generating a ffth of the country’s foreign 
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exchange earnings (Strambo and Atteridge 2018). However, future demand for Colom-
bian coal exports is likely to rely on the development of new export markets. While in 
2019 the EU was still Colombia’s largest export market for coal, accounting for nearly 
20 percent of its coal exports, EU coal imports decreased signifcantly between 2011 
and 2019 (Chatham House 2021; Trademap 2021). The consumption of hard coal has 
halved in the EU since 1990, and demand looks set to fall further, as many EU member 
states move to reduce power sector emissions by phasing out coal-fred power plants, and 
some, such as Poland and Czechia, seek to support their domestic coal industries (Oei 
and Mendelevitch 2016). Demand for coal imports is also falling in what has tradition-
ally been Colombia’s other main export market, the United States (Trademap 2021). Al-
though demand for coal is still increasing in Asian markets, Colombian coal is unlikely to 
be able to compete against coal from Indonesia and Australia, which can be extracted and 
transported at lower cost (Strambo and Atteridge 2018). Colombia is therefore likely to 
become increasingly reliant on just a few export markets. In 2017 and 2018, it increased 
its coal exports by signifcantly increasing its exports to Turkey and other Latin American 
countries, although coal exports in 2019 fell back to 2016 levels (Chatham House 2021; 
Trademap 2021). 
Colombia has also faced signifcant budgetary pressures – due both to fuctuations in its 
key commodity markets and the major public spending commitments made by the govern-
ment under the peace agreement with the FARC. Keeping the economy stable is therefore 
essential to honouring these commitments and Colombia’s post-confict development. 
Future drops in oil rents, either due to falling reserves or oil market fuctuations, com-
bined with the decline of the Colombian coal industry could subject the economy and 
public budgets to further pressures. Coal has contributed the largest part of the income 
generated by the extractives sector (Strambo and Atteridge 2018). However, economic 
growth and public budgets would be most vulnerable in the Departments of Cesar and La 
Guajira, which produce and export 90 percent of Colombian coal production. In 2015, 
coal accounted for about 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 30,000 direct 
jobs in these two departments. A further 100,000 jobs reportedly rely on the mines in 
the other departments. There has also been little focus on this issue in public debates or 
policy documents at national, departmental, and municipal levels, and as such the likely 
decline of the coal industry could lead to hardship in coal-producing regions (Strambo 
and Atteridge 2018). 
Consecutive crises have accelerated the decline of fossil fuel industries in Colombia, 
in particular coal, and have led to policy adaptations. The fall in commodity prices, in-
cluding coal and oil between 2014 and 2016, resulted in the contribution of fuel ex-
ports to GDP decreasing from 11 percent in 2013 to 6 percent in 2016.2 As a knock-on 
efect on government budgets, the fscal contribution of Colombia’s extractives sector 
slumped from 19 percent of Colombia’s national fscal income in 2013 to just 5 percent in 
2016 (EITI 2018). The subsequent stabilisation of the economy has been underpinned by 
important structural reforms including two sets of tax reforms in 2014 and 2016 (IMF 
2018). The Covid-19 pandemic then led to a further decline of extractive industries and in 
particular coal. Colombia sled into a deep recession in 2020 with GDP contracting by 6.8 
percent (World Bank 2021d). Coal production even plunged by 40 percent and may not 
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demand (Natural Resources Governance Institute 2021). While the economic recovery 
stimulus has a mixed environmental record, it has provided little support to a revival of 
the coal industry (Energy Policy Tracker 2021; Global Recovery Observatory 2021). 
Other fragility and security risks 
Still classed as a ‘warning’ area in the Fragile States Index, Colombia had become progres-
sively more stable in the 2010s. There had been signifcant improvement in the strength 
of its democratic institutions and governance and in its moves towards ending the long-
standing internal conficts with insurgent groups, most notably the peace agreement with 
the FARC in 2016 (Fund for Peace 2021). However, the peace agreement has become 
increasingly fragile, its implementation has degraded under the administration of Presi-
dent Duque, and corruption remains a barrier to efective governance. As a result, also 
Colombia’s assessment in the Fragile States Index has deteriorated in 2020–2021 (Fund 
for Peace 2021). Climate change may also intensify existing fragility risks in rural areas 
and impair hydropower electricity generation (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3). 
Complex internal conficts have for long constituted the major national challenge for 
Colombia. Achieving long-term peace with the FARC, and other insurgent groups, will 
depend on the successful implementation of the 2016 peace agreement, which covered 
six main areas – comprehensive rural development, illegal crop eradication, the FARC’s 
political participation in Colombian politics, transitional justice and reparations for vic-
tims, and the demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration of ex-combatants (Felter 
and Renwick 2017). However, the implementation of the peace process has signifcantly 
deteriorated since President Duque took ofce in 2018 and has sufered further setbacks 
under the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Colombia’s long and complex internal confict has been shaped by a number of political 
and socioeconomic drivers. A major root cause of the confict was the issue of land tenure 
and land concentration. Extremely unequal land ownership had been a longstanding cause 
of political tensions since colonial times, and FARC and ELN insurgents gained legitimacy 
and recruits by opposing the privatisation of natural resources and striving for the redis-
tribution of land to small peasants and the abolition of large landholdings (Bilotta 2017). 
The peace agreement set out a series of bold initiatives to comprehensively reform and 
Fragility (2021) 
Human development (2019) 
Strength of governance (2019) 
Climate change vulnerability (2019) 
Sustainable energy development (2019) 
Sustainable Stable Warning ALERT 
Very high HIGH Medium Low 
Very high High MEDIUM Low 
Low Medium HIGH Very high 
Very high HIGH Medium Low 
Figure 5.2 Governance indicators (Colombia). 
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Figure 5.3 Colombia’s performance in the Fragile States Index 2006–2021. 
Source: Fund for Peace (2021). 
Note: Higher index numbers indicate a higher level of state fragility. 
revitalise Colombia’s rural areas, which experts estimated could cost between US$80 and 
US$90 billion over the subsequent decade (Felter and Renwick 2017). Land is also central 
to reparations under the peace agreement, with an estimated 8 million hectares of land – 
14 percent of Colombia’s territory – illegally acquired either by dispossessing or forcibly 
displacing people over the course of the confict (Amnesty 2014; OXFAM 2016). Coca 
(i.e., the raw material for producing cocaine) and cocaine production was also a key driver 
of the confict due to its role in fnancing the activities of rebel groups, and it continues 
to present complex challenges for the peace process. Providing economic alternatives to 
the drugs trade is of crucial importance, but it is fraught with difculty as other insurgent 
groups and cartels compete to take control of coca-growing areas previously controlled 
by the FARC and coca farmers lack alternatives (Bristow 2018). 
The confict and the peace process continue to shape the country’s politics. President 
Duque was elected in June 2018 on a platform that included harsh criticism of the peace 
agreement. Since taking ofce, he has been openly hostile to the peace agreement. His ad-
ministration has generally been slow in implementing the agreement, and the remaining 
challenges are daunting (International Crisis Group 2019a; Fund for Peace 2020; Reith 
2021). The Covid-19 pandemic has further accentuated these challenges, as it ‘laid bare 
the shortcomings in implementing the FARC peace agreement’ and strengthened other 
armed groups (International Crisis Group 2020). 
The sustainable use of Colombia’s immense natural resources also has a crucial role to 
play in Colombia’s post-confict development (UNEP 2017), and the peace agreement set 
important precedents with specifc actions regarding environmental sustainability, nat-
ural resource management, and progressive measures on gender. However, FARC’s de-
mobilisation and the end to violence also opened up a vacuum in terms of environmental 
governance, and, in 2016, deforestation increased by 44 percent as smallholder farmers 
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and industry rushed to take control of the jungle and the Amazon, to log it and convert it 
for uses such as cattle ranching and goldmining (Reardon 2018). 
The Venezuelan crisis has added a further major challenge for Colombia in the late 
2010s. By the end of 2020, Colombia was hosting more than 1.7 million of the 4.5 million 
Venezuelans who had fed their country since the economic and political situation se-
verely deteriorated in 2017 (UNHCR 2020). These refugees added to the approximately 
8 million Colombians who have been displaced over the decades due to domestic confict 
(UNHCR 2020, 2021). The government has provided support in the form of tempo-
rary shelter along the border, as well as temporary residency, and access to healthcare 
and education. However, it faces growing challenges and rapidly increasing costs to stem 
the emerging humanitarian crisis. International support only covered 24 percent of the 
estimated €280 million required to provide for the Venezuelan refugees’ basic needs in 
2019. Consequently, there is growing pressure on public budgets, and the government 
was ‘contemplating relaxing defcit targets so that it can spend an extra €800 million on 
meeting the needs of Venezuelan refugees and reallocating money that should be spent on 
other priorities, including implementation of the 2016 peace deal’ (International Crisis 
Group 2019b). The Covid-19 pandemic and resulting crisis have further increased the 
precariousness of the situation of the Venezuelan refugees.3 
Despite the aforementioned conficts, over the past decades Colombia has developed 
relatively strong democratic institutions. There have been free and fair elections in Co-
lombia for nearly 50 years, and, apart from a few notable exceptions, such as vote-buying 
and intimidation, there are no major concerns regarding voting rights, party competi-
tion, and election campaigns (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020). Looking at the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, over the past decade there have also been gradual 
improvements in regulatory quality, and voice and accountability in Colombia, although 
this index shows that overall few gains have been made in enhancing government efec-
tiveness, the rule of law, and control of corruption (World Bank 2021e). Though still 
categorising Colombia as ‘partly free’, the Freedom House Index 2021 states that ‘public 
institutions have demonstrated the capacity to check executive power and enforce the rule 
of law, and violence declined as the government and the country’s main left-wing guerrilla 
group moved toward a peace accord signed in 2016’. However, the report also notes that 
Colombia still faces major challenges with regard to the consolidation of peace and the 
guarantee of political rights and civil liberties, especially on the countryside (Freedom 
House 2021; see also Figures 5.2 and 5.3). 
Alongside poverty and inequality, corruption constitutes a further central challenge 
for Colombia (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020). Each year, corruption is estimated to cost the 
Colombian economy US$17 billion – equivalent to 5.3 percent of GDP (Grattan 2018). 
As such, Colombia scored 39 out of a potential 100 on Transparency International’s 2020 
Corruption Perceptions Index, placing it 92nd out of 180 assessed states (Transparency 
International 2021). One driver of corruption may be the process of decentralisation in 
Colombia. Beginning in the 1980s and consolidated in the 1991 constitution, this pro-
cess resulted in greater efciencies and social spending, but it also created openings for 
organised crime groups. ‘Following the 2015 local elections, nearly one in three gover-
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suspected crimes, including ties to paramilitaries, drug trafckers and other criminal 
groups’ (Yagoub 2016). 
Colombia is also highly vulnerable to the slow and sudden impacts of climate change, 
and, given its varied geography, the country will have to cope with a variety of adaptation 
challenges (see also Figure 5.2). Projections show that rainfall may decrease by nearly a 
third in some areas, with the Andean region shifting from a semi-humid to a semi-arid cli-
mate (OECD 2014). Sea-level rise will impact coastal and marine ecosystems and fsheries 
as well as Colombia’s coastal infrastructure and cities (US AID 2017). Extreme weather 
events and disasters such as landslides also represent major climate change threats. Like 
the rest of Latin America, Colombia is experiencing more frequent and severe La Niña 
and El Niño phenomena, which are characterised by intense periods of drought followed 
by heavy rain and fooding (FAO 2018). It has been estimated that 85 percent of the 
Colombian population and 87 percent of the country’s GDP are ‘at risk’ from natural 
disasters (OECD 2014). The 2010–2011 La Niña led to estimated economic losses of 
approximately US$6 billion (NDC Partnership 2017). 
Higher temperatures and increased water scarcity are of particular concern in the An-
dean region, home to 75 percent of the population. There, the run-of from the mountains
is the main water source for domestic and industrial users, farming and irrigation, and
electricity generation (OECD 2014). Indeed, 80 percent of Colombia’s GDP is generated in
the basin of the two largest rivers running through the Colombian Andes, the Magdalena,
and the Cauca. The large-scale dams in the watershed hold 84 percent of the Colombia’s
hydroelectric power (Baptiste et al. 2017). Their vulnerability to climate change became
evident during the 1992 and 2015–2016 El Niños. Droughts combined with forest loss re-
duced water levels to record lows and increased sedimentation. These conditions triggered
major electricity crises and a sharp increase in the use of thermal plants (Semana 2015). 
In the agricultural sector, farmers may have to move high-value agricultural crops such 
as cofee to higher altitudes to achieve the same yields, and other important crops, such as 
tropical fruit, cocoa, and bananas are also at risk (US AID 2017). The impact of climate 
change on livelihoods in these areas will be shaped by the socioeconomic struggles that 
infuence activities like illegal land acquisition and conversion of forests to agricultural 
farms or cattle breeding grounds and pasture lands. For example, communities’ vulnera-
bility to extreme weather events is ‘strongly infuenced by deforestation, slash-and-burn 
agriculture, artifcial drainage of wetlands, changes of natural river courses and the build-
ing of human settlements in areas at risk of foods or landslides’ (OECD 2014). 
Past and present eforts to decarbonise 
Colombia has been one of the most active developing countries in the international cli-
mate negotiations (Bustos 2017). It ratifed the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) in 1994 as a non-Annex I party to the Convention. Colombia ratifed 
the Kyoto Protocol in 2005. It has pushed for greater ambition under the UNFCCC as a 
leading member of the AILAC group of progressive Latin American countries, the Cart-
agena Dialogue, the Climate Vulnerable Forum, and as part of the High Ambition Coali-
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Colombia submitted its intended nationally determined contribution (NDC) to the 
Paris Agreement in September 2015, committing to unconditionally reducing its emis-
sions by 20 percent compared to the projected business-as-usual scenario by 2030. Fur-
thermore, Colombia would increase its commitment to a 30 percent emission reduction 
on the 2030 business-as-usual scenario, conditional on international support. Mitigation, 
adaptation, and means of implementation are all addressed in Colombia’s NDC, with ad-
aptation a priority due to the country’s high vulnerability. Mitigation is most important 
in the energy sector and the agriculture, forestry, and land use sectors, but eight Sec-
toral Mitigation Action Plans have been developed to reduce emissions across all sectors 
specifed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (NDC Partnership 
2017). Emissions projections are strongly infuenced by emissions from land use, land 
use change, and forestry (LULUCF), which are subject to considerable uncertainties, 
but, in 2019, Colombia was considered on track to achieve its unconditional NDC target 
(Kuramochi et al. 2019). 
In December 2020, Colombia submitted an updated NDC. It thereby increased its 
overall emission reduction target to 51 percent below business as usual by 2030. At the 
same time, the strategy for achieving the 2030 target relies heavily on action in the LU-
LUCF sector, whereas action in other key sectors (such as energy supply and transport) 
receives insufcient attention. The government of Colombia has also established a long-
term target of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 (the implementation of which will 
require further action) (CAT 2021). 
In 2018, Colombia’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions amounted to 267.95 Mt of CO2 
equivalents, accounting for 0.55 percent of global emissions (WRI 2021). In that year, 
energy, LULUCF, and agriculture were the highest emitting sectors, accounting for ap-
proximately 34 percent, 31 percent, and 23.5 percent of the total emissions, respectively 
(WRI 2021; see Figure 5.4). 
Figure 5.4 Colombia’s greenhouse gas emissions and emission targets (1990–2018). 
Source: WRI (2021). 
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Colombia has made good progress in developing robust institutions, policies, and laws 
to mainstream climate action, environmental sustainability, and green growth strategies 
into its economic development. Colombia has developed a robust institutional, legal, and 
policy framework for implementing its NDC (NDC Partnership 2017). In 2016, the Na-
tional Economic and Social Policy Council played a leading role in establishing the National 
Climate Change System (Sistema Nacional de Cambio Climático, SISCLIMA), which 
aims to provide a comprehensive institutional framework for the implementation of the 
Colombian government’s main climate strategies, including a Climate Change National 
Adaptation Plan, a Colombian Low Carbon Development Strategy, a National REDD+ 
Strategy, and a Strategy for Fiscal Protection Against Natural Disasters (GRICCE 2021). 
SISCLIMA coordinates Colombian climate action at local, departmental, national, and 
international levels (GRICCE 2016; LSE 2019) and brings ministries together with the 
private sector and non-state actors (NDC Cluster 2018). Since passing the Guidelines for 
Climate Change Policy in 2002, Colombia’s government has adopted successive legislation 
and laws to strengthen the country’s climate change mitigation and adaptation action, 
with a signifcant focus on promoting market mechanisms. Key pieces of recent legislation 
include the National Policy on Climate Change and the introduction of a carbon tax in 
2017 and the Green Growth Policy introduced in 2018. The country’s frst climate change 
law was passed in July 2018. 
The Colombian government has conducted analysis of the economic benefts of cli-
mate action for Colombia’s long-term growth (DNP 2015) and taken steps towards main-
streaming climate action and environmental sustainability within Colombia’s overarching 
economic development plans. The last three National Development Plans have prioritised 
the sustainable use of Colombia’s national resources. Introduced by the Duque administra-
tion in autumn 2018, the latest National Development Plan for 2018–2022 acknowledges 
climate change as one of the key ‘constraints on the country’s progress’ and comprises a 
‘pact for sustainability’ that outlines, for example, national priorities for climate change 
mitigation and the circular economy (DNP 2018). While the plan’s exact implementation 
remains to be seen, the pact’s provisions have been criticised as ‘not precise and lacking 
ambition’ – for example, due to the absence of strategy to halt deforestation. The plan also 
includes a ‘Pact for mining-energy resources for sustainable growth and the expansion of 
opportunities’, which foresees an increase in coal extraction, hydrocarbon production, 
and oil exploration (Peñaloza 2019). 
Colombia challenges the idea that middle-income countries dependent on fossil fuel ex-
ports are not able to play a constructive role in international climate negotiations (Bustos 
2017). This is the result of the dynamics between the diferent institutions and pressure 
groups active in domestic climate politics. The 2018 presidential elections provided a 
snapshot of these diferent coalitions of interest, with the future of the country’s fossil fuel 
industries a key issue distinguishing the two candidates. While leftist candidate Gustavo 
Petro pledged to phase out coal and oil exports for both economic and environmental 
reasons, President Duque supported the continued development of the country’s oil, coal, 
and gas sectors (Casey and Abad 2018). In July 2018, he appointed former Executive Vice 
President of state oil company Ecopetrol4 Maria Fernanda Suarez Londoño as Minister of 
Mines and Energy, and he has encouraged investment in exploration by ofering tax relief 
to the industry. His administration continues to support initiatives to explore whether 
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fracking can be economically and environmentally viable (Acosta and Taj 2019) but has 
also taken action to realise the previous Santos administration’s plans for renewable en-
ergy auctions. Nonetheless, the changing political economy of coal mining and the huge 
investment needed to maintain current levels of oil production have eroded the strong 
support and institutional framework that has supported fossil fuel extraction and mining 
activities in Colombia for decades (Strambo 2017). 
Among the public, there is widespread acceptance that climate change is happening 
and over two-thirds believe that climate change is the result of human activities. A focus 
group study suggested that Colombians are strongly in favour of measures to mitigate and 
adapt to the efects of climate change and are most likely to associate climate change with 
the more frequent and severe fooding and droughts that had occurred in recent years. 
They are concerned about the negative impacts on the agricultural activities and quality 
of life (Martínez and Alfonso 2018). 
Trends and potential 
Colombia’s future prosperity will rest on three pillars: the peace process, economic sta-
bility, and environmental sustainability. Colombia’s updated NDC has a major role to play 
in this, and its implementation is being fnanced in part by climate fnance, a carbon tax, 
and, in future, an emissions trading system. Provided the peace process advances, the 
economy also looks set to reap a ‘peace dividend’ – frst and foremost in the agricultural 
sector. The ‘orange economy’, comprising the innovation and creative industries, remains 
a major focus, with its development reliant on high educational standards. 
Financing low-carbon development 
Colombia has been successful in attracting climate fnance from a range of streams, in-
cluding international donors and domestic sources of public and private climate fnance. 
The fnancial committee of SISCLIMA has been meeting regularly since 2013 and has de-
veloped a robust monitoring, reporting, and verifcation system for the country’s climate 
change project fnancing. The process has been led by the National Planning Department, 
with the assistance of the Ministry of Foreign Afairs, and other institutions have gradu-
ally been invited to become members (GRICCE 2021). Various international donors have 
provided fnancial support ranging from bilateral instruments such as Germany’s Interna-
tional Climate Initiative (IKI 2018) to the Green Climate Fund (Duque et al. 2017; Green 
Climate Fund 2018) and multilateral initiatives such as the US$100 million that Germany, 
Norway, and the United Kingdom pledged to support Colombia’s eforts to reduce de-
forestation in the Amazon under the UNFCCC’s Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation (REDD+) scheme (GGGI 2015). 
Carbon market mechanisms 
At domestic level, Colombia is using green taxes and market mechanisms to support the 
country’s sustainable development and the ongoing peace process, as well as to com-
pensate for a potential decline in oil tax revenues. The major tax reform passed by the 
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Colombian Congress in 2016 included a new carbon tax to be levied on all sales and im-
ports of fuels, including all petroleum derivatives, but excluding coal and consumption of 
natural gas in electricity generation. As such, it covers half of Colombia’s fossil fuel emis-
sions and 16 percent of its emissions overall. The tax entered into force on 1 January 2017 
at US$5/t CO2e – below average when compared with other carbon taxes around the 
world – but is set to gradually increase to US$10/t CO2e. The tax is estimated to generate 
around US$200 million in revenue each year, which is channelled into the ‘Colombia in 
Peace Fund’ administered by the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development. 
Around 70 percent of the funds are directed towards peacebuilding initiatives meeting 
certain sustainability criteria and a quarter of the funds towards environmental activities 
related to coastal erosion, reduction of deforestation, conservation of water sources, con-
servation of strategic ecosystems, and climate change. The remaining 5 percent of funds 
are allocated to a national heritage fund for conservation of biodiversity (IETA 2018; 
Monge 2018). 
Ofset schemes and emission certifcates are also being developed. Since June 2017, 
companies and other types of organisations have had the option of ofsetting their fuel 
consumption and obligations under the carbon tax by buying certifcates generated, for 
example, by UN REDD+5 projects (Conservation International 2018). This has in turn 
led to the development of more projects designed to mitigate carbon emissions. In the frst 
six months, these ofsets compensated around 2 Mt CO2, equivalent to around 5 percent 
of the expected tax collection (Alarcon-Diaz and Lubowski 2018). 
Furthermore, Colombia has taken initial steps towards establishing an emissions trad-
ing scheme in the medium term. An assessment looking at the potential economic advan-
tages of diferent design options has been initiated, and Congress laid the groundwork for 
creating a system of carbon credits and allowances in the Climate Change Law passed in 
July 2018. First steps towards creating a platform to register and trade verifed emissions 
have been taken (ICAP 2021). 
Potential in key low-carbon sectors 
In July 2018, the Santos administration approved a Long-Term Green Growth Strategy for 
Colombia. Recognising that Colombia’s current economic development model is depleting 
its resource base and generating high costs for the environment and society – estimated 
at more than 16.6 billion pesos, equivalent to 2.08 percent of GDP in 2015 (DNP 2018) 
– the strategy aimed to increase the economy’s productivity and competitiveness up to 
2030, while also achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the emission 
reductions outlined in Colombia’s NDC. Developed in collaboration with international 
partners6 and Colombian stakeholders, the strategy specifes key sectors and cross-cutting 
priorities for the economy, which include developing agribusiness and forestry; expand-
ing and diversifying the use of clean energies; increasing efciency in the use of water, 
soil, and energy; promoting the circular economy; and encouraging science, technology, 
innovation, and green jobs (GGGI 2018). The strategy launched a wide-ranging imple-
mentation process comprising 150 actions to be carried out by over 25 ministries and 
agencies. However, there has been criticism that its objectives have not sufciently been 
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Although the importance of the agricultural sector in the economy has declined in 
recent decades, the peace process has opened up opportunities for future investment 
and growth. Large areas of land previously controlled by the FARC became accessible 
and, combined with Colombia’s favourable climate and water resources, could represent 
a signifcant peace dividend. The government’s Green Growth Strategy estimated that 
the ‘bioeconomy’ sector could grow 2.5 percent annually, with the number of planted 
hectares expected to increase by 44 percent between 2015 and 2030 (Government of 
Colombia 2018). The National Association of Entrepreneurs of Colombia was even more 
optimistic, predicting an annual 8–10 percent increase in agricultural production, with 
major increases in crops such as African palm, cocoa, and mangos (Oxford Business 
Group 2018). Much of this increase in production could be exported, and in 2019 agri-
cultural products were already worth US$7.2 billion, making up 21 percent of Colombian 
commodities exports (Chatham House 2021). 
The rural reforms launched as part of the peace process will be crucial in determining 
both the development of Colombia’s agricultural sector and the stability of the peace-
building process. Agriculture and cattle ranching are important livelihoods in the rural 
areas afected by Colombia’s internal conficts. The peace agreement aimed to simultane-
ously increase the cultivation of licit crops and address longstanding grievances about land 
rights and land concentration by opening up previously uncultivated land to agriculture, 
including smallholder farmers and creating a land fund with 3 million hectares to formal-
ise small and medium landholdings. It also aimed to strengthen the property rights and 
economic independence of rural women (OXFAM 2016; Oxford Business Group 2018). 
However, implementation of the reforms has slowed since President Duque took ofce. 
‘According to the Kroc Institute, which tracks peace agreement progress, 51 percent of 
the initiatives in the rural reform chapter have made such little progress that it is unclear 
they will ever be fully implemented and a further 38 percent have made no progress at all’ 
(International Crisis Group 2019b). 
As acknowledged in its (updated) NDC, measures to adapt to and mitigate the im-
pacts of climate change can also be designed to play an important role in strengthening 
the peace process and the agricultural sector in Colombia. For example, promoting the 
cultivation of crops, such as cocoa, in already deforested areas previously used for coca 
production is preferable to clearing forest to make way for cattle ranching (CIAT 2018). 
Although many farmers in the Amazon are turning to the latter as an alternative to grow-
ing coca, it is unsustainable as ever greater areas of land are needed due to the unsuitable 
soil (Palmer 2017). Introducing climate-smart agricultural techniques will also be im-
portant in the main producing regions in Colombia’s mountain and coastal areas (US AID 
2017). For example, the land reforms agreed during the peace process included a plan to 
ensure ‘democratic and environmentally sustainable access to water’ for ‘family-run and 
community-based’ farming (Government of Colombia 2016). 
As to renewable energy, domestic energy production in Colombia already has a very 
low carbon footprint due to the large proportion of hydropower in its electricity mix. 
However, the National Energy Plan for 2050 aims to diversify the country’s renewable 
energy mix beyond hydropower to meet growing demand and ensure a reliable, low-
emission electricity supply, even during the droughts in El Niño cycles. There is sig-
nifcant potential for the inclusion of wind power plants, photovoltaic solar generation, 
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geothermal energy, and generation from biomass in the country’s energy basket, and the 
plan’s most feasible scenario estimates these other ‘unconventional’ sources could account 
for 6 percent of the electricity mix by 2028, equivalent to an installed capacity of 1,207 
MW (IEA 2017b). The Duque administration drew up contracting projects for up to 
1,500 MW of installed capacity, prioritising such non-conventional sources of renewable 
energy in its frst months in ofce (Ministry of Mines 2018). It also planned to allocate 
1.18 million MWh per year via auctions. The frst large-scale auction for unconventional 
renewable energy capacity held in February 2019 failed to award any contracts since the 
auction’s competition criteria were not met. However, a second auction held in October 
2019 successfully awarded contracts for about 1.3 GW of new wind and solar photo-
voltaic capacity, expected to start operating by 2022 (Bellini 2019; IRENA 2021b). In 
addition, Colombia’s economic recovery plan from the Covid-19 crisis foresees signifcant 
additional spending on renewable energy and clean growth (Energy Policy Tracker 2021; 
Global Recovery Observatory 2021). 
The orange economy 
During his presidential campaign, Duque frequently highlighted the importance of devel-
oping the ‘orange economy’ – entrepreneurship, innovative technologies, and the creative 
sector, including music, flm, and fashion design – as new exporting industries and engines 
of the Colombian economy. Before entering politics, he co-authored an Inter-American 
Development Bank publication entitled ‘The Orange Economy – An Infnite Opportu-
nity’, which highlighted that Latin America had yet to harness the economic potential of 
its creative industries, which had seen exponential growth in other parts of the world. It 
also made the argument that the creative industries were more proftable than extractives 
– stating that ‘by 2012 activities at the core of the orange economy would be contributing 
US$2.2 trillion dollars per year to the world economy, … equivalent to 230 percent of the 
actual value of the oil exports of all the OPEC members for the same year’ (Duque and 
Buitrago 2013). Once in ofce as a senator, Duque also wrote the ‘Orange Law’, passed in 
May 2017, to promote, develop, and protect Colombia’s creative industries. In 2017, the 
industries associated with the orange economy accounted for 3.4 percent of Colombia’s 
GDP, more than mining or cofee (Dempsey 2020), and the National Development Plan 
2018–2022 targets growth to 6 percent by 2022 (DNP 2018). 
Education and skills development 
Both access to education and the quality of teaching in Colombia have improved signif-
icantly over the past two decades, and, according to the World Bank’s Human Capital 
Index, the current level of education and healthcare would allow the average child born 
in Colombia today to achieve around 60 percent of their potential, somewhat above the 
worldwide and Latin American average (World Bank 2020a). Successive reforms have 
boosted enrolment rates in primary, secondary, and higher education, and increased 
standards in the teaching profession, for example, by raising entry requirements or chan-
nelling investment into skills development. New governance structures and funding ar-
rangements have also made the education system more efcient (OECD 2016). In 2018, 
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the literacy rate stood at around 95 percent, and the average number of years spent in 
primary to tertiary education was 14 years for males and 15 years for females (CIA 2021). 
Ensuring a lasting peace and sustainable development in Colombia will depend on 
many factors, but it has been argued that ‘none will be more important to the country’s 
future than its ability to build a strong and inclusive education system’ (OECD 2016). 
The 2018–2022 National Development Plan lists education as one of the main pillars of 
Colombia’s future prosperity (DNP 2018). However, to achieve the government’s goal of 
becoming the ‘most educated’ country in Latin America by 2025, further investment and 
changes are needed. In 2018, expenditure on education amounted to 4.5 percent of the 
Colombian GDP, slightly below the average of the member countries of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (5 percent in 2017) and the EU 
(4.7 percent in 2017) (World Bank 2021f). The strong inequalities between socioeco-
nomic groups and regions in Colombia are also more than evident in its educational sys-
tem. Depending on a child’s location and background, the number of years a child spends 
in formal education can range from 6 to 12 years (OECD 2016). These disparities also 
afect the enrolment rates in tertiary education across diferent socioeconomic groups. 
While 53 percent of students from wealthy families enrol at universities, only 9 percent of 
students from poor families do so (OECD 2016). 
Low skills and lack of access to training present major barriers to those seeking decent 
jobs in the labour market. Many low-skilled workers end up in Colombia’s large informal 
labour market, which is estimated to employ between 50 and 60 percent of the workforce 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020). Unemployment in the pre-Covid-19 period was slightly 
above 10 percent before surging to more than 20 percent at the height of the Covid-19 
crisis in 2020 and retreating to around 15 percent since (Trading Economics 2021). The 
distribution of employment has not changed signifcantly over the past decade, and, in 
2020, 63.5 percent were employed in the services sector, 20 percent in industry, and 
16.5 percent in agriculture (Statista 2021). Besides policies to level out the enrolment 
rates between regions and socioeconomic groups, the OECD has argued that improving 
the quality of technical and technological education should be a priority (OECD 2016). 
Cooperation with the EU 
Cooperation between Colombia and the EU is well developed, with Colombia being one 
of the EU’s most important partners in Latin America. After the United States and China, 
the EU is Colombia’s most important trade partner and has also been a strong supporter 
of Colombia’s peace process and post-confict development. Fossil fuels represent a major 
pillar of EU-Colombia trade, and the reduction in European coal demand is leading the 
Colombian coal sector to seek new export markets. 
Institutional framework: multiparty free trade agreement 
As Colombia has developed into an upper-middle-income country, the focus of bilateral 
relations has shifted from development cooperation towards political dialogue and trade. 
Trade between Colombia and the EU is governed by the multiparty free trade agreement, 
which was formalised with Colombia and Peru in 2013, and Ecuador in 2017 (Grieger 
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and Harte 2018). Overall, it is considered to have had a ‘stabilising’ and ‘clear positive 
impact’ on trade between the EU and the three Andean countries (EPRS 2018). The 
EU is Colombia’s third biggest trading partner after the United States and China, and in 
2019 bilateral trade totalled €10.5 billion (€8.3 billion in 2020), with the EU importing 
€4.3 billion (€3.7 billion in 2020) worth of goods from Colombia (European Commission 
2021a, 2021b). Since the free trade agreement came into force in 2013, Colombia has 
diversifed its exports to the EU (European Commission 2018). Since 2019, agricultural 
products have substituted fossil fuels as the largest share of Colombian exports to the 
EU. According to the European Commission, fuels and mining products accounted for 
16.2 percent of imports from Colombia in 2020 (when they took a particular hit due to 
the Covid-19 pandemic), compared to almost 50 percent in 2017 (European Commission 
2021a, 2021b; see also Figure 5.1). Coal accounted for more than 60 percent of fossil fuel 
exports (Chatham House 2021). Agriculture constituted 57 percent of total exports to 
the EU in 2020, up from 42 percent in 2017 (European Commission 2021a). This has had 
a positive efect on the implementation of the peace agreement by improving regional em-
ployment opportunities (European Commission 2018). The agreement has also allowed 
Colombian small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to increase their exports to the 
EU (European Commission 2018). Colombian imports largely comprise manufactured 
goods, equipment, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals (Garcia 2016). 
European investments have mainly been in the services sector and directed towards 
companies, software, IT, and fnance (ProColombia 2018). Colombia’s membership of 
the OECD is likely to yield further opportunities for cooperation on modernising the 
economy, for example, in reforming its education system and labour market, and the 
reforms that accompanied OECD membership, such as those to reduce corruption, have 
made the country a more attractive destination for European foreign investment. In 2020, 
Colombia achieved the third highest score in the Latin America and Caribbean region on 
the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index (World Bank 2020b). 
The free trade agreement is an example of a ‘new generation’ of free trade agreements, 
in which the EU has sought to promote sustainable development in its external trade 
relations, and includes clauses on human and labour rights, environmental protection, 
and good governance. At the time it was negotiated, the agreement was welcomed by 
business associations but criticised by civil society groups for its lack of detail regarding 
the enforcement of the sustainable development clauses.7 Five years later, an assessment 
on behalf of the European Parliament concluded that ‘serious concerns’ remained about 
the agreement’s ability to ensure that ‘environmental standards will be met and that those 
standards will be relaxed to facilitate investment in extractive industries’. The report 
recommended closer cooperation in international and multilateral fora relevant to min-
ing, energy, and hydrocarbon sectors, as well as the monitoring of good practices among 
European enterprises in Colombia, as potential entry points for promoting sustainable 
development (EPRS 2018). 
Cooperation on climate action and clean energy 
Colombia and the EU are strong partners with ‘very like-minded views’ in international 
processes related to climate change, and, under the UNFCCC, Colombia and the AILAC 
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group have coordinated eforts to increase ambition in the negotiations via the Cartagena 
Dialogue and the High Ambition Coalition. This also applies to broader processes relating 
to Agenda 2030 and sustainable development, the sustainable use of natural resources, 
and the protection of biodiversity (EEAS 2018a). For example, cooperation via the Inter-
national Urban Cooperation programme has linked up European and Colombian cities, 
so that they can share knowledge and experience for meeting the goals of the New Urban 
Agenda, the Paris Agreement, and the SDGs (European Commission 2016). The diver-
sifcation of Colombia’s renewable energy mix could provide an entry point for further 
cooperation, as it has remained relatively underdeveloped to date. 
Support for the peace process 
A major focus of EU-Colombia relations to date has been supporting Colombia on the 
road to peace. Since 2002, the EU and its member states have provided €1.5 billion to 
support peacebuilding in Colombia, €550 million of which came from the EU budget. 
This has been used to promote reconciliation and address the root causes of the confict 
by investing in economic and regional development, human rights, and democratic gov-
ernance at local level. The EU also provided support throughout the peace process with 
the FARC but was particularly active during the fnal six months of the negotiations when 
the Colombian government reached out for international partners to support Colombia’s 
post-confict development. At this stage, former High Representative Federica Mogher-
ini appointed a special envoy to coordinate the EU response and support, allowing for a 
more rapid, organised, and strategic cooperation at a critical time (Chaparro 2018). The 
EU has since reafrmed its support for Colombia’s post-confict development with an 
overall support package totalling almost €600 million. This includes €95 million for the 
EU Trust Fund for Colombia agreed in December 2016 to support ‘comprehensive rural 
development’, reinforce ‘state presence and restore the social fabric in areas afected by 
the confict’, and reintegrate ex-combatants (EEAS 2018a). Building on its long history 
of involvement in the process of confict resolution and peacebuilding, the EU continues 
to hold an important potential to contribute to keeping the precarious peace process alive 
and advancing it (Ioannides 2019; International Crisis Group 2020). 
Broader cooperation agenda 
The EU and Colombia are engaged in a number of political and policy consultations at 
bilateral, regional, and global levels. A bilateral high-level political dialogue in July 2019 
saw the two sides afrm their commitment to continued cooperation on a range of areas 
of mutual interest, including human rights, security and defence matters, protection of 
the environment, education, science and innovation, and cooperation in the fght against 
illicit drugs. They also agreed to explore new areas of cooperation, including the creative 
industries (the ‘orange economy’) and the circular economy, and new mechanisms for 
‘lifting bilateral relations to a new level’ in future (EEAS 2019). The latest round of bi-
lateral high-level political dialogue in December 2020 focused on the Covid-19 pandemic 
and the need for inclusive and sustainable green recovery. Both parties expressed satisfac-
tion with the progress made towards the fnalisation of a Memorandum of Understanding 
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on an agenda of enhanced political and sectoral dialogue and cooperation for the next 
decade in which an environmental and a digital agenda are supposed to feature strongly 
(EEAS 2020). 
In the area of security and defence, the Framework Participation Agreement that the 
EU and Colombia concluded in August 2014 has also made way for greater future co-
operation between both partners in missions undertaken within the framework of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy. Colombia has also asked for further EU assistance 
to help respond to the Venezuelan crisis. 
EU-Colombia relations are also shaped by various dialogues promoting cooperation 
within the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. These include the Joint 
Initiative on Research and Innovation, the Erasmus+ programme for cooperation in higher 
education, a Structured Dialogue on Migration, and a Coordination and Cooperation 
Mechanism on Drugs (EEAS 2018b). In 2015, Colombia’s Ministry of External Relations 
and the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy also 
established regional policy dialogues to support the strengthening of economic, social, 
and territorial cohesion – an important aspect of Colombia’s post-confict development 
(European Commission 2015). 
Conclusions 
After decades of internal confict, Colombia made an important step towards peace in the 
2016 peace agreement with the FARC. However, the process of building lasting peace is 
in its early stages, has become increasingly fragile, and has come under additional strain as 
a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. Continued political commitment is needed, and eco-
nomic stability will also be crucial, given the high cost of fulflling the terms of the peace 
agreement. Major public spending is required to enact, for example, the rural reforms 
that are fundamental to the peace deal and Colombia’s post-confict development, as well 
as to respond to other security challenges, such as narcotics production and trafcking, 
continued activities of other insurgent groups, and large infux of Venezuelan refugees. 
Oil and coal remain important to the economy, accounting for a substantial proportion 
of Colombian exports. It remains to be seen how prices recover from the pandemic but 
for the moment it appears that the unfavourable economic conditions have tempered the 
Duque administration’s focus on expanding fossil fuel production. 
Global decarbonisation processes therefore have the potential to reinforce economic 
and political challenges to stability in Colombia. With decarbonisation precipitating falls 
in demand for coal imports in its traditional export markets, including the EU, and Co-
lombian coal lacking competitiveness in other major coal markets, Colombian coal ex-
ports will likely rely on a shrinking circle of countries that still favour coal power. With 
no coal exit strategies or policies in place as of 2021, any signifcant short-term decline in 
coal exports could harm the economy and present signifcant economic and development 
challenges in coal mining regions. Furthermore, although Colombia proved more resil-
ient than other countries to the sharp drop in oil prices between 2014 and 2016, future 
market fuctuations combined with a potential decline of its coal exports could place pres-
sure on public budgets, with implications for political stability. Decarbonisation therefore 
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strong low-carbon economy, on top of the complex task of implementing the fundamental 
reforms required for the success of the peace process. The fallout of the Covid-19 pan-
demic has given a strong foretaste of the size of the challenge since 2020. 
The EU and Colombia have well-established relations and are cooperating in many ar-
eas that can support both decarbonisation and Colombia’s post-confict development. The 
EU has ofered solid support to Colombia throughout the peace process and has launched 
initiatives that can play a role in supporting long-term peace, particularly in the cru-
cial area of rural development. Trade relations between Colombia and EU member states 
have already advanced beyond coal, as trade in agricultural products has increased under 
the multiparty free trade agreement, also supporting rural development. Although the 
sustainable development clauses of the free trade agreement have played a limited role 
in strengthening environmental governance to date, cooperation in other forums could 
begin to fll this gap. The EU and Colombia have also cooperated constructively in climate 
policy. With Colombia an example of an oil-producing state playing an active and con-
structive role in the international climate negotiations, it has also cooperated with the EU 
to advance decarbonisation by increasing ambition in the UNFCCC. 
On the basis of our analysis, we can identify rural development, climate action, and 
economic diversifcation as important entry points for EU-Colombia cooperation to sup-
port both decarbonisation and post-confict development processes. Accordingly, the fol-
lowing areas may constitute key priorities for European foreign policy towards Colombia: 
• Political and diplomatic support for peace and post-confict develop-
ment: The EU has assured a reliable, coordinated support for the peace process 
with the FARC using a range of diplomatic instruments, including appointment of a 
special envoy. The EU can continue to make use of its diplomatic toolbox to develop 
sound European responses to support lasting peace, as well as responses to other 
security challenges, such as the Venezuelan crisis. 
• Economic diversifcation: To support the transition towards a low-carbon econ-
omy in Colombia, the EU can support initiatives and investment advancing and
strengthening commercial ties in the alternative sectors proposed by the Colombian 
government in its Green Growth Strategy (bioeconomy, forestry, sustainable energy) 
and in the priority of President Duque for the development of creative industries 
or ‘orange economy’. In this context, cooperation on a green recovery from the 
Cobid-19 crisis deserves particular attention. 
• Investment in rural development and reform is an important lever for sup-
porting both post-confict development and decarbonisation in Colombia. Projects 
fnanced by the EU Trust Fund have provided valuable support in this area and could 
be expanded in future. Beyond development cooperation, the EU can also promote 
European foreign direct investment in the development of climate-resilient agricul-
ture and thereby the sustainable development of Colombia’s ‘bioeconomy’. Again, 
the recovery from the Covid-19 crisis may reinforce the related potential. 
• Renewable energy sources beyond hydropower: Further developing renew-
able energy sources beyond hydropower can safeguard electricity production when 
water levels drop in El-Niño years and also help to meet rising energy demand. The 
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supporting the development of higher education courses on renewable energy tech-
nologies; promoting European investment in Colombian renewable energy projects, 
through related cooperation on the Covid-19 recovery; and pairing forward-thinking
European cities with Colombian cities investing in renewable energy sources. 
• Promotion of just transition narratives in EU (climate) diplomacy with 
Colombia: Colombia has to adapt to a decline in its coal exports which the Covid-19 
pandemic has accelerated. As well as promoting wider economic diversifcation, de-
carbonisation calls for targeted policies to ensure a just transition and new types of 
employment in Colombia’s coal-producing regions. The EU and its member states 
are developing policies and good practices in this area, as well as gathering lessons 
learned, and the EU can encourage related bilateral exchange on this issue. 
• Continued cooperation within the UNFCCC: The EU and Colombia have co-
ordinated their eforts to push for increased ambition within UNFCCC processes.
They can continue to work together to push for higher ambition. As implementation
advances, countries that have pushed for more ambition will be required to also show
they can ‘walk the walk’, and the EU has signifcant expertise to support this. 
Overall, the EU has already developed a sound basis for cooperation to support both peace 
and low-carbon development in Colombia, with increasing political dialogue in relevant 
areas of mutual interest. The EU has proved a valuable partner in the peace process, and it 
continues to help tackle the root causes of the confict as a donor, and more and more via 
investment and trade. The free trade agreement has played a role in shifting EU-Colombia 
trade relations away from fossil fuels towards agricultural products and, therefore, in 
supporting rural development and economic diversifcation in Colombia. This also bodes 
well for building up trade and other ties (e.g., via higher education and research and de-
velopment) in other low-carbon, knowledge-based sectors, including in a context of the 
recovery from the Covid-19 crisis. 
Notes 
1 An extensive network comprising approximately 3,100 miles of natural gas pipelines trans-
ports natural gas throughout the country (EIA 2019). Long self-sufcient, Colombia began 
regularly importing LNG from the United States for the frst time in late 2017 (Kraul 2017). 
In 2019, LNG imports mainly from Ireland, Nigeria, and the United States valued US$79.7 
million (Chatham House 2021). 
2 Calculated using World Bank development indicators (GDP in current US$, Merchandise ex-
ports in current US$, and fuel exports as percentage of merchandise exports). 
3 Venezuela: Assisting refugees afected by Covid-19 in Colombia, https://www.hi-us.org/news_ 
venezuela_assisting_refugees_afected_by_covid_19_in_colombia (visited 21 July 2021). 
4 Ecopetrol has been partly privatised, with state-owned companies controlling 89 percent of 
its shares (Ecopetrol 2018). The largest company in Colombia, Ecopetrol is responsible for 
producing almost two-thirds of Colombia’s oil and owns two of the country’s largest refneries 
and most of the pipeline network (Acosta 2017). The company has begun diversifying into 
renewable energy (Morais 2018), but the focus is likely to remain heavily on fossil fuels under 
the new government. 
5 ‘Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) is a mechanism devel-
oped by Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
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countries to reduce emissions from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable
development’ (UN REDD 2018). 
6 The Green Growth Taskforce was initiated by Colombia’s National Planning Department. 
Strategic partners were the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), the Government of Nor-
way, the World Bank, the French Development Agency, KfW, UNEP, and the Inter-American 
Development Bank. 
7 A notable exception were the enforceable labour provisions in the agreement, included due 
to pressure from the European Parliament. The move was intended to ensure that the EU 
supports the improvement of the labour situation in Colombia, which has one of the world’s 
highest murder rates of trade unionists (Van den Putte and Velluti 2018). 
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The State of Qatar (henceforth Qatar) is a country of around 2.8 million inhabitants 
(UN DESA 2019) located in the Persian Gulf with neighbouring countries Saudi Arabia, 
the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Iran. Of the total population, approximately 
2  million are foreign workers, mainly from India, Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. 
When Qatar started exploiting its fossil fuel resources in 1949, it had less than 16,000 in-
habitants. In the twenty-first century, population growth has been driven primarily by an 
increase of (primarily male) foreign workers (De Bel-Air 2014). Qatar has a territory of 
only 11,571 km2 (somewhat less than Northern Ireland) and is composed of eight munici-
palities, with Doha as the country’s biggest city and capital. The country is highly urban-
ised with 99.3 percent of the inhabitants living in cities in 2021 (CIA 2021). Qatar gained 
independence from the United Kingdom in 1971 and is ruled as an absolute monarchy by 
Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, who has been in power since 2013.
In recent decades, Qatar has experienced dynamic economic development, driven by its 
oil and gas industry. From 1995 to 2019, Qatar’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased 
more than 20-fold to about US$175.8 billion (in current US$) (World Bank 2021a). Over 
the same period, GDP per capita grew nearly four-fold to about US$62,000 (World Bank 
2021b), one of the highest per capita incomes in the world. By 2017, industry and services 
each contributed approximately half of Qatar’s GDP, while the role of agriculture was 
negligible (0.2 percent) (CIA 2021). Poverty is an issue to some extent among the foreign 
population, but unemployment is all but absent. Qatar has been selected as the host of the 
2022 FIFA World Cup, a prospect that has motivated numerous ambitious construction 
projects in the country (which have drawn significant criticism – see below). Overall, 
Qatar has become a high-income country, ranking relatively high on economic welfare 
and human development indices.
Qatar’s relations with other countries in the region have been under strain in the 
2010s, and particularly after 2017 when several neighbouring countries led by Saudi Ara-
bia cut off diplomatic relations and established an economic embargo against Qatar. They 
accused Qatar of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and of being a close ally of Iran. 
The embargo constituted an enormous challenge, since Qatar was highly dependent on 
its neighbouring countries for food imports and general trade. In 2016, Qatar had im-
ported goods and services valued US$5 billion from the countries behind the embargo 
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and exported about US$5.6 billion of goods and services to these countries. However, 
under the embargo Qatar largely succeeded in rebuilding its trade links and food supply 
chains with other countries (Collins 2018; CIA 2021). On 1 January 2019, Qatar further-
more withdrew from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a 
sign of the troubled relationship with Saudi Arabia and its allies as well as of its strategic 
economic orientation towards producing and exporting natural gas rather than oil. The 
embargo by Saudi Arabia and others was eventually lifted in January 2021. 
In line with the overall approach of the case studies, this chapter will explore the 
challenges and opportunities Qatar and Qatar-EU relations are facing under decarboni-
sation in fve steps. The next section frst substantiates that Qatar is highly dependent on 
the production and export of oil and gas and hence vulnerable to price fuctuations and 
the phase-out of fossil fuels. It also analyses other fragility and security risks, including the 
geopolitical position of Qatar in the Gulf region and the Middle East more generally. Sub-
sequently, the status of Qatar’s climate policy is assessed, which leaves signifcant room 
for further improvement. This is followed by a review of relevant trends and potentials, 
especially regarding eforts to diversify the economy that have only been efective to a 
limited extent so far. The one but last section reviews the framework and basis of EU-
Qatar relations beyond fossil fuels. The fnal section concludes and identifes focal points 
for EU foreign policy towards Qatar under decarbonisation. 
Exposure and risk 
Exposure to global decarbonisation trends 
Qatar’s economy is highly dependent on the production and export of oil and gas. It is the 
largest exporter of liquefed natural gas (LNG) in the world, which accounts for a large 
share of its GDP and government revenue. Qatar consequently also remains exposed to oil 
price fuctuations, and investments in oil and gas may become ‘stranded’. 
Qatar is a signifcant producer of gas and oil. In 2019, it produced about 1.88 million 
barrels of oil per day, equivalent to about 2 percent of the world total. Qatar’s gas pro-
duction reached 178 billion cubic metres in 2019 (nearly a doubling over the previous 
decade), which represented 4.5 percent of global production (BP 2020). There is no coal 
production in the country (IEA 2015). 
Qatar possesses both signifcant oil and gas reserves, with the latter being particularly
impressive. Its proven oil reserves are estimated to amount to around 25 billion barrels,
which could support current production levels for about another 35 years (BP 2020).
Estimated gas reserves are even more abundant and amount to 25 trillion cubic metres, the
third largest gas reserves in the world after Russia and Iran (BP 2020; see for other esti-
mates: EIA 2015; CIA 2021). They could support current production levels for nearly 140
years. Gas production and exports are expected to increase further (Meltzer et al. 2014). 
In accordance with its resource base, Qatar mainly uses gas and oil to supply its own 
energy needs. Since 2009, its oil consumption has doubled to about 346,000 barrels per 
day in 2019 (close to 20 percent of production) (BP 2020). Similarly, gas consumption 
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in 2019 (equivalent to about 23 percent of production) (BP 2020). Overall, about three 
quarters of overall energy consumption is accounted for by gas and the remaining quarter 
by oil (BP 2020).1 Plans to diversify the energy mix and develop renewable energy sources 
have yet to bear fruit (see also below). 
Exports of oil and gas are of crucial importance for Qatar’s economy (see Figure 6.1). 
At the end of the 2010s, the country exported more than 80 percent of its oil production 
and more than 75 percent of its gas production (see above). Oil and gas account for nearly 
90 percent of Qatari merchandise exports, with this share having fuctuated somewhat 
over the past two decades (varying between 70 and 95 percent), also as a result of price 
fuctuations (World Bank 2021i). Qatar is the world’s largest exporter of LNG (BP 2020). 
Consequently, oil and gas play a dominant role in Qatar’s economy and government 
budget. The oil and gas industries are the engines of the economy, with the sectors ac-
counting for around 21 percent of GDP in 2019 (fuctuating somewhat with the oil price) 
and for the lion’s share of the state budget (World Bank 2021e, 2021f). To be sure, Qatar 
has made signifcant eforts to diversify its economy. Notably, the Emir Hamad bin Khalifa 
Fossil fuel exports as % GDP (2019) 
20.7% 
Fossil fuel exports as % total exports 
(2019) 
88.8% 
Fossil fuel exports to EU as % of 
total exports to the EU (2020) 
68.7% 
Exports to the EU as % of total export
(2020) 
6.6% 
Figure 6.1 Status of fossil fuel exports of Qatar in 2019/2020. 
Sources: Data based on https://data.worldbank.org (fossil fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise export; 
oil, gas, and coal as a percentage of GDP – accessed on 25 July 2021) and European Commission (2021) (ex-
ports to EU – accessed on 25 July 2021). 
 
 
Qatar: moving beyond oil and gas 125 
al Thani founded the Qatar Investment Authority in 2005 to invest revenues from the oil 
and gas sectors in a variety of projects in Qatar and abroad. The Investment Authority 
makes investments in international markets (including in Europe) and in non-oil projects 
in Qatar itself (Qatar Investment Authority 2016). Even though the share of non-oil/gas 
sources of government revenues grew to 22 percent in 2018 (Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis 2018), the fossil fuel sector still generates the largest share of government reve-
nues and Qatar remains highly dependent on these sources of income. Indeed, a previous 
diversifcation strategy was to increase gas production and exports (in order to diversify 
away from oil). 
Qatar’s government also provides signifcant subsidies for energy. According to the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), the country supported oil, gas, and electricity with 
about US$500 million in 2020. However, this constituted a major decrease from subsidies 
of more than US$4 billion in 2014 (IEA 2020), when Qatar was among the countries with 
the highest energy subsidies per capita in the world (with electricity being free for Qatari 
nationals: Meltzer et al. 2014). 
Qatar remains highly exposed to variations in oil and gas prices. Declining oil prices 
after 2014 and reduced demand in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis have left clear marks 
on economic development. GDP dropped from US$206 billion in 2014 to 151.7 billion 
in 2016 and from US$183.3 billion in 2018 to US$146.4 billion in 2020 (in current US$). 
GDP per capita similarly dropped from nearly US$84,000 in 2014 to about US$57,000 
in 2016 and from nearly US$66,000 in 2018 to about US$51,000 in 2020 (World Bank 
2021a, 2021b). Due to exchange rate fuctuations, the fgures difer in constant 2010 US$, 
according to which overall GDP remained at above US$170 billion from 2015 to 2020, 
whereas GDP per capita decreased from about US$67,000 in 2014 to about US$60,000 
in 2020 (World Bank 2021c, 2021d). Given the robust demand for gas, the conditions for 
a relatively strong recovery of Qatar’s economy from the Covid-19 crisis seem to be in 
place (World Bank 2021h). 
Accordingly, the government budget situation has also seen signifcant fuctuations. 
Qatar’s government revenues increased from 54 billion Qatari Rials in 2005 to 360.6 
billion Qatari Rials in 2014, before decreasing, in the wake of plummeting oil prices, to 
185.4 billion Qatari Rials in 2018 (equivalent to about €42 billion). As oil prices recover 
and gas production increases, government revenues are expected to increase (Quandl 
2021). Qatar’s public debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 32.3 percent in 2014 to 71.8 percent 
in 2020. The increase was only temporarily interrupted by the recovery of oil prices, 
with the ratio dropping to 48.4 percent in 2018 (Trading Economics 2021). Overall, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio has remained modest compared to the international average, even 
though it remains vulnerable to oil price fuctuations (with the full impact of the Covid-19 
pandemic still materialising). 
Refecting its resource base, Qatar has a vast network of pipelines, transport ships, 
and extraction and production facilities for oil and gas. Petroleum and petroleum prod-
ucts are exported from three major terminals: Umm Said (Mesaieed), Halul Islan, and 
Ras Lafan. The oil pipeline network of the state-owned company Qatar Petroleum (see 
below) brings oil from ofshore felds to the Halul Islan terminal where it is further pro-
cessed and then exported. Oil from onshore sources is mainly transported to the Umm 
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leader in gas-to-liquids technologies and has two operational facilities that can turn dry 
natural gas into liquid fuels (EIA 2015). 
The oil and gas sector has remained a major focus of Qatari investments, creating a high 
risk of stranded assets under decarbonisation. The emphasis on fossil fuel investments has 
increasingly shifted towards gas (which may somewhat mitigate the decarbonisation risk 
at least in the medium term). In 2018, Qatar announced investments of US$12 billion in 
the oil and gas sectors, out of a total of new investments of US$85 billion in diferent sec-
tors. The three biggest planned projects are the Bul Hanine Field Redevelopment Project 
(US$11 billion), the North Field Gas Development Project (US$2 billion), and the Barzan 
Gas Development Ofshore Project (US$700 million) (Trade Arabia 2018). The North 
Field is estimated to hold recoverable gas reserves of more than 900 trillion standard 
cubic feet, which makes it the largest single non-associated gas reservoir in the world 
(Ofshore Energy Today 2017). The Barzan Gas Development Ofshore Project forms part 
of the broader Barzan Gas Project, a joint venture between Qatar Gas and Exxon Mobile. 
This US$10.4 billion project includes onshore and ofshore developments, a gas processing 
unit, and several pipelines (EIA 2015; Hydrocarbons Technology 2018). Several of the 
investment projects involve foreign investors (such as Exxon Mobile, Royal Dutch/Shell, 
and Total; Zhdannikov 2018). 
Other fragility and security risks 
Qatar also faces a number of other risks. To start with, whereas Qatar has developed into 
an advanced economy and has low levels of corruption or repression, it does face chal-
lenges with respect to democracy and political rights. Ranking 144 out of 178 countries 
on the Fragile States Index in 2021, Qatar can be considered relatively stable, although 
sub-indicators do indicate issues with respect to fuctuating economic inequality and state 
legitimacy (Fund for Peace 2021; see also Figures 6.2 and 6.3). Corruption is not a major 
concern, with the country ranked 30 among the 180 countries on the Transparency Inter-
national Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2021). The Freedom 
House Index of 2021 categorises Qatar as ‘not free’ with problems indicated in particu-
lar for general freedom, political rights, and civil liberties (Freedom House 2021). This 
is in line with the fndings of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index, which 
Fragility (2021) 
Human development (2019) 
Strength of governance (2019) 
Climate change vulnerability (2019) 
Sustainable energy development (2019) 
Sustainable STABLE Warning Alert 
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Figure 6.2 Governance indicators (Qatar). 


































Figure 6.3 Qatar’s performance in the Fragile States Index 2006–2021. 
Source: Fund for Peace (2021). 
Note: Higher index numbers indicate a higher level of state fragility. 
shows a clear contrast between strong progress towards establishing a market economy 
and general economic performance, on the one side, and clear defciencies with respect 
to political participation, rule of law, and democratic institutions, on the other (Bertels-
mann Stiftung 2020). 
A particular challenge for Qatar is the highly problematic situation of the about 2 mil-
lion expatriate workers, mainly low-skilled Asian construction workers. While Qatar’s 
sizeable public sector employs about 80 percent of Qatari nationals, almost 80 percent 
of non-nationals are employed in the private sector, mainly in the construction sector. 
While the numbers of expatriate workers have increased, Qatar has been criticised for the 
exploitation of these blue-collar workers especially in the construction sector, including 
in preparation for the 2022 FIFA World Cup (Amnesty International 2020). The very 
large number of foreign workers has led to concerns about their relationship with native 
Qataris and the long-term prospects for their future and integration into Qatari society. 
According to its National Vision for 2030, Qatar is aiming to attract more high-skilled 
workers (De Bel-Air 2014). 
In addition, the Middle East and the Gulf region provide for a sensitive and challenging 
security environment. The region has long been subject to serious political tensions, and 
these have repeatedly culminated in violent and armed confict (most recently in Syria and 
Yemen). The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia for regional dominance is a key factor 
shaping the region’s precarious security situation, as is the engagement of the United 
States and Russia (as well as other players such as Turkey). Other countries and actors 
have strategically aligned themselves with these major players according to the resulting 
fault lines in various ways. 
The escalation of tensions between Saudi Arabia and others, on the one hand, and 
Qatar on the other, in the 2010s, is one expression and result of this precarious regional 
security balance. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain frst withdrew 
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their ambassadors from Doha in 2014. One of the reasons given was that Qatar did not 
want to categorise the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation. In 2017, the crisis 
escalated further. Qatar was asked, among other things, to cut its ties with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, loosen its relations with Iran, and shut down the Al Jazeera news network. 
When Qatar refused to follow these requests, Saudi Arabia and its allies launched an 
embargo against Qatar (as discussed in the introduction), throwing the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) into paralysis (Galeeva 2018). In January 2021, the embargo was lifted on 
the basis of an agreement reached during a GCC summit with the mediation of Kuwait 
and the United States (Salam and Alam 2021). 
With respect to climate change impacts, these are likely to be signifcant in Qatar. In 
particular, Qatar is highly likely to be afected by sea-level rise and the associated risk of 
salinisation of groundwater. With water demand increasing due to industrial uses and 
population growth, water scarcity is already an issue, and precipitation is forecast to de-
crease with climate change. Rising sea levels might require moving much of Qatar’s pop-
ulation (of which 96 percent live in coastal towns or cities; Qatar 2011) away from coastal 
areas and could endanger oil and gas as well as power-producing infrastructure. Further 
increases of already very high temperatures also pose challenges (Qatar 2011; Meltzer 
et al. 2014; Al-Sarihi 2018). 
Nevertheless, Qatar ranked low on the Global Climate Risk Index for 2019 and for the 
period 2000–2019. The Index assesses the extent to which countries have been subject 
to weather-related loss events (storms, foods, heat waves, etc.) (Germanwatch 2021). 
Similarly, the index of the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN), which 
considers eight life-supporting sectors (food, water, health, ecosystems, human habitat, 
coastal, energy, and transportation infrastructure), gives Qatar a favourable medium 
score and rank for its overall vulnerability and readiness. Its vulnerability is considered 
less than average and its readiness slightly higher than average (ND-GAIN 2020; see Fig-
ure 6.2). Hence, climate change impacts in Qatar are considered signifcant but modest 
in international comparison. 
Past and present eforts to decarbonise 
Qatar can be considered a climate policy laggard. It is a party to all major climate treaties. 
It ratifed the UN Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1996, the Kyoto Proto-
col in 2005, and the Paris Agreement in 2017. It is a non-Annex I party to the UNFCCC 
and hence – despite its status as a high-income country – considered a developing country 
for the purposes of the climate treaties. Within the UNFCCC negotiations, Qatar forms 
part of the Arab States, a group (led by Saudi Arabia) that is widely considered as ‘obstruc-
tionist’ in the international climate negotiations. Arab oil producers see climate policy 
and its international cooperation as a serious threat to their economic welfare and political 
stability (Coates Ulrichsen 2010; Reiche 2010; Carbon Brief 2015a). Hence, Qatar does 
not play a progressive role in international climate policy. 
Consequently, Qatar’s frst Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) submitted 
under the Paris Agreement in 2015 remained vague and did not establish any frm com-
mitments to address climate change and mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. It es-
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(1) economic diversifcation with mitigation co-benefts (energy efciency, clean energy 
and renewables, research and development, education, tourism), (2) adaptation actions 
with mitigation co-benefts (water management, infrastructure and transport, waste 
management, and awareness), and (3) response measures to climate change (Qatar 2015). 
Hence, there has not been a clear focus on mitigating climate change (but exports of 
LNG have been portrayed as contributing to emission reductions elsewhere). Qatar’s frst 
NDC did not include GHG emission targets nor did it identify sectors for mitigation ac-
tion. Plans to invest in and use renewable energy sources, especially solar energy, were 
mentioned but, again, no concrete actions were taken or targets established. Instead, the 
NDC highlighted the need for technological assistance and technology transfers (Qatar 
2015; see also Carbon Brief 2015b; WRI 2021). Overall, Qatar’s frst NDC refects a 
lack of commitment to take ambitious action to mitigate climate change. As of July 2021, 
Qatar has not submitted any update of its frst NDC, nor a second NDC. 
According to the UNFCCC, Qatar’s GHG emissions excluding land use, land use 
change, and forestry (LULUCF) in 2007 stood at 61,592.97 Gg CO2 equivalent. Given
the size and geographical location of Qatar, the LULUCF sector is insignifcant (UNFCCC 
2007). Qatar has the largest per capita emissions in the world (Qatar 2011). According 
to Qatar’s National Communication to the UNFCCC, the oil and gas sector accounted 
for half of the country’s GHG emissions, while the power and water sectors contributed 
27 percent, road transport about 7 percent, and industrial processes 8.5 percent (Qatar 
2011). The available UNFCCC data suggest over 90 percent of emissions are related to 
energy (UNFCCC 2007). Other more recent datasets suggest that emissions have in-
creased more than seven-fold between 1990 and 2018 to nearly 100 Mt CO2 equivalent
(WRI 2021, see Figure 6.4). 
Qatar does not have a frm framework for its domestic climate policy that is in embry-
onic state. In line with its NDC under the Paris Agreement, existing plans and measures 
Figure 6.4 Qatar’s greenhouse gas emissions and emission targets (1990–2018). 
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seem to focus on the economy, with side or co-benefts for GHG mitigation. Instead 
of binding legislation, Qatar mainly works with non-binding initiatives, programmes, 
and incentives. Economic development is considered the primary concern, with climate 
change mitigation given a lower priority. Accordingly, the World Energy Council has 
ranked Qatar high on energy security and equity but low on environmental sustainability 
(where it, despite improvements over the 2010s, remains on one of the last ranks) in its 
Energy Trilemma Index (World Energy Council 2021). Although Qatar can also look 
back on a history of failed attempts to expand the use of renewable energy, there are signs 
that this may be emerging once again as a priority (see below). 
The development of domestic climate policies is not helped by the close entanglement 
of Qatar’s oil and gas sectors with the government. Qatar Petroleum, the dominant oil 
and gas company, is a state-owned public corporation which was established in 1974. It is 
responsible for the oil and gas sector in Qatar and is engaged in the exploration, produc-
tion, and sale of, among others, crude oil, natural gas and gas liquids, refned products, 
and LNG in Qatar. The company’s chairman is the Minister of Energy and Industry, but it 
also receives direct guidance from the Emir himself (Qatar Petroleum 2014, 2018). Qatar 
Petroleum operates several subsidiaries. One of these, QatarGas, is responsible for the 
development, production, and management of the country’s gas felds and is the world’s 
largest LNG producer (QatarGas 2018). 
Trends and potential 
Qatar has strong potential and has invested heavily in education and developing a 
knowledge-based economy. This forms part of a longstanding strategy of diversifying the 
economy beyond oil and gas production, including the expansion of renewable energy. 
While some progress has been made, related eforts are still at an early stage and leave 
signifcant room for further improvement. 
Diversifcation of the economy 
Also related to education and developing a knowledge-based economy are Qatar’s long-
standing eforts to diversify its economy, through both domestic and foreign investment
(in particular through the Qatar Investment Authority). Progress has been made, but
Qatar is pursuing further diversifcation in and away from the hydrocarbon sector in
order to ensure a ‘steady and robust’ economy in the long term (Qatar 2011: 13; see
also General Secretariat 2008; Qatar 2018). Past eforts have led to an expansion of
gas production and exports (in large part via LNG capacities); development of petro-
chemical, metallic, and non-metallic industries; programmes for improving the quality
of higher education; and expansion of the maritime and airline transport sectors. In ad-
dition, Qatar has allowed more privatisation in order to enable small- and medium-scale
industries to grow faster. The construction sector (roads, high-rise buildings, private
water and power projects, hospitality infrastructure, and residences) has been growing
and making increasing contributions to GDP. Another growing sector is the transport
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has faced challenges in the process of diversifcation such as a small domestic market,
high production costs, low economies of scale, and low levels of industrial production
(Miller and al-Mansouri 2016). Further diversifcation along similar lines is foreseen
in Qatar’s National Vision for 2030, the implementation of which is advanced through
quintennial national development strategies (Qatar 2018). Particular emphasis has been
put on developing a knowledge-based economy (see above), with a stronger focus on the
private sector and more investment in infrastructure (General Secretariat 2008). Some
advances towards a knowledge-based economy have been made, with some further room
for improvement (Ben Hassen 2021). 
However, from a decarbonisation perspective, it is worth highlighting that Qatar’s di-
versifcation strategy does not appear to take into account the need to decarbonise and the 
risks associated with investments vulnerable to global decarbonisation. In other words, 
investments are not being vetted to assess whether they are climate-proof. Hence, as 
mentioned above, expansion of the gas sector has been part of the diversifcation strategy 
(to reduce dependence on oil). Qatar’s National Vision 2030 considers the oil and gas 
sector to be of central importance for the development of human resources and economic 
capacities, and, in this context, gas is considered a source of clean energy (General Sec-
retariat 2008: 32; Qatar 2018). Furthermore, eforts to build a domestic industrial base 
have been largely focused on the petrochemical industry, which itself is highly dependent 
on oil and gas and vulnerable to decarbonisation. Foreign industrial investments (e.g., 
in the European car industry) run related risks. Under the circumstances, the emphasis 
of Qatar’s NDC on the possible negative impacts of climate change mitigation measures 
on the Qatari economy is understandable (Qatar 2015). However, Qatar lags in its own 
eforts to enhance its resilience. 
Renewable energy and clean energy 
As mentioned above, renewable energy seems to be emerging as a new priority feld for ac-
tion. This contrasts with a lack of delivery on past plans for renewable energy expansion. 
These included the target to generate 10 percent of total energy use for electricity and 
water desalination with solar power by 2018 (Arabian Business 2012). In 2019, renewable 
energy generation still amounted to a negligible 43 MW (of which 38 MW were bioen-
ergy/waste and only 5 MW photovoltaics: IRENA 2021). In 2017, Qatar published a re-
newable energy strategy aimed at cutting emissions and diversifying the energy sector and 
the economy (Varghese 2017). Qatar has set a target to generate 2 percent of its electricity 
with renewable energy sources by 2020 and 20 percent by 2030 (Oxford Business Group 
2017; Ren21 2018). It also intends to power the football stadiums built for the 2022 FIFA 
World Cup with solar power. However, 2020 data showed that renewable energy sources 
were, due to delays in planned investments, not yet contributing signifcantly to power 
generation (BP 2020). In 2020, Japan’s Marubeni Corporation and French energy major 
Total won the tender to build an 800 MW solar power project, with a scheduled start of 
operation in 2022 (delayed from previous plans for several years; Renewables Now 2020). 
In short, much of the country’s considerable potential for concentrated solar power, wind, 
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Education and knowledge-based economy 
Qatar has a solid basic educational system, although there is still scope for further develop-
ment and improvements. According to the World Bank’s Human Capital Index, the level
of education and healthcare would allow the average child born in Qatar in 2020 to achieve
around 64 percent of their potential, which is above the average for the Middle East and
North Africa, but below the average for high-income countries (World Bank 2020). In
2019, Qatari students were expected to attend school for 12 years (UNDP 2020). In the
academic year 2014/2015, 77.8 percent of the relevant age groups attended secondary
school and about 10 percent of them attended university (Qatar Ministry of Development
Planning and Statistics 2017). Expenditure for education reached a peak of around 15
percent of total government expenditure in 2008 and accounted for 8.6 percent in 2019
(World Bank 2021g). Since 2010, expenditure on education per student has been among
the highest in the world (De Bel-Air 2014). In the 2018 Program for International Student
Assessment (PISA), Qatar was ranked 60 out of 77 countries (according to countries´
performance in the reading category). While the country scored below the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average in all three main catego-
ries (reading, mathematics, and science), it performed on average in indicators related
to socioeconomic background and obtained above average values on indicators related to
immigration backgrounds (OECD 2019). 
Qatar does have the ambition to develop a world-class educational system to underpin 
the development of a knowledge-based economy. To this end, the National Vision 2030 
envisages the creation of a national network of formal and non-formal educational pro-
grammes (General Secretariat 2008). The country wants to ‘accomplish a culture of in-
novation through investment in research and development’ (Mohtar 2015: 49). To realise 
this ambition, the Qatari government has announced it will invest 2.8 percent of its GDP 
(US$2–3 billion) into research and development (General Secretariat 2009: 24; see also 
Qatar 2018). The Qatar National Research Fund that issues grants for diferent research 
programmes and the Qatar Science Leadership Programme that aims to motivate students 
to pursue careers in science and research are important tools in this context. 
The signifcant expatriate workforce is also an important factor to consider in this 
respect. Currently, this workforce is mainly low skilled. Qatar’s National Vision for 2030 
therefore aims to improve ‘the size and quality of the expatriate labour force and the 
selected path of development’ in particular by promoting a recruitment policy ‘in line 
with a knowledge-based economy’ (De Bel-Air 2014: 5). Eforts aim to balance ‘local and 
imported talent’ (Mohtar 2015: 54). 
EU-Qatar cooperation 
EU-Qatar relations have grown closer over the 2010s, and a Cooperation Agreement was 
signed in 2018. Furthermore, EU-Qatar relations are embedded in broader EU-GCC 
cooperation. Trade and investment as well as energy are important and evolving areas, 
with signifcant potential to integrate decarbonisation. Given the precarious situation in 
the Middle East, security and geopolitics form another key area of the relations between 
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Institutional framework: Cooperation Agreement and embedding in the 
Gulf Cooperation Council 
Relations between the EU and Qatar have grown closer in the 2010s, particularly in 
certain economic areas. Since 2011, there have been annual rounds of high-level strate-
gic dialogue between Qatar and the EU (Miller and al-Mansouri 2016), and a dedicated 
GCC-EU dialogue on trade and investment issues was launched in 2017 (European Com-
mission 2018a). In March 2018, a Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Qatar was 
signed as a basis for ‘enhanced political dialogue and strengthened cooperation on sectoral 
areas of mutual interests’ (EEAS 2018), such as private sector development and research 
and innovation. These processes are intended to support Qatar in realising its National Vi-
sion for 2030. Qatar also maintains important bilateral relations with several EU member 
states, such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and some of the smaller EU member states 
(as well as the United Kingdom) (Miller and al-Mansouri 2016). 
Relations between the EU and Qatar have been very much embedded in the broader 
relations between the EU and the GCC. Founded in 1981, the GCC consists of Bah-
rain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. An EU-GCC 
Cooperation Agreement was adopted in 1989. A Joint Council and a Joint Cooperation 
Committee under the Agreement both meet annually. Cooperation covers trade and 
investment issues, macroeconomic matters, climate change, energy, environment, and 
research. Negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement were launched in 1990, but GCC 
countries suspended them in 2008. As mentioned above, since 2010 increasing tensions 
between GCC countries and especially between Qatar and Saudi Arabia have called into 
question the future role of the GCC (including for cooperation with the EU). Qatar’s 
announcement in December 2018 to leave OPEC points in a similar direction. It remains 
to be seen to what extent the settlement reached between Qatar and Saudi Arabia within 
the GCC in January 2021 will result in a lasting solution. 
Trade and investment 
There is already signifcant trade and investment between Qatar and the EU, and there is po-
tential for increasing both in future. The EU’s total trade in goods with Qatar in 2019 (i.e.,
pre-Covid-19) was around €17 billion, with the EU exporting about €11.4 billion to Qatar
and importing around €5.8 billion from Qatar (European Commission 2021). Nearly half of
EU exports to Qatar were machinery, while gas and oil accounted for more than two-thirds
of imports from Qatar. As a result of the Covid-19 crisis, EU-Qatar trade (both imports and
exports) contracted by more than a third in 2020 (European Commission 2021). In 2019,
around 4 percent of EU import of natural gas came from Qatar (Chatham House 2021). EU
exports accounted for more than 35 percent of Qatari imports, whereas EU imports made
up little more than 10 percent of Qatar’s exports. Trade in services was somewhat less sig-
nifcant at around €6 billion (2016), accounting for close to 15 percent of Qatar’s total trade
in services (European Commission 2018c; see also Miller and al-Mansouri 2016). Like all
GCC countries, Qatar is classifed as a high-income country by the World Bank and there-
fore does not beneft from the EU Generalized Scheme of Preferences (European Commis-
sion 2018a). It is also not a recipient of EU aid (European Commission 2018b). 
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Trade in fossil fuels is relatively modest for both sides. In 2019, Japan and the Republic 
of Korea were the top importers of Qatar’s fossil fuels, with shares of 19 and 17 percent, 
respectively. India accounted for a share of 13 percent, and China 12.5 percent. As visible 
from the above trade fgures, the EU received about 8 percent of Qatari fossil fuel ex-
ports, with Italy (2 percent) and Spain (1.4 percent) as important destinations (Chatham 
House 2021). Nevertheless, Qatar is an important partner for the EU’s eforts to diversify
gas supplies (see also Figure 6.1). 
The investment relationship between Qatar and the EU is also signifcant and inverse 
to trade in comparison. The stock of EU foreign direct investments (FDI) in Qatar 
amounted to €6 billion in 2016, whereas Qatari FDI in the EU stood at €20.8 billion 
(European Commission 2018c). This refects that Qatar considered the economic crisis 
that struck Europe after 2008 an investment opportunity. Qatar used the situation to 
buy European sovereign debt and rescued several fnancial institutions (Miller and al-
Mansouri 2016). Qatar has made various strategic investments in EU companies (e.g., 
Siemens and Volkswagen). The EU and Europe are therefore an important partner for 
Qatar in its eforts to diversify its economy by investing in other economic activities. 
Energy 
Beyond existing relations on trade and investment, in particular regarding oil and gas 
(see above), the potential for cooperation on (renewable and clean) energy remains to be 
exploited to a large extent. The EU GCC Clean Energy (Technology) Network has the 
ambition to catalyse and coordinate joint EU-GCC clean energy initiatives, including pol-
icy and technology aspects. The network’s main instruments are activities such as policy 
discussions, joint research, or technology implementation projects organised in a system 
of diferent Working Groups and a web-based cooperation platform (European Commis-
sion 2016). However, it has not yet led to a measurable increase in renewable and clean 
energy in Qatar (BP 2020; IRENA 2021). 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) has been identifed as another potential area for
cooperation. CCS has the potential to contribute to emission reductions in the power and
industry sectors. CCS may be attractive for Qatar and other GCC states because it could
‘green’ natural gas-fred power generation and emissions-intensive industrial processes
such as LNG production, as well as being used for enhanced recovery of oil and natural
gas (Meltzer et al. 2014; Flamos 2015). Its use in enhanced oil recovery could also reduce
the cost of oil production. Qatar has itself developed some CCS projects in recent years,
some in cooperation with international companies such as Shell, and others based at the
Qatari University. Some GCC countries (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait) have also
cooperated on funding CCS research (Meltzer et al. 2014; Al-Yaeeshi et al. 2018; Adler
2021). 
Clean energy cooperation between the EU and GCC has been challenging due to GCC 
and EU countries’ diferent approaches to climate change. While the EU has developed a 
broad policy framework with legislation and other measures to mitigate GHG emissions, 
GCC countries (including Qatar) are more concerned about the efects of climate policy 
on their economies (Flamos 2015). 
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Security and geopolitics 
The geopolitical and security component of EU-Qatar relations also deserves highlight-
ing. The EU and its member states are only some among the many players in the delicate 
regional security balance between Saudi Arabia and Iran with the involvement of other 
regional players, including the United States and Russia (but also Great Britain). These 
security and defence aspects are particularly relevant to Qatar’s bilateral relations with 
France (which is, together with Great Britain, a signifcant arms supplier to Qatar), while 
the United States is the dominant external regional security actor and a crucial partner for 
Qatar (Miller and al-Mansouri 2016). While socioeconomic aspects remain most prom-
inent in relations between the EU and Qatar, the EU has ofered to support Kuwait in 
mediating in the GCC crisis (EEAS 2018). Overall, the role of the EU has been rather that 
of a mediating power. While this has had its value for Qatar, the EU did not play a signif-
cant role in ending the embargo by Saudi Arabia and others, as the related agreement was 
brokered by Kuwait with support from the United States (see above). 
Conclusions 
Qatar is highly dependent on oil and gas exports for its economic welfare and political 
stability. Hence, decarbonisation in Europe and the world has the potential to undermine 
the political and economic stability of Qatar. Phasing out fossil fuel production and ex-
ports will mean replacing Qatar’s main engine of economic development and source of 
government income, which could reinforce existing risks to political stability, including 
limited political freedom and the integration of a large number of (low-skilled) expatriate 
workers. Decarbonisation hence poses the challenge to develop alternatives to oil and gas 
as a basis of Qatar’s economic well-being and political settlement. Gas likely remaining 
a signifcant fuel in the transition for some time provides the opportunity the develop 
alternatives in a stepwise process. 
Risks to political stability in Qatar could have important wider regional ramifcations. 
Being located in the Gulf region, Qatar is part of a politically delicate regional power play 
and balance with a high potential for confict – as is evident from the blockade against 
Qatar by several of its regional neighbours led by Saudi Arabia from 2017 to 2021. Also, 
neighbouring countries face very similar challenges under decarbonisation. Hence, de-
carbonisation requires proactive transition management in order to contain stability risks 
across the region more broadly. Such transition management may best address relations 
with Qatar in the context of an integrated approach towards the Gulf region and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council as its main regional organisation. 
There are a number of entry points for fruitfully developing the relationship between 
Qatar (and the Gulf region) and the EU under decarbonisation. At a geopolitical level, the 
EU has an interest in developing this relationship because of the central role of the Middle 
East in its neighbourhood and the potential for diversifying its relations with the region 
(and strengthening its role as a neutral bridge builder). On its side, Qatar – given contin-
uing intra-regional tensions – has a growing interest in diversifying its external relations 
and opportunities. More specifcally related to the decarbonisation challenge, Qatar has 







136 Qatar: moving beyond oil and gas 
from OPEC) and eventually also beyond gas (which, however, will remain of strategic 
importance in the medium term). The EU can ofer to be a partner in important ways to 
this end. The rather limited fossil fuel/oil relationship between the EU and Qatar may 
provide a useful background in this respect. 
On the basis of the preceding analysis, we can identify a number of prominent and 
promising focal areas for developing the relationship between the EU and Qatar beyond 
oil and gas: 
• Education and training are a central part of the efort at economic diversifca-
tion and developing a knowledge-based economy and a priority for Qatar. Bilateral 
cooperation to this end could be developed to bring the signifcant resources of the 
EU and its member states to bear to assist in enhancing and shaping education and 
training in Qatar (and the wider Gulf region). One signifcant focus in this respect 
could be cooperation supporting the expansion of renewable energy. Concretely, 
partnerships between universities in the EU and Qatar could be fostered. 
• Further developing the energy system, and particularly expanding re-
newable energy, could result in numerous benefts by reducing economic depend-
ence on oil and gas. As well as addressing the urgent need to decarbonise, it also 
makes sense in terms of Qatar’s continued exploitation of its oil and gas resources. 
Increasing the proportion of renewables in domestic power generation would in-
crease the share of resources available for export. Concrete frst steps may include 
cooperation in the installation of renewable energy capacity for the 2022 FIFA World 
Cup (and beyond) and creation of a policy dialogue on the potential of clean/renew-
able energy (possibly in a GCC context). Such eforts could also be developed into a 
more comprehensive partnership for climate and clean energy which could integrate 
several elements, including development of the adaptation-mitigation nexus (e.g., 
benefts of renewables development in building resilience), a medium-term strategy 
for the development of the gas sector as a bridge to decarbonisation, and possibly the 
development of renewables-based hydrogen production. 
• Advancing mutual market access and investments. Qatar’s eforts to develop 
its external investment portfolio and to spur foreign direct investment in Qatar 
(as part of its diversifcation strategy) provide a fruitful basis for further advanc-
ing economic cooperation. The EU and its member states possess signifcant expe-
rience and expertise in this regard and are attractive for and engage in FDI. Part of 
enhancing cooperation in this area could be a dialogue on strengthening fnancial 
governance, including the Qatar Investment Authority and the changing landscape of 
climate-proofng investments. Again, renewable and clean energy may be an obvious 
focal area. 
• Multiple other areas can be further developed over time, including water manage-
ment and security cooperation. 
Overall, there is a range of options for developing the EU-Qatar relationship under decar-
bonisation. Such a renewed direction for the bilateral relationship would promise signif-
cant benefts for Qatar as it would support the country in advancing its own diversifcation 
strategy and making it climate-proof. This may in turn increase awareness in Qatar about 
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would help make EU-Qatar relations ft for a decarbonising world and may make a signif-
icant contribution to stabilising the geopolitically precarious Gulf region in the context 
of decarbonisation. 
Note 
1 Production, consumption, and export data vary between diferent sources (including IEA, 
CIA, BP Statistical Review) but all give roughly the same overall picture. 
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 7 Canada 
Reframing a well-established 
partnership 
Introduction 
Canada is a country of more than 37 million people (UN DESA 2019), with Ottawa as its 
capital. It is the world’s second largest country by area (including waters) and stretches 
from the Atlantic Ocean in the east to the Pacifc Ocean in the west, with the Arctic 
Ocean to the north. Its neighbours include the United States (with borders to the United 
States to the south and to the US state of Alaska to the northwest), Greenland to the 
northeast, and the French overseas territories of Saint Pierre and Miquelon to the south-
east. Canada is an industrialised economy and a highly urbanised country with 83 percent 
of its population living in metropolitan areas and census agglomerations (Statistics Canada 
2016), principally near its southern border with the United States. Canada has the tenth 
largest gross domestic product (GDP) in the world, amounting to US$1.736 trillion in 
2019 (World Bank 2021b). Canada’s debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 86.8 percent in 2019, 
down from 91.8 percent in 2016 (Trading Economics 2021). It is a stable federal parlia-
mentary democracy and a constitutional monarchy, with the United Kingdom’s Queen 
Elizabeth II as the head of state. It is one of the world’s most ethnically diverse and mul-
ticultural nations. 
The Canadian federal political system deserves particular attention. Canada is
composed of ten provinces (Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick,
Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec,
and Saskatchewan) and three territories (Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and the
Yukon). Territorial governments exercise authority delegated by the federal govern-
ment, whereas each of the ten provinces possesses a formally independent government
(so that Canada is governed by 11 governments in total). Canadian federalism has its
roots in longstanding diferences and tensions, especially between French-speaking and
English-speaking parts (with French-speaking Quebec hosting a strong independence
movement). The provinces possess far-reaching authority independent of the federal
government, including for the exploration, development, and export to other provinces
of non-renewable natural resources, forestry resources, and electricity. Important as-
pects of climate and energy policy are therefore either partly or entirely determined at
the provincial level. The division of powers between the provincial and federal levels
has evolved over the years and has remained the subject of intense political and legal
battles. 
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Among developed nations, Canada’s economy is unusual given the relative importance 
of the primary and energy sector – logging, mining, and the oil industry are among the 
most important. Canada is also one of the few advanced economies to be a net exporter 
of energy. In 2019, Canada’s energy sector constituted more than 10 percent of its GDP 
and 23 percent of its total goods exports, employing approximately 280,000 people or 
1.5 percent of total employment (Government of Canada 2020a). Government revenues 
collected annually from the oil and gas industries averaged CAN$14 billion between 2015 
and 2020 including CAN$11 billion from upstream oil and gas extraction and its sup-
port activities (Natural Resources Canada 2020). In addition, the Canadian forest sector 
provides employment to about 205,000 workers and accounts for about 4.3 percent of 
total Canadian exports, adding CAN$23.7 billion to the economy in 2019 (Government 
of Canada 2020b; World Bank 2021a). Canada also has a very signifcant mining sector 
beyond fossil fuels (including chromite and iron mining and others). It possesses about 8 
percent of the world’s unmined uranium resources and accounts for a quarter of global 
primary uranium production (Natural Resources Canada 2019). 
Canada is highly interdependent with and dependent on the United States. The United 
States is the only country with which Canada has a (very long) land border, and the US 
and Canadian economies are closely intertwined. Economic and trade relations have fur-
ther intensifed through their embedding in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and its successor, the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (in force since 2020). As 
a result, the United States is by far Canada’s most important trading partner, accounting 
for about half of Canadian imports and three quarters of Canadian exports (European 
Commission 2021a). More than 90 percent of Canadian exports of oil and gas have the 
United States as their destination, mainly through several pipelines (also due to a lack of 
sufcient other export capacity in Canada) (Chatham House 2021). 
Like the other case studies, this chapter will explore the challenges and opportunities 
Canada and Canada-EU relations face under decarbonisation in fve steps. The next sec-
tion frst demonstrates Canada’s dependence on the production and export of oil and gas 
and hence its vulnerability to price fuctuations and the phase-out of fossil fuels. It also 
investigates other fragility and security risks that are comparatively minor. Subsequently, 
we assess the status of Canada’s climate policy. This is followed by the review of relevant 
trends and potentials, including in the services sector and renewable and clean energy. 
The one but last section reviews the broad framework and basis of EU-Canada relations. 
The fnal section concludes and identifes focal points for EU foreign policy towards Can-
ada under decarbonisation. 
Exposure and risk 
Exposure to global decarbonisation trends 
Canada is a major producer of oil, gas, and also coal. In 2019, it produced more than 5.6 
million barrels of oil per day, equivalent to almost 6 percent of the world total and an 
increase of about 70 percent from 2009 levels. Canada’s gas production exceeded 170 
billion cubic metres in 2019 (up from about 150 billion cubic metres in 2012), which 
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represented 4.3 percent of global production. Coal production in 2019 amounted to about 
50 million tonnes, down from 68.4 million tonnes in 2013 and accounting for less than 1 
percent of global production (BP 2020; see also EIA 2019; CIA 2021). The production of 
fossil fuels plunged in 2020 in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis. 
Canada also possesses signifcant fossil fuel reserves, especially oil and gas. Its proven 
oil reserves – primarily in the form of oil sands – are estimated to amount to nearly 170 
billion barrels, which could support current production levels for another more than 80 
years. They are the third largest in the world (after Venezuela and Saudi Arabia) and 
account for 10 percent of the global total. Estimated gas reserves are less abundant and 
amount to 2 trillion cubic metres (BP 2020; see for other estimates: EIA 2019; CIA 
2021). They could support current production levels only for another ten years. Canada 
also has signifcant reserves of shale gas that remain to be further explored. Proved coal 
reserves of about 6,600 million tonnes could support 2019 production levels for another 
130 years (BP 2020; see also EIA 2019). 
In accordance with its resource base, gas and oil supply a large part of Canada’s energy 
needs. Oil consumption exceeded 2.4 million barrels per day in 2019, equivalent to about 
45 percent of production. Gas consumption amounted to about 120 billion cubic metres 
in 2019, up from about 90 billion cubic metres in 2009 and equivalent to about 70 percent 
of production. Coal consumption reached 13.4 million tonnes oil equivalent, down from 
almost 23.4 million tonnes oil equivalent in 2009 and equivalent to about 50 percent of 
production. Overall, about 62 percent of overall energy consumption is accounted for 
by oil and gas, about 4 percent by coal, about 24 percent by hydroelectricity, and the 
remainder by nuclear power and renewable energy other than hydro (BP 2020).1 Hydro-
power is the backbone of the electricity system, supplying around 60 percent of electricity 
consumption. Among the International Energy Agency (IEA) member countries, Canada 
has the highest energy supply per capita: total primary energy supply per capita in Canada 
in 2019 was 8.0 tonnes of oil equivalent versus an OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development) average of 4.1 (IEA 2021). 
Fossil fuel production and reserves display enormous regional diferences across Can-
ada. Gas, oil, and coal production and reserves are concentrated in the broader Western 
Canada Sedimentary Basin (in addition to oil production in the ofshore oil felds in the 
Atlantic Ocean, which has been declining) and hence in Alberta (oil, gas, and coal), Brit-
ish Columbia (gas and coal), and Saskatchewan (oil and gas). By far the largest share of 
Canada’s proved oil (oil sands) and gas reserves are located in Alberta. Consequently, 
Alberta accounts for more than three quarters of Canadian oil and gas production. 
Energy exports are of great importance for Canada’s economy. In 2019, the country 
exported more than 50 percent of its oil production, about 30 percent of its gas produc-
tion, and about half of its coal production. Shares of actual exports of production are even 
higher, as Canada also imports these fossil fuels (BP 2020). Energy exports accounted 
for nearly a quarter of Canadian goods exports in 2019, with this share having fuctuated 
roughly between 20 and 30 percent since 2005, also as a result of price fuctuations (Gov-
ernment of Canada 2020a; World Bank 2021e; see Figure 7.1). 
The United States is Canada’s top energy trade partner. In 2019, the United States ac-
counted for 90 percent (CAN$ 121.5 billion by value) of Canada’s exported energy prod-
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Fossil fuel exports as % GDP (2019) 
1.7% 
Fossil fuel exports as % total exports 
(2019) 
24% 
Fossil fuel exports to EU as % of 
total exports to the EU (2020) 
5.6% 
Exports to the EU as % of total export
(2020) 
5.3% 
Figure 7.1 Status of fossil fuel exports of Canada in 2019/2020. 
Sources: Data based on: https://data.worldbank.org (fossil fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise export; 
oil, gas, and coal as a percentage of GDP – accessed on 25 July 2021) and European Commission (2021a) (ex-
ports to EU – accessed on 25 July 2021). 
the United States. Most of Canada’s crude oil goes to the United States principally due to 
a lack of sufcient export capacity in Canada to send its liquids elsewhere. All of the coun-
try’s current natural gas exports go to the United States. Canada also imported energy 
products from the United States worth CAN$35 billion in 2019 (Government of Canada 
2020a; see also EIA 2019). The pressure to advance decarbonisation therefore depends to 
a signifcant degree also on the US demand for Canadian oil and gas. 
Fossil fuels hence play an important role in Canada’s economy and government budget. 
Especially oil and gas industries are an important engine of the economy, with the overall 
energy sector (including electricity) accounting for about 10 percent of GDP (fuctuating 
somewhat with the oil price). Fossil fuel exports accounted for less than 5 percent of 
GDP in 2019. The contribution of fossil fuels to the government budget was signifcant 
(but not dominant), accounting for more than 7 percent of all taxes paid by all industries 
over 2014–2018 averaging CAN$14 billion per year (Natural Resources Canada 2020). 
Government revenue for the fscal year 2018–2019 was CAN$332.2 billion (Government 
of Canada 2019). The sector employs approximately 280,000 people directly (and about 
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550,000 indirectly), accounting for 1.5 percent of total employment (Natural Resources 
Canada 2020). 
Diferent from other fossil fuel exporting countries, Canada possesses a highly devel-
oped and diversifed economy. Fossil fuel production and export are signifcant (espe-
cially, as mentioned previously, in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia), but the 
Canadian economy has other signifcant sectors to build on (see below). 
Canada has also provided signifcant subsidies for fossil fuels. Data on these subsidies 
are hard to come by. Canada’s federal Auditor General in 2017 expressed frustration at his 
inability to gain access to government documents which would allow him to determine 
the extent of the country’s subsidies for the oil, gas, and coal industries (Ofce of the Au-
ditor General of Canada 2017). The International Institute for Sustainable Development 
estimated that Canada’s annual fossil fuel subsidies – including tax breaks and direct cash 
– in 2013–2015 amounted to CAN$3.3 billion annually. Tax expenditures occurring at 
both the federal and provincial levels represent a combined minimum total of CAN$2.5 
billion annually (CAN$1.6 billion at federal level), while direct spending includes budg-
etary transfers the Canadian government provides to producers of oil, gas, and coal (Tou-
chette 2015). The International Institute for Sustainable Development found in 2018 that 
federal subsidies had declined somewhat in 2016–2018 compared to 2015 but that this 
decline was not the result of a subsidy reform and may not be lasting (also because subsi-
dies interrelate with oil prices) (IISD 2018a). The Canadian government has also drawn 
criticism because a signifcant amount of spending for the recovery from the Covid-19 
crisis went to the production of fossil fuels (Climate Action Tracker 2021). 
Canada is, as a result of the signifcance of its oil and gas sector, exposed to variations 
in oil and gas prices to some extent. Declining oil prices after 2014 have left a mark on 
economic development. GDP per capita in constant 2010 US$ stagnated from 2014 to 
2016 (at approximately US$50,000) and rose slightly to about US$52,000 in 2019, before 
declining to US$48,600 in 2020 due to the Covid-19 crisis. GDP growth slowed from 
2.9 percent in 2014 to 0.7 percent in 2015 and 1.0 percent in 2016. GDP growth picked 
up with the recovery of world oil prices in 2017 (3 percent) but fell again to 1.9 in 2019 
before a recession of minus 5.4 percent in 2020 as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic 
(World Bank 2021c, 2021d). 
Accordingly, the government budget situation has also seen signifcant fuctuations. 
Canada’s public debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 85.7 percent in 2014 to 91.8 percent in 
2016, before dropping slightly to 90.1 percent in 2017 and 86.8 percent in 2019 with 
the recovery of oil prices. The ratio jumped to 117.8 percent in 2020 as a result of the 
Covid-19 crisis (Trading Economics 2021). Given the diversifcation of the Canadian 
economy, oil price fuctuations have left their mark on economic development and the 
government budget but have overall remained manageable, as they could be balanced by 
other sectors of the economy. 
Canada also harbours signifcant investments in oil and gas that may become ‘stranded’. 
Refecting its resource base, Canada has a vast network of more than 840,000 km of oil 
and gas pipelines. Pipelines mainly serve to transport oil, natural gas, and liquefed nat-
ural gas from Alberta west to British Columbia, north to the Northwest Territories, east 
to Quebec, and south to the United States (Texas). Several major additional pipeline pro-
jects are under construction or in planning, including the Trans Mountain expansion and 
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Enbridge’s Line 3 replacement project. Over the years, indigenous groups, environmen-
talists, municipalities, mayors, and labour unions have increasingly opposed and legally 
challenged new pipeline projects over fears of contamination and climate change (Hughes 
2018; The Canadian Encyclopedia 2018). 
After years of political controversy, TransCanada’s contentious Keystone XL project 
was abandoned by the developer in June 2021. In January 2021, during his frst day in 
ofce, US President Joe Biden had revoked the permit for the pipeline issued by former 
president Donald Trump. The project would have signifcantly increased oil transport 
capacity to the United States at a cost of US$5–8 billion but faced severe criticism from 
environmentalists (Puko and Monga 2021). 
Also beyond oil and gas pipelines, Canada is continuing to make considerable invest-
ments into fossil fuels. These in particular concern the production of oil from the large 
oil sands deposits, especially in Alberta. They also include investments in liquefed nat-
ural gas (LNG) terminals. In 2018, total Canadian energy assets amounted to CAN$685 
billion (up 5 percent from 2017, mainly due to an increase in assets abroad in the United 
States and Mexico), of which assets worth CAN$452 billion (or 66 percent) were in Can-
ada (Natural Resources Canada 2020). 
The risk of stranded assets is far lower in the power sector. This is not least the result of 
the dominant role of hydropower in the Canadian electricity system. About two-thirds of 
Canada’s total electricity production comes from renewables, and hydropower alone ac-
counts for about 60 percent (with wind, biofuels, and solar providing for the balance). Hy-
dropower generated 384,600 GWh in 2018, with an emphasis on Quebec, Manitoba, and 
Newfoundland and Labrador. Nuclear power provided a further 15 percent of total elec-
tricity in 2018. Coal and gas provided the remainder and were concentrated in selected 
provinces, contributing to electricity production in particular in Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
and Nova Scotia (Natural Resources Canada 2020). Canada is one of the co-founders of 
the Powering Past Coal Alliance and has committed to a phase-out of coal in electricity 
production by 2030. In 2018, it adopted performance standards for coal and natural gas-
fred power stations to this end. Accordingly, it plans to signifcantly increase the use of 
renewables (including wind and solar, but also further expanding the use of hydropower 
and biomass) in power generation (Oil Change International 2015; Hughes 2018; Climate 
Action Tracker 2021). 
Other fragility and security risks 
As a highly developed country with a stable federal parliamentary democracy, Canada 
faces few other fragility risks. A range of available indices confrm that Canada is a stable 
federal parliamentary democracy with strong socio-political institutions, a welfare state 
with well-developed social security, public healthcare, and educational systems. Accord-
ingly, Canada ranked 171 out of 179 countries on the 2021 Fragile States Index. Can-
ada scores very highly on most indicators and has made signifcant progress on economic 
equality, while ‘group grievances’ remain somewhat of a challenge (especially refecting 
internal challenges between francophone and anglophone communities) (Fund for Peace 
2021). Corruption is not a signifcant issue with Canada ranked 11 among the 180 coun-
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International 2021). Also, Canada ranks high on the Freedom House Index of 2021 
scoring a near-perfect 98 aggregate score (highest mark in the political rights category) 
(Freedom House 2021) as well as on the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(World Bank 2021f; see also Figures 7.2 and 7.3). 
As indicated, a particular feature of Canadian politics is longstanding diferences and 
tensions between French-speaking and English-speaking parts. French-speaking Quebec 
hosts a strong independence movement. Two referendums on achieving (greater) inde-
pendence from the rest of Canada were narrowly defeated in the 1980s and 1990s. Under-
lying tensions have since been successfully managed but remain a virulent undercurrent 
of Canadian politics. 
Canada faces signifcant climate change impacts that are, however, comparatively mod-
est. Climate change impacts are already being felt in Canada and set to grow further. 
Temperature increase in Canada exceeded 1.5°C between 1950 and 2010, approximately 
double the global average. This has had signifcant impacts in the coastal and northern 
Fragility (2021) 
Human development (2019) 
Strength of governance (2019) 
Climate change vulnerability (2019) 
Sustainable energy development (2019) 
SUSTAINABLE Stable Warning Alert 
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Figure 7.2 Governance indicators (Canada). 
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Figure 7.3 Canada’s performance in the Fragile States Index 2006–2021. 
Source: Fund for Peace (2021). 
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parts of the country. Indigenous peoples are the most vulnerable to climate change im-
pacts. As they enjoy special rights in Canada, they have become increasingly important 
voices advocating action on climate change. Further impacts such as an increase in ex-
treme weather events, sea-level rise, and a further change of the northern and Arctic parts 
of the country are expected. At the same time, some positive impacts such as a growth of 
food production from agriculture are also anticipated (Warren and Lemmen 2014; Gov-
ernment of Canada 2016b; Bush and Lemmen 2019). 
Accordingly, Canada does not rank high on the Global Climate Risk Index for 2019 (60 
out of 130) and for the period 2000–2019 (93 out of 130). The index assesses the extent 
to which countries have been subject to weather-related loss events (storms, foods, heat 
waves, etc.) (Germanwatch 2021). Similarly, the index of the Notre Dame Global Adap-
tation Initiative, which considers eight life-supporting sectors (food, water, health, eco-
systems, human habitat, coastal, energy, and transportation infrastructure), gives Canada 
a favourable score and rank for its overall vulnerability and readiness. Its vulnerability 
is considered relatively low (the 12th least vulnerable country assessed in 2018) and its 
readiness high (among the top 20 in 2018) (ND-GAIN 2020; Figure 7.2). Hence, climate 
change impacts in Canada are considered signifcant but modest, and Canada possesses 
considerable means to manage and adapt to these impacts and hence is relatively resilient. 
Past and present eforts to decarbonise 
International climate policy 
Canada is a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and its Paris Agreement. It ratifed the UNFCCC in 1992 and the Paris 
Agreement in 2016. It was also originally a party to the Kyoto Protocol. It withdrew from 
the Protocol in late 2011, when it was clear that the country would not be able to live up 
to its commitment to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 6 percent below 1990 
levels. Canada is an Annex I party to the UNFCCC and considered a developed country 
for the purposes of the climate treaties. Within the UN climate negotiations, Canada has 
formed part of the so-called Umbrella Group of non-EU developed countries. 
Under the Paris Agreement, Canada submitted an original frst Nationally Determined 
Contribution (NDC) in 2017 that committed it to achieving an economy-wide (including 
LULUCF – land use, land use change, and forestry) GHG emission reduction target of 30 
percent below 2005 levels by 2030. This implied a reduction from 747 Mt CO2 equivalent
in 2005 to 523 Mt CO2 equivalent in 2030 (Government of Canada 2017). In 2016, the 
Canadian government further adopted a long-term target of reducing emissions by 80 
percent below 2005 levels by 2050. The 2017 submission in particular also provides infor-
mation on the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change adopted 
in late 2016 as the main vehicle for the implementation of the Canadian NDC (see below 
on the status of domestic climate policy). 
In July 2021, Canada submitted an update of its frst NDC and increased its GHG emis-
sion reduction target (including LULUCF) to 40–45 percent below 2005 levels by 2030. 
Accordingly, Canadian GHG emission in 2030 would need to be reduced to 406.5–443.4 
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neutrality (net zero emissions) by 2050. The 2021 submission provided supporting infor-
mation on Canada’s strengthened climate plan launched in December 2020 (Government 
of Canada 2021). 
Both the initial Canadian NDC and its update represent a signifcant departure from 
a business-as-usual scenario that would have reduced projected Canadian GHG emis-
sions to around 2005 levels by 2030. Measures have been taken since 2016, and further 
measures are required to achieve the envisaged 40–45 percent reduction. The Canadian 
government’s own projections show that the national measures currently planned and 
under implementation will signifcantly reduce GHG emissions but will be insufcient 
to achieve the 2030 target. To this end, the Canadian government has identifed a broad 
set of measures in its strengthened climate plan of 2020 (Government of Canada 2021). 
The Climate Action Tracker concludes that the Canadian NDC has been and remains 
‘insufcient’ for achieving the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal of well below 2°C or 
1.5°C of warming. However, the updated NDC brings Canada close to being ‘2°C com-
patible’. However, a signifcant implementation gap remains to be flled to actually achieve 
the upgraded NDC (Climate Action Tracker 2021). 
GHG emissions 
According to the UNFCCC, Canada’s GHG emissions excluding LULUCF in 2019 stood 
at 730.245 Mt CO2 equivalent (up 21.4 percent since 1990) (UNFCCC 2021). Given its 
large forestry sector, LULUCF is signifcant and was estimated to have acted as a car-
bon sink until 2018, however with shrinking negative emissions (from −41.63 Mt CO2 
equivalent in 2009 to −12.86 Mt CO2 equivalent in 2018, according to UNFCCC data) 
(WRI 2021). In 2019, the sector was estimated to have emitted 9.878 Mt CO2 equivalent
(UNFCCC 2021). Accounting of LULUCF is surrounded by large uncertainties, as also 
illustrated by the fact that other sources have come to the conclusion that LULUCF has 
for long been a net source (WRI 2021) (see Figure 7.4). 
Together, the oil and gas sectors were the largest GHG emitter in 2019 contributing 
about 26 percent to total Canadian emissions, followed by the transport sector with 25 
percent. Other sectors like buildings, electricity, heavy industry, agriculture, and waste 
and others each accounted for between 7 and 12 percent of total GHG emissions (Envi-
ronment and Climate Change Canada 2021). Between 1990 and 2019, emissions of the oil 
and gas and transport sectors rose by 87 percent and 54 percent, respectively. In contrast, 
emissions in the electricity and heavy industry sectors declined. In 2019, the GHG with 
the largest reported emissions (without LULUCF) was CO2 (79.75 percent), while meth-
ane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and aggregate fuorinated GHG emissions stood at 13.39 
percent, 5.01 percent, and 1.85 percent, respectively (Environment and Climate Change 
Canada 2021; UNFCCC 2021). 
Climate policy 
Under the then-new liberal Prime Minister Trudeau, Canada adopted a Pan-Canadian 
Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change in December 2016 to (over)achieve 
Canada’s original NDC to reduce GHG emissions to 30 percent below 2005 levels by 
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Figure 7.4 Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions and emission targets (1990–2018). 
Source: WRI (2021). 
2030. This Framework constituted ‘a comprehensive plan to reduce emissions across all 
sectors of the economy, accelerate clean economic growth, and build resilience to the 
impacts of climate change’ (Government of Canada 2017). After its re-election, the lib-
eral government released a strengthened climate plan for ‘A Healthy Environment and 
a Healthy Economy’, in December 2020 as a key plank to realise the ambition of the 
updated NDC to reduce GHG emissions by 40–45 percent below 2005 levels by 2030 
(Government of Canada 2021). 
The central pillar of modern Canadian climate policy has been the establishment of 
a carbon price across Canada, rising from an initial at least CAN$10 per tonne of CO2 
equivalent to CAN$50 per tonne by 2022. To be implemented in collaboration with the 
Canadian provinces that enjoy considerable fexibility as to how to implement carbon 
pricing (e.g., through a tax or levy or through emissions trading), the carbon pricing 
initiative saw a delay to 2019 and opposition in particular from the conservative opposi-
tion party. Victories for the conservatives in the provincial elections in Ontario in 2018 
and Alberta in 2019 have led to rollbacks of climate policy in these provinces. Court 
proceedings against carbon pricing led to its reconfrmation in 2021, when the supreme 
court declared the initiative constitutional. The strengthened climate plan of December 
2020 foresees an increase of the carbon price by CAN$15 per year from 2023 reaching 
CAN$170 by 2030 (Government of Canada 2017, 2021; Climate Action Tracker 2021). 
The Pan-Canadian Framework and the strengthened climate plan contain a number 
of complementary measures beyond the carbon pricing initiative. Hence, Canada is to 
develop a clean fuel standard to reduce emissions from fuels used in transportation, build-
ings, and industry and drive down emissions from electricity, including through phasing 
out traditional coal units by 2030 and performance standards for natural gas-fred elec-
tricity, and modernising Canada’s electricity systems. New codes for new and existing 
buildings and new standards for energy-efcient appliances and equipment are planned. 
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emission by 2035 and promoting the shift to lower-emitting transportation and using 
cleaner fuels. The framework also aims to achieve a 40–45 percent reduction of methane 
emissions from the oil and gas sectors by 2025 through regulations and covers actions to 
enhance carbon sinks (forests, wetlands, and agricultural lands), waste-to-energy, and 
adaptation. Throughout the diferent sectors, targeted investments and incentives play a 
particularly prominent role (Government of Canada 2017, 2021; see also Climate Action 
Tracker 2021). 
Climate investments have been further boosted and reinforced by the response to the 
Covid-19 crisis. To be sure, the overall record of the Canadian recovery spending has 
been mixed because signifcant support also went to fossil fuel industries. However, a 
comparatively large part of recovery spending has been found to have been allocated for 
clean energy and, more generally, for greening (Climate Action Tracker 2021; Energy 
Policy Tracker 2021; Global Recovery Observatory 2021). 
Natural and man-made sinks play an important role in Canada’s climate plans. Canada 
has already made signifcant eforts in harnessing Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and 
continues to do so. It harbours several large-scale operational CCS projects and continues 
to support and foster CCS. In addition, enhancing natural carbon sinks, prominently 
including forests, constitutes an important focus of its climate plans (Natural Resources 
Canada 2013; Government of Canada 2021). 
In line with the overall federal governance system, Canadian provinces and territories
enjoy considerable fexibility to determine policies, including climate policy (see above).
As a result, both Quebec and Ontario established emissions trading systems, which were
linked to each other and to the emissions trading system of California through the Western
Climate Initiative. However, a change of government in Ontario in 2018 resulted in the
province abandoning its emissions trading system in 2018 (Climate Action Tracker 2021). 
Climate politics 
The future of Canadian climate policy is also uncertain, because climate change and cli-
mate policy has remained a very partisan issue in Canadian politics. As a result, Canada 
has not been able to maintain a stable trajectory in its climate policy over the years, with 
changes of government between liberal and conservative resulting in major shifts in cli-
mate policy. Whereas liberal governments have tried to advance Canadian climate policy, 
conservative governments have stalled progress and have at times actively undermined cli-
mate action. The liberal government of the 1990s signed and ratifed the Kyoto Protocol, 
which saw a commitment to reducing emissions by 6 percent from 1990 levels between 
2008 and 2012 (but failed to introduce a GHG reduction plan). The subsequent govern-
ment of Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper, in power from 2006 to 2015, 
abandoned Canada’s commitment and instead advanced policies that made emissions rise 
to a new all-time high of 748 Mt CO2 equivalent (CBC News 2007). In 2011, Canada 
became the frst party to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol. The pendulum swung back 
with the change of government to liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in 2015. Action 
on climate change had been a prominent part of his election and re-election platforms, 
which were followed up most notably by establishing and implementing the aforemen-
tioned Pan-Canadian Framework and strengthened climate plan of 2020. Nonetheless, 
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Trudeau has also maintained frm support for oil pipelines and the creation of a liquefed 
fracked gas export industry, despite opposition from environmental groups and sections 
of the public. The liberal Canadian government furthermore established a Just Transition 
Task Force in 2018 to consider and mitigate negative impacts of the energy transition on 
workers and afected communities with participation of stakeholders (IISD 2018b; see 
also Government of Canada 2021: 9–10). 
As mentioned above, provinces and territories enjoy signifcant room for political ma-
noeuvre in the Canadian federal system, including on climate policy. Some provinces have 
advanced more ambitious climate policies than the federal government. For instance, Al-
berta is planning to phase out coal electricity by 2030 and cap overall oil sands emissions, 
while Quebec and British Columbia have already enacted policy instruments including 
phasing out coal, implementing a carbon tax, and working with California on a regional 
cap-and-trade system (Government of Canada 2016a, 2021). As at the federal level, cli-
mate policy is frequently advanced under liberal provincial governments, while at times 
being turned back under conservative leadership (see on Ontario above). 
Public opinion in Canada has displayed awareness of climate change but has remained 
somewhat divided when it comes to acknowledging that this change is caused by humans 
and with respect to climate policy. Overall, it has favoured climate action despite the 
signifcant energy resources that the country owns. According to a public survey con-
ducted by Yale University’s Programme on Climate Change Communication (dataset of 
more than 5,000 individuals and collected since 2011), 79 percent of Canadians believe 
that the Earth is getting warmer and 61 percent believed that the Earth is getting warmer 
partly or mostly (44 percent) due to human activities. As much as 66 percent of Canadians 
interviewed were in favour of a cap-and-trade system and 49 percent believed that taxes 
on carbon-based fuels should be increased. Signifcant diferences exist between diferent 
provinces, with belief in climate change clearly less in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Mani-
toba (Mildenberger et al. 2016). 
Overall, Canadian climate policy has efectuated a signifcant deviation from business 
as usual, but its ability to deliver on the 2030 NDC remains uncertain at best. Important 
measures have been initiated under a Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and 
Climate Change and the strengthened climate plan of 2020. However, they fall short of 
what would be required and the efects on Canadian GHG emissions have so far been lim-
ited. The achievement of Canada’s NDC is also uncertain as climate policy has remained a 
partisan issue in Canadian politics, with the conservative party largely opposed to decisive 
climate action. Hence, it is as yet uncertain whether Canada will be able to fully achieve 
its 2030 target. 
Trends and potential 
Canada possesses most of the means required to wean itself of fossil fuels. It has a devel-
oped educational system and a strong human capital resource base. It also possesses a de-
veloped economy with an evolving services sector and a strong innovation potential. And 
its natural resource endowments include plentiful renewable energy resources that should 
enable the decarbonisation of the Canadian economy and provide strong opportunities for 
exporting renewable energy, especially to north-eastern US states. 
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Education and knowledge-based economy 
Canada ranks high on education and skills. According to the World Bank’s Human Capital 
Index, the current level of education and healthcare would allow the average child born 
in Canada today to achieve about 80 percent of its potential, clearly above the world-
wide average and ranking under the top ten of 174 countries (World Bank 2020). Canada 
spends more on education as a percentage of GDP than the OECD average and also has 
a higher-than-average share among OECD countries of 25–34 year olds who have a ter-
tiary qualifcation (63 percent as compared with 45 percent) and has one of the lowest 
unemployment rates in the OECD. At the same time, the percentage of frst-time mas-
ter’s graduates younger than 35 is relatively low. There is therefore also room for further 
improvement (OECD 2018, 2020). 
Growing services sector 
The Canadian services sector is well developed, accounting for 70 percent of the Cana-
dian GDP and employing three quarters of the Canadian working population. Among the 
services sector, the retail sector employs the largest percentage of Canadians (12 percent) 
followed by business services (which include fnancial services, real estate, and communi-
cations industries), and the health and education sectors (both largely under the infuence 
of the government). Canada also has a signifcant high-tech industry, and a burgeoning 
flm, television, and entertainment industry, in addition to a growing tourism industry. 
Canada also ranks high in terms of innovation. The 2018 Global Innovation Index ranked 
Canada 18th globally and the top innovation region in the world along with the United 
States (Cornell University, INSEAD, and WIPO 2018). 
In the 2010s, the services sector overtook the manufacturing and energy sector as the 
engine of development and job creation (Kirby 2017). Since 2013, the vast majority of jobs 
have been created in the services sector, while there have been fewer jobs in the oil and gas 
sector. The case is the same in energy-rich provinces like Ontario and Alberta. In 2016, 
the goods sector in Ontario generated 5,000 jobs as compared to 75,000 in the services 
sector, while in Alberta, the services sector added 34,000 jobs as opposed to a loss of 
53,000 jobs in the manufacturing sector (Kirby 2017). Overall, the Canadian economy 
therefore has well-developed potential to transition away from the production of fossil 
fuels and towards a low-carbon economy. In this context, it should be highlighted that the 
‘old’ fossil fuel-based industries are concentrated in a few provinces and regions, requir-
ing particular attention when devising accompanying measures to smooth the transition. 
The long-term impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic are as yet unclear. 
Renewable energy and clean energy 
Canada also possesses considerable potential to further develop the use of renewable en-
ergy, especially in the power sector. As mentioned before, about two-thirds of Canada’s 
power generation already comes from renewable sources, particularly hydropower that 
alone accounts for around 60 percent. The country has very signifcant potential to fur-
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more heavily on fossil fuels (such as Alberta and Saskatchewan). According to Canada’s 
Mid-Century Long-Term Low-Greenhouse Gas Development Strategy, electricity gener-
ation should rise from 17 percent of delivered energy in 2016 to 33–65 percent in 2050 
(Hughes 2018). This increase could be supplied through increases in renewable energy, 
including further hydropower and a strong increase in the use of wind and solar energy as 
well as biomass. Accordingly, the National Energy Board of Canada projected in 2017 that 
Canada’s renewable capacity could grow rapidly by 2040, with wind power doubling or 
even tripling and solar power potentially increasing more than tenfold (National Energy 
Board 2017). The 2050 strategy foresees even higher potential for increases, including in 
biomass and hydropower, which will require very signifcant investments (Hughes 2018). 
In this context, the very large availability of hydropower resources in Canada seems ideal 
for the decarbonisation of the power system in a mix with more intermittent renewable 
energy sources such as wind and solar. The 2020 strengthened climate plan and recovery 
spending already aim at further developing Canada’s clean energy potential, 
The considerable renewables potential in Canada also creates opportunities for related 
exports, especially to the north-eastern states of the United States. Greater exports of 
zero-carbon electricity to the north-eastern Unites States would require the construction 
of long-distance transmission lines to US markets. As a result, Canada could also provide 
its hydroelectric reservoirs as enormous energy storage services. Such an arrangement 
could reduce the cost of decarbonisation in the US northeast making both the United 
States and Canada more energy-competitive (Sachs 2018). This could help balance future 
declines of fossil fuel exports to the United States. 
Cooperation with the EU 
EU-Canada relations have been close and dense for several decades, as evidenced by the 
conclusion of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) in 2016, as 
well as long-established close cooperation in a multitude of settings and areas. Trade and 
investment as well as energy (both fossil fuels and renewables) are important and evolving 
areas, with signifcant potential to integrate decarbonisation. Historical ties and shared
interests and values provide a fruitful basis for developing EU-Canada relations under 
decarbonisation and help both partners address shared challenges in this respect. Overall, 
there is a frm basis to further advance EU-Canada relations independently from fossil 
fuels grounded in shared values. 
Institutional framework: Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
and Strategic Partnership Agreement 
The EU (then the European Economic Community) concluded a frst Framework Com-
mercial and Economic Agreement with Canada in 1976, also opening its overseas dip-
lomatic mission in Ottawa. The Framework Agreement was the frst of its kind with an 
industrialised country. The EU-Canada relationship is based on shared values such as de-
mocracy, fundamental human rights, rule of law, free trade, and multilateralism. Coop-
eration between these likeminded partners has evolved into a frm, strategic partnership 
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with a balanced focus on both socio-economic and politico-security cooperation. Annual 
high-level bilateral summits bring together the Canadian Prime Minister, the European 
Council and Commission Presidents, and the High Representative for Foreign Afairs and 
Security Policy allowing a regular stocktake and reiteration of bilateral ties. Since the 
early 2000s, Canada has also been acknowledged as one of the EU’s ten strategic part-
ner countries (along with the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa, 
China, Japan, and South Korea). 
In this context, the partners in 2004 adopted an ambitious strategic partnership agenda 
and agreed on a framework for a new Canada-EU Trade and Investment Enhancement 
Agreement. The latter evolved into CETA. CETA negotiations ofcially began in 2009 
and were concluded in August 2014. CETA was signed in 2016 and provisionally ap-
plied as of September 2017. It would eliminate 98 percent of tarifs between both parties. 
Alongside CETA, the EU and Canada launched a Strategic Partnership Agreement which 
sought to deepen and broaden political cooperation on a series of issues like international 
peace and security, counterterrorism, human rights and nuclear non-proliferation, clean 
energy and climate change, migration and peaceful pluralism, sustainable development, 
and innovation. The Partnership Agreement was signed alongside CETA in 2016 and sub-
sequently provisionally applied from 1 April 2017. Both partners have been active inter-
national proponents of free trade and anti-protectionism. 
Trade and investment 
Trade relations between the EU-27 and Canada are strong. In 2019, bilateral trade in 
goods between both partners stood at €59.3 billion (excluding the United Kingdom). 
Canada was the EU’s 11th top trading partner representing about 1.5 percent of total EU 
external trade, while the EU was Canada’s third largest trading partner after the United 
States and China, accounting for more than 8 percent of its global trade. EU exports to 
Canada amounted to €38.3 billion (accounting for about 11 percent of Canadian imports 
– ranked third after the United States and China), while imports from Canada totalled 
€20 billion (accounting for more than 5 percent of Canadian exports – ranked second 
after the United States). This resulted in an EU trade surplus of about €18 billion. Trade 
in services exceeded €35 billion, also with a signifcant surplus for the EU. The stock of 
foreign direct investments between the two stood at about €640 billion, of which the 
EU accounted for nearly €400 billion. In the aftermath of CETA, trade volumes have 
grown (while Brexit reduced trade volumes by more than 20 percent). The year 2020 saw, 
however, a contraction especially of EU exports to Canada in the wake of the Covid-19 
pandemic (European Commission 2021a, 2021b; see also EPRS 2017). 
Trade in fossil fuels is relatively modest for both sides. In 2019, fuels accounted for 
about 7 percent of all EU exports to Canada, while EU fuel imports from Canada were 
about 10 percent of the total. As a result, trade in fuels between both partners is – with 
some annual variation – in balance. Over recent years, the top three categories of goods 
traded between the EU and Canada have been machinery (around 25 percent of both EU 
exports and imports), chemical and pharmaceutical products (more than 15 and close to 
10 percent, respectively), and transport equipment (more than 15 percent and about 7 
percent, respectively). Hence, fossil fuels represent a signifcant share of bilateral trade, 
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but they are not the most important commodity (European Commission 2021a, 2021b; 
see also Figure 7.1). 
Clean energy and climate change 
Beyond existing relations related to trade and investment (including oil and gas – see 
above), the potential for cooperation on (renewable and clean) energy remains to be 
exploited to a larger extent. The EU and Canada established a High-Level Dialogue on 
Energy in 2007 and further refreshed it at the bilateral summit in 2014 (European Com-
mission 2018). The dialogue covers areas of energy security, energy efciency, renewable 
energy, safe and responsible exploitation of conventional and unconventional energy re-
sources, LNG trade, and improved market transparency and stability. Specifc issues dis-
cussed are split almost equally between renewable energy, fossil fuels, and international 
cooperation (international fora, Ukraine, global energy markets). 
Both partners discuss renewable energy development domestically as well as the pub-
lic acceptance of new energy infrastructure. Decarbonisation technologies like CCS and 
smart grids are also discussed through the perspective of research and innovation. A sig-
nifcant part of bilateral discussions continues to focus on gas and oil markets in Canada 
and the EU (including infrastructure, LNG, unconventional resources) and the evolv-
ing global LNG market. Bilateral cooperation on renewable energy remains limited to 
dialogues and workshops and has potential for further substantiation. However, CETA 
can help facilitate and boost trade in clean technologies given that it eliminates all tarifs 
on clean technology products traded between the partners and extends access to public 
procurement markets that can play a signifcant role in supporting the EU’s and Canada’s 
initiatives towards decarbonisation. 
General geopolitics and broader cooperation agenda 
Overall and beyond the areas addressed above, the EU and Canada share a very broad 
agenda and related interests and values that have grown historically. At a very general 
level, developing relations with the EU is one important way for Canada to balance its 
dependence on the United States and allows its voice to resonate internationally. Con-
versely, Canada is also an important partner for the EU and its member states in forming 
international alliances on a par with the United States and China. 
The EU and Canada therefore cooperate in a variety of international institutions and on 
a number of foreign policy issues. Canada and the EU share similar positions on a number 
of critical international issues, including security (with close cooperation long established 
in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]), human rights, free trade, and oth-
ers. Both partners collaborate closely within the ambit of organisations like the UN, G7, 
G20, WTO, OECD, IAEA, and others. 
Climate diplomacy has become an increasingly important facet of EU-Canada relations, 
especially following the decision by then US President Donald Trump to withdraw from 
the Paris Agreement in 2017. In September 2017, the EU, Canada, and China established 
a Ministerial on Climate Action to fll the void left by the United States under President 
Trump abandoning its convening of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate.
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The Ministerial on Climate Action has been convened annually since. Climate change was 
also a priority in the unsuccessful Canadian campaign for a seat on the UN Security Coun-
cil in 2021–2022. Furthermore, Canada is a member of the Powering Past Coal Alliance, 
along with many EU member states. 
Science and technology cooperation between the EU and Canada is also well developed 
and institutionalised. In 1996, both partners signed the bilateral Agreement for Scientifc 
and Technological Cooperation, which is overseen by a Joint Science and Technology Co-
operation Committee that meets regularly. The Agreement covers areas such as aeronaut-
ics, the bioeconomy, marine and arctic research, research infrastructures, health, nuclear 
and other areas. In 1998, Canada and Euratom signed an agreement on cooperation in 
nuclear research. Canada has also been an active participant in various of the EU research 
and innovation funding programmes, including the EU framework programmes for re-
search and Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions. 
Conclusions 
Fossil fuels (oil and gas, and, to a lesser extent, coal) are important sectors of the Canadian 
economy and provide for a signifcant share of Canadian exports. Hence, decarbonisation 
in Europe and the rest of the world requires Canada to adapt signifcantly, depending 
especially on developments in the United States as the major export market. This consti-
tutes a major challenge for the Canadian economy and political system. Addressing this 
challenge requires consistent long-term efort to phase out fossil fuel production (and 
consumption), while also nurturing the country’s many non-fossil-fuel-dependent eco-
nomic sectors and activities. This challenge is reinforced by the fossil fuel economy being 
concentrated in just a few provinces (notably, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and British Co-
lumbia) – provinces that enjoy high levels of authority and independence from the federal 
government in Canada’s federal political system. Achieving signifcant emission cuts will 
therefore depend on astute political decision-making and management to ensure that cli-
mate policy also takes into account the just transition to a low-carbon economy in more 
fossil-fuel-dependent regions of Canada. 
Fragility risks present are relatively moderate in Canada. Canada is a highly devel-
oped country with a stable federal parliamentary democracy. Adverse impacts of climate 
change are comparatively modest, and Canada possesses sufcient resources to adapt to 
the impacts of the warming climate. However, northern parts of the country and indig-
enous peoples are most vulnerable to climate change impacts. With indigenous peoples 
enjoying particular rights in Canada, they have become increasingly prominent voices in 
favour of decisive climate action. 
EU-Canada relations are not heavily based on fossil fuels and are already broadly an-
chored and very close. Fossil fuels account for a modest share of the signifcant trade 
relationship between the two partners. The EU and Canada already cooperate closely in a 
wide range of areas, including security and defence (within NATO), science and technol-
ogy, clean and renewable energy, and climate diplomacy. As partners at a comparable level 
of development, with close historical ties, and similar political systems and values, both 
face similar challenges, also with respect to decarbonisation, and have a deeply rooted 
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to balance its dependence on the United States, and Canada is important for the EU in its 
attempts to build international alliances. Cooperating allows both partners to boost their 
international standing. As such, there is ample scope for EU-Canada relations to fourish 
as they and the rest of the world decarbonise and for these relations to actively support the 
transition to a low-carbon economy in both jurisdictions. 
Under the current circumstances, EU foreign policy towards Canada does not need 
to profoundly reorient under decarbonisation. Given the richness of contemporary EU-
Canada relations and the limited role of fossil fuels in the relationship, the global shift 
towards decarbonisation should focus the EU and Canada’s relations on developing areas 
of cooperation that will help both partners to reduce emissions in their respective juris-
dictions. Key priorities in this regard include: 
• Both the EU and Canada face the challenge of ensuring a ‘just transition’ for 
coal/fossil fuel-producing regions. In Canada, this challenge relates to par-
ticular provinces and regions, while in the EU it is particular member states and 
regions that are afected. Consequently, on both sides of the Atlantic a variety of 
approaches are currently being tried and tested to manage the transition away from 
fossil fuel production and generation. Thus, there is obvious potential for both part-
ners to enter into a dialogue to identify best practices and further develop them in a 
mutual learning process. Related eforts could for example be embedded in broader 
existing frameworks, such as the Powering Past Coal Alliance. 
• Beyond a focus on fossil-fuel-producing regions, Canada and the EU also face com-
mon challenges with regard to other sectors and aspects of the climate and 
energy transition. These include decarbonising the building and transport sec-
tors, as well as energy-intensive industries, and expanding the use of renewable 
energy sources (including the related challenges of grid management and develop-
ment). These common challenges provide fertile ground for targeted dialogues and 
for identifying specifc opportunities and projects for cooperation, including joint 
research and development. 
• In addition, Canada and the EU have considerable scope to further coordinate their 
international policies to support and raise ambition for decarbonisation. Both 
partners share important international objectives, including supporting the imple-
mentation and development of the Paris Agreement and a related international trade 
agenda. They can build on and further expand existing cooperation in this feld (for 
example, in convening the Ministerial on Climate Action) to jointly build broader 
international alliances. In the context of Covid-19 pandemic, this includes eforts to 
coordinate towards a green recovery. 
Overall, there is already ample scope for EU-Canada relations to develop fruitfully under 
decarbonisation. A joint climate agenda has the potential to advance the relationship in a 
targeted way, helping both partners to more efectively address the common challenges 
they face in the climate and energy transition, both domestically and at the international 
level. Decarbonisation therefore does not call for the EU and Canada to drastically re-
calibrate their relations; rather, it provides a strong rationale for focusing their attention 
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deepening cooperation accordingly. Given the partisan nature of climate policy in Can-
ada, developments in domestic Canadian politics will be a major factor infuencing the 
prospects for deepening this cooperation in future. The outcome of the federal elections 
in October 2019 have therefore reinforced the basis for further advancing EU-Canada 
cooperation in this area in the early 2020s. 
Note 
1 Production, consumption, and export data vary between diferent sources (including IEA, 
CIA, BP Statistical Review) but all give roughly the same overall picture. 
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 8 Conclusions 
Challenges and opportunities for EU 
foreign policy and its analysis in an era 
of decarbonisation 
This study investigated the implications that the phase-out of fossil fuel use and broader 
decarbonisation processes may have for European Union (EU) external relations with 
fossil fuel exporters. As trade in oil, gas, and coal – and other high-carbon products such 
as palm oil – accounts for a sizeable proportion of EU trade with many of these countries, 
the decarbonisation of the European and global economy is set to have important reper-
cussions for bilateral relations. Our study has examined these repercussions in more detail 
with respect to a cross-section of six fossil fuel exporting countries from diferent world 
regions covering diferent resource endowments and stages of development, beyond the 
‘usual suspects’ like Russia, Norway, and Algeria. Beyond assessing the importance of 
fossil fuels and their export for Azerbaijan, Canada, Colombia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and 
Qatar, the study paid particular attention to the potential of these countries and their 
bilateral relations with the EU to productively move beyond fossil fuels and enter a new 
level of cooperation. In this respect, it in particular also tried to identify how EU foreign 
policy could help develop the relations with these countries beyond fossil fuels. 
This concluding chapter synthesises the main fndings of the country studies, discusses 
the study’s overall contribution to advancing the state of the art and identifes next steps 
in addressing the unfolding research agenda on (EU) external relations under decarbon-
isation. While our country selection does not necessarily ensure full representativeness, 
the case studies ofer insights into a considerable range of diferent conditions. In the 
following, we highlight common features across the countries as well as the range that 
exists within our sample. We identify fve key fndings that relate to (1) the political and 
economic challenge of decarbonisation for the studied fossil fuel exporters, (2) the fra-
gility and security context of these countries, (3) their climate policies and politics, (4) 
existing cooperative arrangements with the EU, and, last but not least, (5) the scope and 
starting points for the EU to fruitfully develop relations with these six countries under 
decarbonisation. Subsequently, we discuss the contribution of the study and its fndings to 
key literatures (as identifed in Chapter 1). The chapter concludes with a brief discussion 
of avenues for future research. 
Key fnding I: decarbonisation constitutes a key political and 
economic challenge for fossil fuel exporters 
The case studies demonstrate that the decarbonisation imperative constitutes a key po-





products. The economies and government budgets of these countries are, with some var-
iations, highly dependent on the production and export of these goods. As a result, and 
again to varying degrees, they are also exposed to fuctuations in the price of fossil fuels, 
and continuing investments in related infrastructure carry a high risk of creating stranded 
assets. 
High dependence on fossil fuel production and export and exposure to 
price fuctuations 
The case studies illustrate that the economies and government budgets of a number of 
fossil fuel exporting countries are highly or signifcantly dependent on the production and 
export of oil, gas, coal, and/or other carbon-intensive goods. While for all of them these 
goods are a very signifcant part of their economy and related revenues are a signifcant 
contributor to public budgets, for some of them they are the main and even all-dominant 
sector, and/or their public budgets are overwhelmingly dependent on income from these 
dominant sectors. 
Fossil fuel production and export account for signifcant shares of these countries’ 
economies, ranging from less than 2 percent to about 25 percent of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP). In Azerbaijan, the oil and gas sector accounted for about 25 percent of GDP in 
2019, while in Qatar it contributed one-ffth of GDP. While the share tends to be smaller 
in bigger countries and economies, it is still signifcant with almost 10 percent in Nigeria 
and close to 2 percent in Canada. Colombia’s fossil fuel sector is relatively limited but 
sizeable at about 4.3 percent of GDP in 2019. In the case of Indonesia, fossil fuels and palm 
oil contribute an estimated total of around 7 percent of GDP. 
Fossil fuels account for even bigger shares of these countries’ merchandise exports (see 
Figure 8.1 below). In 2019, fuel exports accounted for over or close to 90 percent of mer-
chandise exports from Azerbaijan, Nigeria, and Qatar, illustrating extremely high levels 
of export earnings from fossil fuels and the signifcance of these goods for trade relations 
in general. Nearly half of Colombian export earnings in 2019 can be attributed to fossil 
fuels (45 percent). In Indonesia, fuels provided for about 20 percent of Indonesia ś foreign 
exchange earnings in 2017, whereas agricultural products (including palm oil) made up 
nearly 30 percent of exports. In 2019, palm oil accounted for more than 16 percent of 
Indonesia’s foreign exchange earnings from merchandise trade. In 2019, fuels accounted 
for about 24 percent of Canadian goods exports. 
Fossil fuels and fossil fuel exports, accordingly, also make major contributions to gov-
ernment budgets. These contributions may come from direct foreign exchange earnings, 
royalties, and taxes. The oil and gas industries have consistently accounted for more than 
50 percent of Qatar’s state budget and provided the largest share of income for the state 
budgets of Azerbaijan and Nigeria (fuctuating somewhat with the oil price). Fossil fuels 
have contributed less than 10 percent to government budgets in Canada and Indonesia. 
Fluctuations in the price of fossil fuels in international markets illustrate the high de-
pendence on fossil fuel production and export, as could be seen in the fall of the interna-
tional oil price between 2014 and 2016 and is confrmed by the dramatic falls resulting 
from the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. These falls have had a major impact on the eco-
nomic development and public budgets of the six countries studied, in some cases causing 
recessions (with the Covid-19 impacts still unfolding). Although decarbonisation has not 
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been a major driver of international fossil fuel markets to date, it could reinforce down-
ward pressure on fossil fuel prices in future.
The drop in international oil and coal prices from 2014 to 2016 left a clear mark on 
the economies of the fossil fuel exporters investigated, in some cases leading to economic 
crises. For example, Nigeria experienced its first full year of recession in 25 years in 
2015, with real GDP contracting by 1.6 percent. In Azerbaijan, GDP nearly halved from 
Nigeria  Indonesia Azerbaijan Colombia Qatar Canada
Fragility 
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Fossil fuel trade with the EU and in general
Fossil fuel as 




exports to EU 
as % of total 
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Figure 8.1  Governance indicators and fossil fuel exports for Nigeria, Indonesia, Azerbaijan, Colom-
bia, Qatar, and Canada.
Sources: Governance indicators based on: Fund for Peace (2021), ND-GAIN (2020), UNDP (2020), World 
Bank (2021a, 2021b); trade data based on: European Commission (2021a, 2021b, 2021c, 2021d, 2021e, 
2021f); https://data.worldbank.org (fossil fuel as a percentage of merchandise export; oil, gas, and coal as a 
percentage of GDP).
* In the case of Indonesia, palm oil export to the EU.
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2014 to 2016, and in Qatar it contracted by more than one-fourth (all in current US$). 
In Colombia, GDP growth fell from 4.9 percent in 2013 to 2 percent in 2016, and the 
contribution of fuel exports to GDP decreased from 11 percent in 2013 to 6 percent in 
2016. Canada also experienced a decline of the growth rate from 2.9 percent in 2014 to 1 
percent in 2015. In Indonesia, the economic impact was somewhat balanced by a decrease 
of fossil fuel subsidies that was facilitated by the price drop. In most cases, the economic 
repercussions of the Covid-19 pandemic, which led to a sharp decline in fossil fuel prices 
and further-reaching economic crisis, even exceeded those of the fossil fuel price crisis 
of 2014/2015. 
The price drop also had major knock-on efects for public budgets. In Nigeria, public 
debt rose from 17.6 percent of GDP in 2012 to 29.1 percent in 2019. Azerbaijan and Qa-
tar experienced even greater increases in public debt between 2014 and 2016, from 7.3 
percent in 2008 to more than 22 percent in 2016 and from 32.3 percent in 2014 to 71.8 
percent in 2020, respectively. Colombia experienced a decrease of the extractives sec-
tor’s contribution to national fscal income from 19 percent in 2013 to 5 percent in 2016. 
Canada saw its public debt ratio increase from 85.7 percent of GDP in 2014 to nearly 92 
percent of GDP in 2016. 
Although the economies and public budgets of fossil fuel exporters were all hit by the 
fall of fossil fuel prices (depending on the overall dependence on fossil fuel exports), the 
efects also depended on the instruments available to cushion the impacts. For example, 
the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan was created to support the development of the country’s 
non-oil sectors, but it has in reality served to balance price and resulting revenue fuctu-
ations. In a more ad hoc fashion, the Indonesian government has managed the efects of 
price decreases to some extent by reducing fossil fuel subsidies. Canada has generally been 
less vulnerable to price fuctuations due to the advanced diversifcation and development 
of its overall economy, including non-oil sectors. 
In general, the still-evolving Covid-19 crisis has largely confrmed and reinforced these 
fndings. As a result of the steep fall in demand, prices of oil and gas also decreased, and 
fossil fuel exporters saw their exports and export earnings decline. This in turn put pres-
sure on public fnances and led to an increase of public debt. It also led to a broader reduc-
tion of GDP. Overall, the Covid-19 crisis therefore once more illustrated the dependence 
of the selected countries on fossil fuel production and exports and their vulnerability to 
price and demand fuctuations (even though the Covid-19 crisis admittedly also afected 
various other commodity markets). 
High risk of stranded assets and insufcient diversifcation 
The countries investigated have continued to invest heavily in fossil fuels and related 
high-carbon infrastructure, entailing a high risk of stranded assets under decarbonisation. 
This has contrasted with lower investment in non-fossil fuel sectors and at times even 
undermined progress towards economic diversifcation. 
Fossil fuel assets at risk from stranding range from as yet untapped hydrocarbon re-
serves to fossil fuel sector infrastructure. In all the countries studied, proven reserves 
could support fossil fuel production well beyond 2050. For example, proven reserves 
could support current Nigerian oil production for almost another 50 years and current 
 168 Conclusions 
Indonesian gas and coal production for more than 20 and 60 years, respectively. Azer-
baijan’s oil reserves are forecast to last for another 20 to 30 years, and the country could 
maintain current levels of gas production until 2090. Colombia could maintain current 
levels of coal production until the 2070s, and Canadian oil and coal reserves and Qatari 
gas reserves would support current production levels for more than 100 years. Impor-
tant carbon-intensive infrastructure highlighted in the case studies includes oil and gas 
extraction facilities, networks of pipelines and other fossil fuel transport infrastructure 
(especially in Qatar, Azerbaijan, Canada), and fossil fuel-based power stations (especially 
coal, Indonesia). In Qatar, US$12 billion in investments in the oil and gas sector were 
announced in 2018, out of a total of new investments of US$85 billion in diferent sectors. 
Canada has also continued to make considerable investments into fossil fuels (especially oil 
sands). In 2018, total Canadian energy assets amounted to CAN$685 billion. The major 
share of foreign direct investment totalling nearly US$15 billion in Azerbaijan in 2017 
went to oil and gas. 
Progress towards economic diversifcation has been varied but has generally remained 
insufcient/slow, also as a result of a continuing focus on fossil fuels. The aforementioned 
State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan has aimed to support economic diversifcation – with very 
limited results. The Qatar Investment Authority set up in 2005 has a similar purpose but 
has in fact diversifed to some extent the fossil fuel sector itself (from oil to gas) and has 
still left the overall economy hugely dependent on oil and gas. Eforts at economic diversi-
fcation in Nigeria have also faced major obstacles, including an appreciating exchange rate 
due to the oil-based foreign currency earnings (the so-called Dutch disease), a neglect of 
other key economic sectors (such as agriculture), and a high dependence of industry and 
services on imports of inputs and raw materials. 
The Canadian and Colombian economies are more diversifed, but particular regions 
within these countries are heavily dependent on fossil fuel production and face particu-
lar challenges in transitioning towards decarbonisation. In Colombia, coal production is 
concentrated in the Departments of Cesar and La Guajira where it accounted for around 
40 percent of GDP and 30,000 direct jobs (2015). In Canada, while overall the fossil fuel 
industry only accounts for a smaller part of the economy, it is of greater importance for 
the provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and, partially, British Columbia. 
Key fnding II: the decarbonisation challenge frequently 
intersects with various other fragility and security risks 
The decarbonisation challenge in fossil fuel exporting countries frequently intersects with 
other fragility and security risks, including conficts at national and regional levels; weak 
and fragile governance arrangements; and impacts of climate change. Such risks and their 
severity vary across countries. These risks can exacerbate the difculty of moving away 
from fossil fuels, and decarbonisation could in turn enhance these risks if not addressed 
adequately. 
National and regional security risks 
Our case studies illustrate that fossil fuel exporting countries frequently face signifcant 











have encountered substantial security challenges; these take diferent forms and are highly 
specifc to the respective contexts. 
For Colombia and Indonesia, the main security challenges are domestic. Indonesia
has a long history of separatist movements and clashes between divergent ethnic and
religious groups (as well as discontent over unequal treatment of indigenous groups).
In addition, terrorism remains a palpable threat to security. Colombia has faced long-
standing internal conficts with insurgent groups, in particular the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC). After the 2016 peace agreement, the situation has remained
fragile, and the country is in the midst of complex and nonlinear peacebuilding and
post-confict development processes. In addition, the Venezuelan political crisis that es-
calated in 2018–2019 has afected Colombia, which accommodated more than 1 million
Venezuelan refugees. 
In the cases of Qatar and Azerbaijan, security risks relate in particular to the regional 
context. Being located in the Middle East and the Gulf region, Qatar is part of a sensi-
tive and challenging security environment, including the rivalry between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia for regional dominance and the involvement of various external actors (the United 
States, Russia, and Turkey in particular). In this context, deteriorating relations with 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries in the 2010s culminated in them launching an 
embargo against Qatar from 2017 to early 2021 – which also left the Gulf Cooperation 
Council in paralysis for several years. With regard to Azerbaijan, the country is in a con-
fict with Armenia over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is entirely situated in 
Azerbaijan but has an Armenian ethnic majority. After the confict had been ‘frozen’ for 
many years, it escalated into a full-fedged war in the second half of 2020, and tensions 
remain high even after a Russian-mediated ceasefre was reached in November 2020. 
Nigeria faces both serious internal and regional security threats, which pose a risk to 
political and economic stability. The security challenges include longstanding secessionist 
sentiments and movements in the southeast (in the wake of the secessionist Biafran War 
from 1967 to 1970) and militant groups in the Niger Delta seeking control and revenues 
from the oil industry. Further to the north, the insurgency of the Islamist sect Boko 
Haram has constituted a serious security risk since 2012. It also connects to the broader 
and growing security threat posed by Islamist extremists across several countries in the 
Sahel region (including Mali, Niger, and others). Many of the security challenges have 
their roots in acute socioeconomic inequality and conficts, for example intensifying com-
petition for fertile land and control over oil resources. 
Under these circumstances, decarbonisation can hamper eforts to alleviate domes-
tic confict, while also creating opportunities. In particular, declining fossil fuel exports 
could threaten economic stability and government spending commitments essential for 
confict management and post-confict development. In Colombia, for example, the long-
term success of the peace agreement with the FARC requires the government to honour 
its commitments to major investments and reform in rural areas. The resulting signifcant 
budgetary pressures Colombia has faced in recent years have already been aggravated by 
fuctuations in its key commodity markets and demonstrate the challenge arising from 
decarbonisation. As another example, volatility in oil markets may place further strain 
on Nigeria’s economy and exacerbate other interrelated fragility risks, such as major gaps 
in public infrastructure, high inequality, rapid population growth and urbanisation, and 












that, advancing decarbonisation policies can also create opportunities that provide leeway 
to counter negative efects (e.g., through the expansion of renewable energies). 
Fragile governance contexts 
Most of the fossil fuel exporting countries also face governance challenges at the national 
level, although their signifcance varies (see also Figure 8.1). These seriously curtail the re-
spective government’s capacities to efectively address dependence on fossil fuel exports,
and, more generally, to implement targeted policies to foster low-carbon development. 
The main exception is Canada, which is a developed and mature parliamentary democracy 
(with longstanding tensions between its French-speaking and English-speaking regions 
having been successfully managed in the twenty-frst century). 
Nigeria stands out as being particularly debilitated in this respect. While characterised 
by increasing inequality and signifcant demographic pressures, Nigeria also sufers from 
high levels of corruption and weak governance. The ability of the state to collect taxes and 
control its external borders (and internal territory) is therefore seriously curtailed. Key 
indexes point to low levels of human development and poor governance, while the Fragile 
States Index places Nigeria in the ‘alert’ category (see Figure 8.1). 
Indonesia and Azerbaijan also face signifcant challenges. In addition to grappling with 
high levels of inequality, Indonesia faces issues regarding discrimination and state capac-
ity. While strength of governance is rated as medium, the Fragile States Index remains at 
‘warning’ level. Azerbaijan is characterised by serious issues of corruption and political 
freedom. The 2021 Freedom House Index categorises Azerbaijan as ‘not free’ and cur-
tailment of political rights, repression of civil liberties, and stifing of press freedom are 
identifed as shortcomings. 
Qatar and Colombia face fewer governance challenges. Qatar has low levels of cor-
ruption or repression but faces challenges with respect to democracy and political rights
(low-level general freedom, civil liberties, political participation). A particular issue is
the problematic situation concerning around 2 million expatriate workers, mainly low-
skilled Asian construction workers. Qatar has been criticised for their exploitation and
for the lack of integration of these Asian workers into the society. In reverse, Colombia
has developed relatively strong democratic institutions and has improved on the rule
of law, although its recent rating in the Fragile States Index has worsened and corrup-
tion continues to constitute a central challenge (along with high levels of inequality).
Overall, governance challenges present less of an impediment to addressing fossil fuel
dependency. 
Climate change impacts 
Climate change is predicted to have a medium to high impact on the countries studied. 
These impacts could strengthen support for engaging in climate policy and related coop-
eration. However, the concrete impacts might also restrict the capacity to act on fossil fuel 
dependency, as priority might be given to urgent adaptation measures. 
Climate change vulnerability is assessed as medium in Canada, Azerbaijan, and Qa-
tar (Figure 8.1). Temperatures in Canada have already increased more than 1.5°C, 
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approximately double the global average and signifcant impacts are particularly being 
felt in coastal and northern parts of the country. At the same time, Canada may also 
see some positive impacts, such as growth in agricultural food production in northern 
regions. The country also scores relatively favourably on indexes measuring vulnerability 
and readiness. Qatar is afected by sea-level rise (with 96 percent of its population living in 
coastal towns and cities and much of its infrastructure in peril) and the associated risk of 
groundwater salinisation. Further increases to already high temperatures and aggravated 
water scarcity also constitute signifcant challenges, while the country scores slightly 
above average on readiness. In Azerbaijan, rising temperatures constitute a threat for the 
agricultural sector due to resulting increased evaporation, droughts, and water shortages 
– while the sea level of the Caspian Sea may in fact fall as a result of increased evaporation. 
The country scores medium on vulnerability and readiness. 
Climate change vulnerability is considered high in Colombia, Indonesia, and Nige-
ria. Colombia is subject to a variety of climate change impacts, including sea-level rise, 
more frequent and more intense La Niña and El Niño phenomena, and decreased rain-
fall. Higher temperatures and increased water scarcity (due to decreasing run-of from 
the mountains) are of particular concern in the Andean region, home to 75 percent of 
the Colombian population. With the second longest coastline in the world, Indonesia is 
particularly impacted by changing rainfall patterns, temperature and sea-level rise, and 
extreme weather events and natural disasters. Jakarta is the world’s fastest-sinking city, 
with around 40 percent of the city below the sea level. Nigeria is already sufering from 
increasing temperatures, erratic rainfall, desertifcation, rising sea levels, and drought. 
This puts further pressure on an agricultural sector that is already struggling to maintain 
or enhance productivity, as well as urban centres, not least Lagos. 
Key fnding III: climate policy frameworks are in urgent need 
of further development, but ambitious climate policies face 
signifcant resistance 
While climate policy frameworks are at various stages of underdevelopment, progress 
in the development of adequate targets and policies of the studied countries is hampered 
by signifcant socioeconomic barriers, in particular strong opposition from the fossil fuel 
industry that is frequently closely related to governments. 
Climate policy frameworks at various stages of underdevelopment 
The development of climate policy frameworks in the studied fossil fuel exporting coun-
tries has remained inadequate. All six countries are parties to the Paris Agreement and 
consequently have ‘Nationally Determined Contributions’ (NDCs). All except Qatar have 
included economy-wide greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets for 2030 in 
their NDCs. As an industrialised country, Canada aims to reduce its emissions by 40–45 
percent below 2005 levels, while Azerbaijan’s target of keeping emissions 35 percent be-
low 1990 levels can be considered relatively ambitious (but lacks implementing policies). 
Nigeria, Indonesia, and Colombia aim to reduce emissions by 20 percent (Nigeria), 29 




scenarios and establish higher targets on the condition that sufcient international assis-
tance is made available. Qatar’s NDC does not establish any emission target. 
While these targets are generally insufcient for achieving the objectives of the Paris 
Agreement, the (under)development of domestic policy frameworks also raises concerns 
about the capacity to efectively implement them (and any upgraded targets in the future). 
Within the sample, Canada and Colombia are the most advanced in developing their do-
mestic climate policies. Canada has advanced its domestic policy frameworks, especially 
since the Paris Agreement, with a national carbon pricing mechanism at its core and a 
number of other measures addressing various sectors. While this framework still needs 
to be further strengthened to meet Canada’s enhanced emission reduction target and to 
advance towards climate neutrality, its long-term stability is in question given that climate 
policy has been a highly partisan issue. Changes of government at both federal and provin-
cial levels have therefore hindered the development of a consistent trajectory. Colombia 
has also developed a relatively robust institutional, legal, and policy framework for im-
plementing its NDC (that will, however, require further elaboration and strengthening) 
and advancing both climate mitigation and adaptation. It has actively promoted market 
mechanisms and introduced a carbon tax in 2017. The country’s frst climate change law 
was passed in 2018. 
In contrast, efective climate policy frameworks in Indonesia, Nigeria, Azerbaijan, and 
Qatar are at best at an early development stage. Indonesia has elaborated general action 
plans on climate change mitigation and adaptation, including a moratorium related to 
deforestation, its main source of GHG emissions. However, progress on policy measures 
for addressing GHG emissions in other growing sectors has lagged. Similarly, Nigeria has 
established general frameworks for addressing mitigation and adaptation, but concrete 
measures need further elaboration and implementation. While Azerbaijan has reported 
the adoption of a number of relevant legislative acts and established supporting institu-
tional structures, climate change policy, incentives, or regulations have nevertheless been 
found to be absent. Finally, Qatar does not have a frm framework for its domestic climate 
policy but appears to focus on developing its economy, reaping co-benefts for GHG miti-
gation where opportune (e.g., some investments in renewable energy). 
Signifcant opposition to transformational climate action 
The underdevelopment of domestic climate policy frameworks in the studied countries 
correlates with signifcant politico-economic opposition to transformational climate ac-
tion. Even in Canada and Colombia where fossil fuels have a comparatively modest im-
portance for the national economy, this opposition has been signifcant and strong. In 
Canada, climate policy has remained a very partisan issue, with conservatives opposing 
and undermining climate action. Opposition is particularly strong in the fossil fuel-rich 
provinces (Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia), which hold signifcant political 
power in the Canadian federal system. As a result, oil and gas pipelines and exploitation 
of oil sands have also received support from liberal governments. While climate change 
has been less contested as a political issue in Colombia, support for fossil fuel extraction 
and mining activities, while slowly receding, has remained strongly embedded in the 




been complicated by strong dependence of particular regions on fossil fuel exploitation. 
At the same time, support for addressing climate change has also been growing in both 
Colombia and Canada. 
Fossil fuel interests have been even more strongly entrenched in the other four coun-
tries studied. Most importantly, fossil fuel extraction has been either dominated by 
state-owned companies (Qatar, Azerbaijan) or such enterprises have at least played an 
important role in the sector (Nigeria, Indonesia). As a result, the formal and/or informal 
links between fossil fuel industries and the government have generally been very close, 
at times also in the context of corruption. At the same time, societal and political sup-
port for decisive climate action has remained too weak to balance strong fossil fuel/high-
carbon interests across these countries. 
Key fnding IV: EU external relations can build on various 
pre-existing cooperative arrangements 
Existing cooperative arrangements between the studied fossil fuel exporters and the EU 
provide a sound basis for developing the bilateral relations fruitfully beyond high-carbon 
products. The most important institutional arrangements in this respect include Partner-
ship and Cooperation Agreements and Free Trade Agreements, but existing cooperation 
is also based on various regional and multilateral forums. 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, high-level political dialogues, 
and Free Trade Agreements 
EU relations with the studied countries can build on existing Partnership and Cooper-
ation Agreements or other forms of high-level dialogues. Building on decades of close 
political cooperation and consultation, the EU and Canada launched a Strategic Partner-
ship Agreement, alongside the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 
in 2016, and they hold annual high-level bilateral summits. The EU and Azerbaijan have 
cooperated under the umbrella of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement since 1999 
(with an update under negotiation since 2017). EU-Indonesia dialogue has a frm basis 
in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 2014, and the EU and Qatar have 
strengthened cooperation under a Cooperation Agreement concluded in 2018. Without a 
formal overarching agreement, the EU and Colombia have engaged in bilateral and high-
level political dialogues and have explored new mechanisms for ‘lifting bilateral relations 
to a new level’ (EEAS 2019). While primarily rooted in the Cotonou Agreement with Af-
rican, Caribbean, and Pacifc developing countries (and its successor agreed in late 2020), 
EU-Nigeria relations have also been developed under a political framework for dialogue, 
the ‘Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward’. 
In several cases, bilateral trade relations fnd a further frm basis in relevant free trade 
agreements. Perhaps the best-known among them is the aforementioned CETA between 
Canada and the EU. Trade between Colombia and the EU is governed by a multiparty 
free trade agreement formalised in 2013. Negotiations on a Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement between the EU and Indonesia have been ongoing since 2016. 






the Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and the Economic Community of 
West African States), Qatar (with negotiations between the EU and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council countries suspended in 2008), and Azerbaijan (with trade to be covered in the 
broader Cooperation Agreement under negotiation – see above). 
Nevertheless, the trade and investment relationship of all studied countries with the 
EU is very substantial. In 2019, EU exports accounted for more than 35 percent of Qatari 
and more than 20 percent of Azeri imports, whereas EU imports made up more than 10 
percent of Qatar’s overall exports and about half for Azerbaijan. Canada is the EU’s 11th
top trading partner, representing about 1.5 percent of total EU external trade, while the 
EU is Canada’s and also Colombia’s third largest trading partner after the United States 
and China. Nigeria is the destination for around half of EU export to the West African 
region and the origin of close to 70 percent of the imports. Also, the EU accounted for 
5.5 percent of Indonesian commodities exports. The EU is also a signifcant investor in 
Colombia. The stock of EU-Canada direct investments amounted to some €640 billion 
in 2019. Qatar has also become a signifcant investor in the EU after the fnancial crisis, 
with Qatari investments in the EU surpassing EU investments in Qatar by a factor of three 
(2016). The importance of fossil fuel trade between the studied countries and the EU is 
clear from Figure 8.1. 
Other felds and institutions of cooperation 
Beyond these formal agreements, the studied fossil fuel exporters and the EU also coop-
erate within a web of other bilateral, regional, and multilateral fora. How tight this web 
is, and where its focal points lie, varies between the countries, but it generally provides 
a solid basis for developing cooperation. This web of cooperation is perhaps closest with 
Canada, as the EU (and its member states) and Canada actively collaborate in many fo-
rums, including NATO, the UN, the G7, the G20, the WTO, the OECD, the IAEA, and 
others. Since 2017, Canada, the EU, and China have convened a Ministerial on Climate 
Action, and Canada and several EU member states are members of the Powering Past 
Coal Alliance. Bilateral scientifc and technological cooperation has been developed under 
a targeted Agreement for Scientifc and Technological Cooperation since 1996. 
However, cooperation with the other studied countries also has a much broader ba-
sis than fossil fuels, shaped by the particular conditions in each country. The EU and 
Colombia have cooperated closely to set Colombia on the road to peace and have also 
sought to collaborate in a number of political and policy consultations. This includes the 
area of security and defence under a Framework Participation Agreement on the partic-
ipation of Colombia in EU crisis management operations. Relevant regional fora include 
the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (covering various issues, includ-
ing research and innovation, education, migration, etc.) and regional policy dialogues on 
economic, social, and territorial cohesion. The EU and Colombia have also been close 
partners in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
and international climate policy more generally. 
EU-Azerbaijan cooperation fnds another frm basis in the European Neighbour-





programme, and there is a bilateral Mobility Partnership (signed in 2013). The EU has 
also taken a role in managing the confict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh (al-
though not most prominent). With Nigeria, there is established cooperation on security 
and counterterrorism, humanitarian aid, and rural and economic development (including 
investment). The aforementioned Cotonou Agreement (to be succeeded by a new Post-
Cotonou Agreement) has provided a strong multilateral basis. EU-Qatar cooperation has 
been strongly embedded in EU cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council and thus 
sufered due to increased tensions between Council’s member states in the 2010s. The EU 
ofered to mediate in this confict and has otherwise focused on developing socioeconomic 
aspects of the relationship. EU-Indonesia relations are embedded in the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Both sides concluded a Voluntary Partnership Agree-
ment on legal timber exports to the EU in 2013, and the EU and its member states are 
proactive in a number of cooperation projects, including some to tackle climate change 
and deforestation. Since the late 2010s, cooperation has been under strain in the wake of 
the EU’s decision to phase out the recognition of palm oil-based biofuels under its Renew-
able Energy Directive. 
Key fnding V: there is ample potential for developing EU 
external relations with fossil fuel exporters beyond fossil fuels 
Furthermore, our case studies indicate that there is a strong and varied basis for fruitfully 
developing EU external relations beyond fossil fuels even with those countries that may be 
considered particularly hard cases, namely fossil fuel exporters. Partners highly depend-
ent on the production and export of coal, oil, gas, and other high-carbon products also 
have other signifcant interests that provide entry points for developing climate-neutral 
EU foreign relations. As mentioned in Chapter 1 and illustrated in Figure 8.2, we focus on 
fve prime areas to describe and assess the room for advancing decarbonised EU external 
relations: (1) climate and energy, (2) trade and investment, (3) science and education, (4) 
fnance and development, and (5) security and peace. 






Climate and energy 
Low-carbon development, including renewable and clean energy technologies, is a par-
ticularly promising feld for developing future cooperation because there is considerable 
scope for stepping up action worldwide and the EU is relatively advanced in its climate and 
energy transition by international comparison. With countries such as Canada, Colombia, 
and Indonesia, the EU shares challenges related to a ‘just transition’ for regions particu-
larly dependent on high-carbon assets, including fossil fuel production, and this can pro-
vide suitable levers for closer cooperation. Furthermore, enormous potential to further 
intensify cooperation on renewable energy exists in virtually all studied countries. Devel-
oping renewable energy can, in a frst step, enhance availability of oil and gas for export 
(especially in Azerbaijan and Qatar). Beyond that, renewable energy has increasing price 
advantages, is becoming an internationally recognised prime energy resource, and can 
be linked to established programmes and strategies for economic diversifcation. While 
taking into account country-specifc circumstances (e.g., high solar potential in Qatar and 
Azerbaijan, linkage with climate-smart agriculture and rural electrifcation in particular 
in Nigeria, general links with development fnance for both Nigeria and Indonesia), co-
operation can in several cases also put an emphasis on related (higher) education (see also 
below). 
Climate and energy policies also provide a promising feld of cooperation beyond re-
newable energy. Again, entry points vary between diferent countries in accordance with 
diverging interests and conditions. Shared interests in the development of climate policy 
with Canada could support cooperation on buildings, transport, and energy-intensive in-
dustries. Discussions on the future development of gas extraction and trade may be linked 
to the development of renewable energies and more ambitious climate policy especially 
regarding Azerbaijan and Qatar. Especially for the more vulnerable countries (Nigeria, 
Indonesia, Colombia), the exploration of the adaptation-mitigation nexus holds particular 
promise. And especially with Canada and Colombia, existing close cooperation on in-
ternational climate policy in the UNFCCC and beyond can be further developed. As the 
interest in efective climate policies and measures continues to grow, targeted dialogues 
can explore the diferent aspects of this feld. 
Trade and investment 
Trade, investment, and, more generally, economic cooperation with the studied coun-
tries have enormous further potential also beyond fossil fuels and other carbon-intensive 
products. The aforementioned partnership and cooperation agreements and free trade 
agreements provide a strong basis for such economic cooperation. Economic relations 
with Canada already go far beyond fossil fuels that only account for about 10 percent of 
Canadian exports to the EU. Similarly, EU-Colombia trade already goes much beyond 
fossil fuels, even if the latter still accounts for a signifcant share of Colombian exports to 
the EU; economic cooperation can in this case tie in with progressing Colombian plans
for economic diversifcation, including a green growth strategy and the development of 
creative industries. Since palm oil and related biofuels have accounted for a signifcant 






indirect land-use change, sustainable biofuel production deserves particular attention in 
the evolving bilateral cooperation – along with sustainable forest management and sus-
tainable urban development. In the cases of Nigeria, Azerbaijan, and Qatar, exports in 
general and to the EU have remained dominated by oil and gas. All three countries have 
longstanding strategies or plans for economic diversifcation that cooperation with the EU 
could more strongly build on and connect to (including regarding renewable energy – see 
above). This could also help enhance these countries’ economic resilience in a world that 
is beginning to move beyond fossil fuels. 
Science and education 
Poorer fossil fuel exporters in particular face signifcant challenges in developing a 
knowledge-based economy, which is itself closely linked to aspirations for economic di-
versifcation. With considerable variation, education and skills development remain a par-
ticular point of attention for most countries. While Canada has a developed educational 
system, Azerbaijan faces signifcant challenges in this respect. Despite sizeable progress 
in the 2010s (also as part of the Azeri strategy for economic diversifcation), the sup-
ply of skilled graduates does not sufce to meet the demand and Azerbaijan’s workforce 
is considered medium-qualifed. Qatar has invested signifcantly in education but still 
ranked 60th out of 77 countries in the 2018 Program for International Student Assess-
ment (PISA). Despite targeted government eforts, related challenges in Nigeria have 
remained severe, and have even deteriorated in many respects, regarding both primary 
education and university training. Aspiring to become the most educated country in Latin 
America, Colombia has made good progress, but access to education varies signifcantly 
between socioeconomic groups. Finally, Indonesia has made huge progress in education 
in the twenty-frst century, but still has some way to go to catch up with neighbouring 
countries such as Vietnam and Singapore. 
Possessing advanced knowledge economies as well as established educational and re-
search programmes, the EU and its member states have much to ofer in cooperating with 
fossil fuel exporters on education and skills development as well as research. This promi-
nently includes the EU Erasmus+ programme for educational exchanges and cooperation 
that several of the investigated countries are already tied into. Canada has also been an 
active participant in the EU framework programmes for research and Marie Sklodowska-
Curie Actions, and the EU and Canada have even developed a bilateral Agreement for 
Scientifc and Technological Cooperation. Building on such existing frameworks, coop-
eration with fossil fuel exporters on education, research, and training can be intensifed 
bilaterally and/or in interregional frameworks. Renewable energy and other aspects of a 
low-carbon economy hold a particular potential in this respect (e.g., related university 
partnerships or joint university degrees). 
Finance and development 
The EU already has strong fnance and development cooperation with many of the coun-




support from and has had access to a number of fnancial and support mechanisms, includ-
ing the European Neighbourhood Instrument. The EU and its member states have also 
worked with Indonesia on a range of relevant initiatives, including for achieving the Sus-
tainable Development Goals (SDGs) and addressing climate change (as well as in the con-
text of ASEAN). Furthermore, development assistance to Nigeria has been signifcant and 
has covered energy, low-carbon development, and climate change adaptation, in addition 
to humanitarian aid, health, governance, and other areas. The fnance and development 
relationships with Colombia and Qatar (and Canada) are based less on bilateral aid (even 
though Colombia has received both bilateral and multilateral climate fnance support) and 
rather are characterised by signifcant investment fows. For example, the EU is a sizeable 
investor in Colombia, and Qatari investments in the EU have been signifcant. 
Signifcant scope remains for realigning fnance and development cooperation to sup-
port decarbonisation. This can take inspiration from general debates on green and climate 
fnance within the EU, for example, on the EU budget, the sustainable fnance taxonomy, 
and guidelines of the European Investment Bank (e.g., Kavvadia 2021; Ohnesorge and 
Rogge 2021). Accordingly, external fnance and development cooperation could aim (1) 
to ensure a signifcant share of overall fnance (at least 30 percent) is reserved for climate 
and low-carbon development purposes and (2) to phase out or prohibit fnance that is 
not aligned with low-carbon development objectives. An important element of such a 
reformed policy on external fnance and cooperation would be resources for the support 
of a just transition that would heed the lessons from EU internal debates on the need for 
support for regions particularly dependent on high-carbon industries and activities. For 
example, the EU could provide assistance to set up just transition task forces to engage 
directly with stakeholders in afected regions and mobilise political and fnancial support 
for the development of new employment opportunities there. Such approaches have been 
tried and tested in both the EU and Canada. 
Security and peace 
Decarbonisation is also closely related to issues of peace and security. As mentioned 
above, all fossil fuel exporters studied except Canada have faced serious internal and/ 
or external security challenges (that have been reinforced, to varying extents, by weak-
nesses of governance systems and worsening climate change impacts). While the main 
security challenges are domestic for Colombia and Indonesia, Qatar and Azerbaijan are 
embedded in precarious regional security contexts. Nigeria faces both serious internal and 
regional security threats. These security challenges, while tending to exacerbate eforts at 
low-carbon development, provide an important feld of cooperation for the EU. 
To this end, the EU can build on existing cooperation with fossil fuel exporters on these 
matters. For example, the EU ofered its services to mediate in the confict between Qatar 
and partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council. It has also promoted confdence and peace-
building activities in the confict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and has supported the 
rule of law and the fght against corruption in Azerbaijan. It has also actively supported 
the peace process in Colombia and has closely cooperated with Nigeria on addressing the 
humanitarian and security crisis, as well as on strengthening good governance. 
Whereas we have discussed the above fve policy areas for developing EU external re-














to ensure coherence across these areas of cooperation. For example, cooperation on
climate and energy will not least be fed by channelling fnance and development co-
operation accordingly. Similarly, and as indicated above, cooperation on science and
education can reinforce cooperation in other areas. Cooperation in the diferent areas
may hence usefully be pursued in an integrated manner through long-term engagement
strategies that consider interactions and maximise coherence and synergy across the fve
building blocks. Successfully developing relations with partner countries in a decarbon-
ising world requires the EU to take an active and targeted approach. Fruitful external
relations are unlikely to come about by themselves but need to be shaped via an active
foreign-relations strategy. Long-term engagement strategies with individual countries
and regions could form an efective and concrete means for enhancing sustainability
across EU external relations in line with the European Green Deal (European Commis-
sion 2019). 
Beyond the state of the art 
How do the fndings of this study advance the scientifc state of the art? In the introduc-
tory chapter, we have built on four strands of literature on (1) EU climate diplomacy and 
foreign climate policy; (2) EU foreign policy and external energy relations; (3) environ-
ment/climate and security, and (4) the geopolitics of energy under decarbonisation. Here, 
we discuss the contribution of our study to advancing each of them in turn. 
EU climate diplomacy and foreign climate policy 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the longstanding literature on EU climate diplomacy and for-
eign climate policy and governance has in particular investigated the EU external en-
gagement focused on climate policy itself. It has hence largely focused on the role and 
efectiveness of the EU in afecting climate policy developments beyond its borders, be it at 
the multilateral, transnational, regional, national, or subnational levels. Much of this lit-
erature has especially explored the EU international ‘leadership’ on climate change (e.g., 
Wurzel et al. 2017; Adelle et al. 2018; Oberthür and Dupont 2021; Petri and Biedenkopf 
2021). To the extent that bilateral relations have been the subject of this research, the lit-
erature has mainly investigated the EU climate relations with key countries such as China, 
India, the United States, Brazil, and others (Torney 2015; Adelle et al. 2018; Gurol and 
Starkmann 2021). 
This study makes a twofold contribution to advancing this literature. First, it broadens 
the scope of the research interest beyond a focus on climate policy developments by also 
exploring the implications of the global and European decarbonisation process on the 
broader bilateral relations with other countries. We develop an approach for investigating 
the bilateral relations of the EU under decarbonisation more broadly – an approach that 
allows us to identify the challenges and opportunities for the EU to advance both climate 
policy in bilateral relations and the bilateral relations more generally. The investigation of 
EU climate diplomacy thereby becomes embedded in the larger context of general bilat-
eral relations, which facilitates the recognition of linkages across diferent policy felds. 
As a result, each of our case studies could identify scope for fruitfully developing EU 
bilateral relations in climate and energy as well as in other policy felds, thereby ena-












focus on climate diplomacy is redundant, the emerging more integrated approach seems 
timely given the crosscutting nature of the political challenge of climate change – whose 
geopolitical signifcance is increasingly acknowledged, including in the European Green 
Deal (European Commission 2019; see also below). 
Relatedly, the second major contribution of our study is to make a frst step towards a 
much-warranted expansion of the investigation beyond the ‘usual suspects’, that is, the 
key countries and major emitters that have been in focus so far. From a climate per-
spective, the focus on fossil fuel exporters may be warranted because of the importance 
of addressing not only the demand but also the supply of fossil fuels for advancing the 
climate transition (Piggot et al. 2020; Rayner 2021). A broadening of the perspective be-
yond major emitters and economies becomes even more inescapable if we want to address 
the broader foreign policy challenges and implications that the climate transition entails, 
for example in the context of changing regional power dynamics. These challenges and 
implications transcend the major economies and emitters and call for a broad scope and 
perspective. In this vein, our focus on a selection of fossil fuel exporting countries con-
stitutes just the beginning of a broadening research agenda that we discuss further below. 
Overall, our broadening of the view on EU external relations under decarbonisation 
would appear to be in line with the evolving EU policy agenda as refected in the Euro-
pean Green Deal (European Commission 2019). The Green Deal’s external dimension 
aims at integrating climate and the environment into all external policies and relations. 
Consequently, our study can also be read as a contribution to the further development of 
the Green Deal’s external dimension. 
EU foreign policy and external energy relations 
The literature on EU foreign policy and external energy relations has for a long time 
had a strong focus on issues of the security of energy supply and various related issues 
(relationship between the European Commission and member states, EU competence, 
EU-Russia relations, pipeline politics, type of EU action/strategy, etc.). Despite some 
relevant contributions, climate change and climate policy have overall not been at the 
centre of interest. If at all, they have mainly been taken into account as an intervening or 
contributing factor afecting to some extent the actual issue of interest (see Chapter 1). 
This study has the potential to help move the climate transition more centre stage in the
investigation of EU foreign (energy) relations in at least two ways. First of all, our fndings
substantiate the broader and more general relevance of the climate transition for EU part-
ner countries and, consequently, bilateral relations. They illustrate that the political and
economic challenges arising are momentous (Finding I) and that the climate transition
intersects with other key fragility and security risks in important ways (Finding II). They
also provide evidence for the difcult climate policy and politics context in the partner
countries investigated (Finding III) and identify, beyond the challenges, also the opportuni-
ties and potential that decarbonisation may be able to foster and build on. Importantly, our
study goes beyond advancing general propositions about these implications of the climate
transition (as prevalent in current literature) by investigating, corroborating, and nuancing





Furthermore, our analysis demonstrates how climate considerations and objectives are 
relevant and connected to, and can be integrated into, broader external relations. This 
already arises from the aforementioned focus on the exploration of links with other fra-
gility and security risks. It gets into further focus in our investigation of the broader basis 
of bilateral relations between the EU and the partner countries (as addressed in Finding 
IV on existing cooperative arrangements), as well as the analysis of the potential for de-
veloping these bilateral relations fruitfully beyond fossil fuels (as synthesised in Finding V 
above). Again, the study’s distinct contribution not least rests on its case-study approach 
that results in a wealth of concrete and nuanced substantiations of these points, which 
future studies can build on. On the whole, the overall study and its case studies provide 
a basis for advancing our understanding of the concrete implications of the European and 
global climate transition for bilateral relations and the scope and need for developing EU 
external relations. 
Environment/climate and security 
The scholarship on environment/climate and security has highlighted and investigated 
the role of environmental problems and climate change as threat multipliers. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, this literature has also more recently increasingly explored the efects of 
climate policy on the emergence (and mitigation) of confict (e.g., Gemenne et al. 2014; 
Swatuk et al. 2021). A common defning feature of this line of research has been its special 
attention to the interaction of climate/environmental impacts and climate policy with 
other factors such as regions’ fragility or other security risks. 
Our study can be seen to make a twofold contribution to this line of research as well, 
which may also provide a fruitful basis for future research. To start with, the study pur-
sues an approach that advances towards a more comprehensive appraisal of relevant factors 
and their interaction. Hence, our case studies explore climate change impacts, impacts of 
the climate transition, and other fragility and security risks at national and regional levels 
– and they pay specifc attention to how the decarbonisation process may intersect with 
these risks (see Finding II above). Although itself not focusing on security and confict, 
the study thereby nevertheless makes a contribution to framing and understanding the 
interaction of broader security and fragility risks with both climate change impacts and 
the efects of the climate transition. The latter efects may both exacerbate existing risks 
or help counter them (e.g., due to the new opportunities possibly created). Our study 
thereby also provides a valuable basis for future investigations focused on the varying se-
curity implications and their conditions (see also below on future research). 
In addition, it again deserves highlighting that our case studies add valuable concrete-
ness that illustrates and makes tangible the range of diferent factors and their constel-
lations, including security risks. They thus provide demonstration material for how 
conditions for the interaction of these factors vary in the real world and result in difering 
outcomes. In our case selection, the range extends from Canada with low fragility and 
security risks to Colombia and Indonesia with primarily domestic fragility and security 
issues to Azerbaijan and Qatar with regional security challenges to Nigeria where secu-












detailed and systematic explorations of the interaction between the climate transition and 
security (see also below). 
The geopolitics of energy under decarbonisation 
Finally, the evolving literature on the geopolitics of energy has generally begun to explore 
the efects of the global climate transition on the international distribution of power and 
interdependence against the backdrop of geographical factors and resource endowments. 
This has, among other things, included analysis of the decline of fossil fuels also central in 
this study (e.g., de Jong et al. 2017; IRENA 2019; Blondeel et al. 2021). As pointed out in 
Chapter 1, this literature has so far focused on broad and general efects across diferent 
groups and types of countries within their geographical contexts and has hence operated 
at a fairly aggregate level, taking a top-down perspective. 
Based on concrete and detailed country case studies, our analysis makes a start to-
wards matching this top-down perspective with a bottom-up approach. While the so-far-
prevalent aggregate, top-down perspective has been valuable in teasing out main overall 
efects and trends, it has hardly been able to take into account the impacts of difering 
conditions across varying countries. As our case study-based fndings illustrate, diferent 
contexts and constellations do matter and provide widely diverging conditions for the 
management and governance of the impacts of the decline of fossil fuels and the climate 
transition. They provide a good starting point to add nuance to, and complement, the 
existing aggregate perspective. At a minimum, the bottom-up case-study approach of our 
analysis can shed light on the more concrete underpinnings of the general impacts high-
lighted by the literature on the changing geopolitics of energy. In addition, this approach 
allows to trace the interaction with other factors that an aggregate perspective may not 
easily be able to capture. Upon systematic comparison and re-aggregation of the results 
of diferent case studies, this could also inform more nuanced and sophisticated insights 
at the aggregate level. Further case studies may be required for a frmer evidence-based 
foundation of such more general insights. 
Finally, the explicit integration of a policy dimension in our analytical approach deserves
highlighting. As a result of the aggregate perspective of the existing work on the changing
geopolitics of energy (frequently rooted in an overarching political-economy approach),
structural changes tend to be considered a given. By contrast, our bottom-up approach
integrates policymaking in the partner countries (e.g., climate policy and policies towards
economic diversifcation) and the EU (in particular external policies towards the partner
countries) into the analysis as co-shaping the eventual impacts of the climate transition.
While structural changes should be acknowledged and identifed, proactive policymaking
can shape (and mitigate) their impacts – rather than simply reacting to them. 
Overall, the above discussion underscores two major crosscutting and distinctive contri-
butions of our study to advancing the state of the art in the diferent literatures referred 
to. First, our case-study-based approach adds concreteness and nuance to the so far fre-
quently more general and aggregate analyses of the implications of global and European 
decarbonisation on partner countries and the EU relations with them. Also, the group of 




hardly been in the centre of research attention. Second, our approach and research distin-
guish themselves by combining diferent perspectives, factors, and strands of literature. 
We attempt to take account of structural changes afecting EU bilateral relations with 
partner countries, while delimiting the scope for foresightful policymaking to fruitfully 
reshape these relations accordingly. The study does so while taking into consideration 
a variety of factors directly and indirectly afected by the climate transition as well as 
shaping its context. Finally, we thereby keep a double focus on fostering EU external re-
lations for and under decarbonisation. The fnal section turns to possible avenues for future 
research to further advance this agenda. 
Instead of a conclusion: avenues for future research 
The study of the broader repercussions of European and global decarbonisation for foreign 
policy, external relations, and international relations in more general is still at an early 
stage. First steps have been made, including in the literatures discussed in the previous 
section, but many aspects warrant further elucidation. This study has attempted to shed 
some further light on a number of facets, in particular (1) the challenges and opportuni-
ties arising for second-tier fossil fuel exporting countries from the climate transition and 
(2) the scope for the EU to shape and reshape its relations with these countries in support 
of both the climate transition and, more generally, fruitful and productive bilateral rela-
tions. As an early contribution to a still emerging feld of inquiry, our fndings raise more 
questions for future research than they can themselves possibly answer. We here identify 
seven particular avenues for future research that arise from our study. 
First, expanding the investigation to additional countries promises signifcant added 
value. Our study remained focused on six out of several dozens of fossil fuel exporting 
countries. Although we attempted to select them from the larger group so as to ensure 
variance of conditions, the examination of further countries of this group promises to 
create additional insights. The investigation of further countries and the EU relations 
with them should allow to confrm and further nuance and systematise the fndings of 
our study. In addition, our fndings indicate that each country has specifc domestic and 
contextual conditions that need to be taken into account. Hence, defning strategies for 
developing future bilateral relations under decarbonisation will require country-specifc 
analysis. 
Second, in order to develop a more encompassing understanding of the challenges and 
opportunities of the European and global climate transition for EU external relations, the 
analysis should be expanded to other classes of countries as well as other transition chal-
lenges. Whereas our study focused on fossil fuel exporters, the climate transition will also, 
in yet specifc ways, afect countries producing and exporting other high-carbon products 
such as palm oil (partially addressed in our case study on Indonesia), other agricultural 
and forest products (including timber), and products of energy-intensive industries (steel, 
chemicals, etc.). Beyond that, there are a number of other relevant developments implied 
by the climate transition implicating countries in diferentiated ways, including the rise of 
hydrogen as an energy carrier, growing demand for certain raw materials (such as various 
rare earths), changes of international value chains as a result of more circularity, and so 
on. The exact shapes of these developments are in large part only emerging, and further 
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changes may come to the fore as the climate transition advances. Consequently, future 
research may investigate relations with the implicated groups of countries. 
Third, and following from the previous point, future research may usefully consider a 
fuller set of transition challenges in combination. While it is important to understand the 
implications of a fossil fuel phase-out for fossil fuel exporters (as in the current study) or 
the repercussions of the rise of ‘green’ hydrogen as an energy carrier for countries with 
related capacity, it is eventually the combination of these developments driven by the 
climate transition that needs to be understood and managed. For example, Australia and 
Gulf countries are implied both by the decline of fossil fuels and the rise of green hydro-
gen (and renewable energy more broadly) in varying ways, raising interesting questions 
about the management of bilateral relations. Such more integrated analysis could also 
inform a further advance of the understanding of the changing geopolitics of energy that 
could beneft from combining consideration of a range of impacts and political responses. 
What is more, such more integrated analyses are likely to require regular updates and 
revisiting because the developments implied by the climate transition are, as mentioned 
above, set to evolve over time (with some candidates being the rise of circularity and of 
negative emission technologies). 
Regular updates and reviews are also required because of unforeseen new develop-
ments, such as most recently the Covid-19 crisis. Although its wide-ranging efects are 
still further evolving, it seems clear that the pandemic has placed huge additional strains 
on national, European, and international governance structures and has generated enor-
mous economic uncertainty. Lockdowns and restrictions on international travel have 
sharply reduced demand for fossil fuels in Europe and beyond, leading to unprecedented 
price shocks in international markets for oil, gas, and other commodities. The fallout of 
the crisis has provided further evidence of the vulnerability of fossil fuel exporters and 
has reinforced the urgency of economic diversifcation. At the same time, the recovery 
packages countries have designed have created the opportunity to accelerate the climate 
transition. Analytically, however, the crisis has reinforced the need to consider the decar-
bonisation challenge in an integrated way and in its broader context. 
Fourth, there is a need and signifcant potential for an improved understanding of the 
interaction of diferent constellations of factors that shape the impacts of the climate tran-
sition on partner countries and bilateral relations. The present study has identifed and 
taken into consideration a number of relevant factors, including state fragility, security 
context, and domestic climate policy. However, given the explorative character of our 
investigation, we have admittedly not been able to systematise particular constellations, 
also due to the large number of factors and their variation. A worthwhile step may there-
fore be to more systematically compare diferent cases and countries in order to identify 
varying combinations of factors that may produce or facilitate particular outcomes. This 
may also require a more in-depth conceptualisation and investigation of factors such as the 
regional security context. We hope that the results of our explorative study may consti-
tute a sound basis for such more systematic and in-depth studies. 
Fifth, there is signifcant scope to further refne and broaden the investigation and 
understanding of EU foreign policy. As mentioned in Chapter 1, our study has put the 
emphasis on the supranational EU level. We have taken into account the EU member 




most areas of external relations feature strong member state competences and actorness. 
Consequently, future research can further advance the understanding of options and 
strategies available to the EU (as comprising both the supranational and the member-state 
levels) by more systematically and comprehensively reviewing and taking into account the 
capacities and relations of the member states, starting with those that are prominent with 
respect to specifc partner countries. In this context, Brexit may also prominently raise 
the issue of the scope and promise of coordination with non-EU member states such as 
the United Kingdom. 
Sixth, the approach that we have just begun to develop here may obviously also be 
applied more broadly to other actors than the EU. Whereas our interest has been specif-
ically in shedding light on EU external relations, there is nothing to suggest that similar 
questions could – and should – not also be asked and investigated with respect to the 
external relations of the United States, China, Japan, and others. The EU may still be at 
the forefront of the decarbonisation process by international comparison (Wurzel et al. 
2017; Oberthür and Dupont 2021). However, the climate transition is eventually a global 
challenge and increasingly acknowledged as such, so that also the recalibration of external 
relations – and eventually of international relations at large – is a global challenge facing 
all countries individually and jointly. 
Seventh, and consequently, a logical further step in the development of the research 
agenda may be the exploration of other implications beyond foreign policy and exter-
nal relations. We have approached the challenge as one for individual actors (including 
composite/collective actors such as the EU) and their bilateral relations. However, these 
bilateral relations obviously form part of and shape broader contexts. As such, research 
may also usefully focus on and investigate how such broader contexts are challenged by, 
and can be fruitfully further developed, under European and global decarbonisation. 
Hence, future research may for example explore the challenges and opportunities arising 
from the climate transition for broader issues such as regional and international security 
contexts, regional and interregional relations, and international relations and the interna-
tional order more broadly. We would hope that our investigation of (EU) external rela-
tions can form a steppingstone for such broader eforts. 
The identifed seven avenues for future research do not constitute an exclusive list, but 
they illustrate the potential and promise of research on (EU) external relations and for-
eign policy under decarbonisation. They form part of a rich research agenda that we hope 
the present study helps to move forward. While this study could naturally not answer all 
questions, we hope that the tentative answers it was able to suggest help substantiate the 
questions that need to be asked to align EU external relations with the policy imperatives 
of the global and European climate transition and to stabilise international afairs under 
these challenging and turbulent circumstances. 
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